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Thesis summary 
 
This submission is based on a critical analytical literature review of the moral paradigm 
of virtue ethics and a specific application of this to social work value discourse in search 
of lost identity.  It echoes the philosophical academy's paradigmatic wars between 'act' 
and 'agent' appraisals in moral theory.  Act appraisal theories focus on a person's act as 
the primary source of moral value whereas agent appraisal theories - whether 'agent-
prior' or stricter 'agent-based’ versions - focus on a person’s disposition to act morally.  
This generates a philosophical debate about which type of appraisal should take 
precedence in making an overall evaluation of a person's moral performance.  My 
starting point is that at core social work is an altruistic activity entailing a deep 
commitment, a 'moral impulse', towards the distressed 'other'.  This should privilege 
dispositional models of value that stress character and good motivation correctly applied 
- in effect making for an ethical career built upon the requisite moral virtues.  However, 
the neo-liberal and neo-conservative state hegemony has all but vanquished the moral 
impulse and its correct application.  In virtue ethical language, we live in 'vicious' times.  
 
I claim that social work’s adherence to act appraisal Kantian and Utilitarian models is 
implicated in this loss.  Kantian 'deontic' theory stresses inviolable moral principle to be  
obeyed irrespective of outcome: Utilitarian 'consequentualist' theory calculates the best 
moral outcome measured against principle.  The withering of social work as a morally 
active profession has culminated in the state regulator's Code of Practice.  This makes 
for a conformity of behaviour which I call 'proto-ethical' to distinguish it from 'ethics 
proper'.  The Code demands that de-moralised practitioners dutifully follow policy, 
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rules, procedures and targets - ersatz, piecemeal and simplistic forms of deontic and 
consequentualist act appraisals.  Numerous inquiries into social work failures indict 
practitioners for such behaviour. 
 
I draw upon mainstream virtue ethical theory and the emergent social work counter 
discourse to get beyond both code and the simplified under-theoretisation of social work 
value.  I defend a thesis regarding an identity-defining cluster of social work specific 
virtues.  I propose two modules: 'righteous indignation’ to capture the heartfelt moral 
impulse, and 'just generosity' to mindfully delineate the scope and legitimacy of the 
former.  Their operation generates an exchange relationship with the client whereby the 
social worker builds 'surplus value' to give back more than must be taken in the 
transaction.  I construct a social work specific minimal-maximal 'stability standard' to 
anchor the morally correct expression of these two modules and the estimation of 
surplus value.  In satisficing terms, the standard describes what is good enough but is 
also potentially expansive. 
 
A derivative social work practice of moral value is embedded in an historic 'care and 
control' dialectic. The uncomfortable landscape is one of moral ambiguity and 
paradoxicality, to be navigated well in virtue terms.  I argue that it is incongruous to 
speak of charactereological social worker virtues and vices and then not to employ the 
same paradigm to the client’s moral world.  This invites a functional analysis of virtue. 
The telos of social work - our moral impulse at work - directs us to scrutiny of the 
unsafe household.  Our mandate is the well-being of the putative client within, 
discoursed in terms of functional life-stage virtues and vicious circumstance.  
 
I employ the allegorical device of a personal ethical journey from interested lay person 
to committed social worker, tracking the character-building moral peregrinations.  I 
focus on two criticisms of virtue ethics - a philosophical fork.  It is said that virtue 
ethical theory cannot of itself generate any reliable, independently validated action 
guidance.  In so far as it does, the theory will endorse an as-given, even reactionary, 
criterion of right action, making 'virtue and vice' talk the bastion of the establishment 
power holders who control knowledge.  I seek to repudiate these claims.  Given that this 
demands a new approach to moral pedagogy, the practical implications for the 
suitability and training of social workers are discussed. 
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Introduction 
 
Overview  
 
This thesis is based on a critical analytical literature review of the moral paradigm of 
virtue ethics.  From it I construct a framework theory of value which I claim reconnects 
with lost social work identity and offers us action guidance in line with that identity.  
The precursor to this, my critical analytical study (Webster, 2006), looked at the 
emergence of virtue ethics as a counter discourse to the social work mainstream.  I 
identified some major conceptual challenges resonating from the paradigm.  A small 
number of social work commentators have begun to investigate these but such work is 
still in its infancy.  In my study I made a passing reference to the nemesis of 
codification.  I had begun to associate the establishment of a seemingly progressive set 
of rules governing social work behaviour with an existential professional crisis as to 
who and what we are meant to be and do.  My present inquiry explores more deeply 
virtue ethics’ philosophical anti-codification stance in order to bring to the identity 
debate some alternative social work value theory 'beyond code'.  I do so by extolling the 
conceptual potential of virtue ethics and by working through some of the challenges. 
 
Some basic concepts 
 
By code I mean a list of prescriptions or proscriptions determining action - basically 
'do's and don’ts'.  While there is little that is new in my underlying theoretical 
argumentation, synthesised as it is from the mainstream moral philosophic academy and 
cognate disciplines, my claim to originality lies in my particular theoretical adaptation 
of virtue ethics to social work as a unique historical narrative.  I equate social work 
identity with a value discourse.  Identity is founded in memory, so value discourse 
should retain that which needs to be remembered.  I believe that it is impossible to 
sustain in memory what we hold that is of significance without paying attention to a 
supporting language.  When we do not, we cannot but eventually cease to be who we 
would wish to be and will therefore fail in what we would wish to do.  I contend that 
much of the contemporary social work discourse derived from today's codification of 
value invites a disjunction between the two states of being and doing.  It leads us to 
	  	  
2	  
acquiesce into doing something less than social work, or at least does not stop us from 
doing what we should not.  
 
By value discourse I mean our justificatory sense-making accounts of ourselves as 
practitioners.  However, while we are forever necessarily preoccupied with our values 
and the relationship between being and doing, Banks (2008: 1244) points out that social 
work has drawn on concepts and theories from moral philosophy in ‘rather piecemeal 
and simplistic ways’.  If, as I hold, social work is nothing if not a construction of value, 
certainly now we need to be far more systematic in the way we draw on concepts and 
apply theory.  I suggest that our casualness regarding a language of value is implicated 
in the crisis of identity in social work.  Before the asymmetry of being and doing can be 
addressed, and some sort of collective response to the crisis mobilised, so must the 
under-theoretisation which plagues our lackadaisical language.  My thesis seeks to 
sharpen our concepts and apply a theory of professional identity through the lens of 
virtue ethics.  
 
I use the abbreviation 'VE' to refer to a theory of virtue in a tight technical sense rather 
than everyday virtue talk, although, importantly, they are connected.  Moral theory must 
always resonate with and speak to our day-to-day experiences, indubitably so in social 
work.  Generally speaking, I take a virtue to be a certain quality of character that is 
deemed to make a person ‘excellent’ according to the demands of the situation, 
someone who responds in an exemplary manner in the domain of activity covered by 
the virtue in question.  My focus is on the moral sense of excellence and its valued 
directional capacity, where a person endowed with moral virtues is at least more likely 
than a person who is not to act in a morally apposite manner. 
 
A compassionate person will be predisposed to interpret and act in a compassionate way 
when compassion is needed and disregard is not.  This would make the possession of 
moral virtues desirable if not essential, at least for anyone who seeks to be a morally 
excellent person.  I also take it that it is impossible to speak properly of the moral 
positives of virtue without referring to vice and vicious circumstance which would 
negate moral excellence, or at least the opportunity to express it.  My version of VE is 
as much about the overcoming of vicissitude as it is about moral performance.  The 
striving is part of the moral excellence. 
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A virtue defines and expresses value and a vice defines and expresses disvalue.  I make 
the argument for an occupationally specific exemplar of moral virtue which is not just 
desirable but essential if we are to be morally adroit social workers.  I argue that the 
exemplar, once laid out in VE terms, can provide a measure of worth which is the 
necessary condition for occupationally specific social work excellence in the face of 
much circumstantial, especially institutional, viciousness.  I say necessary but not 
sufficient because a person cannot be forced to strive to be morally excellent, which is 
difficult enough even under benign conditions.  It is just that if someone desires to be a 
social worker, she should try.  (For convenience, I will usually employ female pronouns 
to refer to a social worker, client or carer.) 
 
I claim that through an insidious process of the codification of social work value we 
have all but lost the idea of what it is to possess and exercise the relevant moral 
attributes; hence the loss of identity-defining moral acumen, although the shadow of 
these attributes continues to flicker, as it were, in our folk memory.  The arrival in 2002 
of the state's formal Code of Practice backed up by the legal force of regulation is, I 
contend, emblematic of our woes.  Beyond code, the particular VE redemptive direction 
that I choose to take is to propose a framework of value within which an identity-
defining historicised cluster of social work specific virtues can be articulated. 
 
Researcher identity and VE counter discourse 
 
At this juncture, I present a position statement regarding researcher identity, defending 
the rationale for my thesis.  My position cannot be explicated without first outlining the 
genesis of my thinking which began with my critical analytical study.  Self-identity is a 
form of knowing oneself, here first as a social worker and second as a researcher.  
Outwith any legal requirements of registration, I take it that any claim to be a social 
worker should be voiced in terms chosen to reveal the distinctive moral truth of one's 
existence.  As Bisman (2004:109) reminds us, social work has always been at core a 
moral activity.  Where the top-down holders of power and controllers of knowledge 
devalue authentic identity to the point that it is being abrogated, as I claim is the case in 
social work, a counter discourse is required to challenge the hegemony.  As an ex-
employee of the General Social Care Council, the England regulator, I claim to speak 
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with some insider knowledge.  (I may add that I have all along shared my emergent line 
of thinking with both staff and senior managers.) 
 
The professional context is the malaise which undermines those practices internal to 
social work as a special sort of moral helping tradition.  Social worker self-knowledge 
must surely centre on an understanding of the lived world of those people who become 
our clients and the reasons for intruding into it.  Today, it is as if social worker self-
knowledge and the lived world of our clients have come apart.  Complicit in this is our 
present day normative language-in-use where, I claim, performative function has failed 
to match propositional content.  
 
The more immediate motivation for my present inquiry is the all too frequent tragedies 
such as Baby Peter, the child who died of injuries inflicted over a period of time but 
who should have been saved by social workers.  Behind the headlines, social workers 
too often fail their clients nowadays and therefore they also fail their profession and 
themselves.  I identify two related explanations for this.  The first is an institutionalised 
focus on and obeisance to regulations, procedures and targets, as formal inquiries all too 
often conclude.  ‘Compliance with regulation and rules often drives professional 
practice more than sound judgment drawn from the professional relationship and 
interaction with the family' (Community Care, 2010: 1).  The second explanation is that 
with this monofocus on rules, social workers all too often fail to ‘see’ who the real 
client is, or should be.  Critical perspectives on risk and social work are belatedly 
emerging.  Munro (2010) writes about learning to reduce risk in child protection; 
Stanford (2010) writes about 'speaking back to fear' and responding to moral dilemmas 
of risk in social work. 
 
The heavily loaded idea of failure operates at different levels and according to the 
person making the analysis.  A typically overwhelmed practitioner might anguish over 
lack of direct client contact time, poor professional supervision and too much form 
filling.  I see these kinds of explanations as symptoms of the deeper malaise.  It is no 
coincidence that embattled, but as yet undefeated, social workers who live with the fear 
of failure 'spend as much time twisting, evading, bending and reinterpreting rules as 
they do being guided by or conforming to them' (Webb, 2006a: 210).  I suggest that it is 
	  	  
5	  
the 'real' social worker left in them that compels them to do so.  Authentic social work 
identity is not transfixed in a duty to merely do as we are told, as per the official text. 
 
I see a clear link between researcher and social worker identity.  Theoretically based 
research in order to generate alternative, revitalising text can form part of the strategy.  
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of VE are at odds with those that have 
come to inform social work's standardised value purview.  An application of VE 
requires its own way of inquiring, one that critically reflects back and deconstructs the 
gaze generated by today's formulaic codified orthodoxy of do's and don’ts.  I bring this 
outlook to a theoretical engagement with some redemptive VE and what Hart (2006: 23) 
calls the 'imaginary element to research'.  I propose a 'release of this imagination', as 
Hart puts it, through a conceptual journey that follows through some VE sourced ideas 
to their theoretical conclusions. 
 
Some key texts have proved to be invaluable and a constant reference point.  The 
discipline of moral philosophy has its own distinctive intertextual genres, as I have 
come to recall from my forgotten previous life as a student of moral and political 
philosophy.  As a social work researcher, the appropriately named Becoming a 
Researcher: a research companion for the social sciences by Dunne, Pryor and Yates 
(2005) has provided an invaluable travelling aid to managing the logic of my inquiry.  I 
conceive the social work value tradition to be a self-organising process in the 
management of 'moral chaos': hence a search for moral theory to explain complex ever-
changing situations.  Over the years, the nomenclature has, in a piecemeal fashion, 
covered a range of different ontological and epistemological positions in pursuit of 
social work realities, ranging from what can be designated as vernacular positivist and 
naive realist through to postmodernistic and social constructivist stances.  As Dunne et 
al. (2005: 20) suggest, with such a mix, the tensions will reverberate throughout.  My 
framework thesis revolves around recognising and managing these tensions in my 
proposed accommodation of social work moral chaos.  
 
The repertoires of language-in-use define the way social work practices are enacted and 
the subject position of those individuals engaged in them.  I claim that there is much 
about social work's present day flattened value language that is in need of refurbishment 
since the institution of social work is gradually being dismantled, aided and abetted by 
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the codification of practice.  I take it as a given that the loss matters and should be 
resisted.  Methodologically, this resistance requires that we should suspend belief in the 
innocence of our everyday words and engage with the 'locutionary force' behind them 
(Dunne et al., 2005: 105).  The description of the philosophical journey and its technical 
milestones towards a social work telos beyond code involves, loosely speaking, what 
Dunne et al. (2005: 93) call 'worrying at words' and looking at the rules of formation of 
value discourse.  This is not in the precise sense of fine grained close textual analysis 
but an engagement with some applied VE in light of social science’s postmodern 
'linguistic turn' and as a challenge to social work's reliance on increasingly discredited 
late modernistic normativity.  Each milestone invites some consideration of the 
theoretical orthodoxy as an impediment to acquisition of authentic social work identity, 
and its role in the (re)production of dominance.  VE heterodoxy offers a different 
transcript to re-engage with identity and to challenge the dominance.  
 
The philosophical research journey 
 
Webb's (2006a) publication Social Work in a Risk Society: Social and Political 
Perspectives is another of my formative texts.  I seek to re-establish a value vocabulary 
to reclaim that historic radical tendency involved in helping people through what Webb 
(2006a: 15) calls their 'fateful moments'.  I refer to those sorts of good encounters 
between social worker and client which once used to characterise a 'practice of value'.  
A practice of value 'stresses the importance of caring, virtue and recognition as an 
antidote to extreme individualism' (Webb, 2006a: 18).  Today, much of social work 
makes for what I would call a practice of disvalue, a view shared by other fellow 
travellers.  Building on the work of Webb and a few other virtue orientated social work 
commentators, but going in my particular direction, I propose and defend a VE re-
presentation of social work value. 
 
My thesis is predicated on an understanding of the current crisis of confidence that is 
sweeping the profession.  By crisis of confidence I mean the corrosive widespread loss 
of faith by practitioners in their own efficacy as a helping profession, one no longer 
marked out by its own distinctive worthiness.  The institution of social work today is 
much removed from the transgressive spirit of its 19th century philanthropists and the 
founding 'moral reformation' movement which linked personal well-being with social 
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justice.  Modern social work emerged out of a concern to work with families 
immiserised by the wretched 'de-moralising' living conditions of industrialisation under 
primitive capitalism.  The movement away from this commitment can be described as 
the difference between the narrative self in pursuance of honourable altruistic ends and 
the bureaucratic self - the latter day factotum subject worker in advanced capitalist 
society conveying the controlled production and distribution of personal welfare.  
  
In recalling this once rich story now so impoverished, I draw on themes from the history 
of social work, the current standard training of social workers, the generic social work 
value literature available to practitioners and, of course, our Code of Practice.  My 
thesis also assumes an acquaintance with some mainstream moral philosophical theory 
and concepts, including theories regarding the nature of moral ratiocination.  For 
reasons of space more often than not, when alluded to, these themes are stated briefly.  I 
outline the latest social work virtue specific literature, updating my previous review 
(Webster, 2006) not only to indicate what I have carried forward but also to illustrate 
the point of my departure.  I have felt the need to go back to the historical sources of 
original virtue ethical theory and examine the historiography of its evolution. 
 
While the idea of virtue discourse is gaining some belated popularity, with a few 
exceptions much of the current social work literature is, in my sense, VE technically 
undeveloped.  I believe this hampers further application and we need to catch up with 
what the moral philosophers have been arguing about.  Relying at the time mainly on 
the extant social work literature, in hindsight my critical analytical study was superficial 
in its purview and this submission builds on that acknowledgment.  One of the 
exceptions alluded to above is Banks and Gallagher 's (2009) Ethics in Professional 
Life: Virtues for Health and Social Care, which has proved to be another companion.  
In describing a modular set of virtues for social workers, I have ended up taking an 
alternative approach, drawing on my pre-social work career as a qualified nurse to do 
so.  
 
The main research task has involved dealing with the much broader and in-depth 
philosophical corpus of virtue ethical theory, selecting a range of differing positions 
within the paradigm itself and then interpreting and testing out particular slants for my 
express purposes.  I adapt Hart's (2006: 13) definition of a literature review to mean a 
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study of key texts on the topic that contain information, ideas, perspectives, arguments 
and evidence where the purpose of the study is to be used for a particular standpoint for 
a particular purpose in a particular way.  At one level this echoes Fink's (2005: 3-5) 
account of a literature review as a systematic, explicit and reproducible method for 
identifying, evaluating and synthesising the existing body of completed and recorded 
work produced by researchers, scholars and practitioners. 
 
VE thinking entails a paradigmatic mindset shift in the Kuhnian sense, away from 
principle-based moral theory which has dominated social work value talk.  The 
rudiments of my redemptive framework are derived from the conceptual battlegrounds 
of the philosophical academy's relentless  'paradigmatic wars'.  They provide a unifying 
organisational thread throughout this dissertation and in the formation of my thesis. 
 
The paradigmatic wars 
 
I identify two elementary criticisms leveled against VE by advocates of principle-based 
moral theory, a kind of philosophical fork.  First of all, VE struggles to generate any 
valid moral decision-making procedure - the casuistry problem - and secondly, insofar 
as it does, its reference point is always likely to be the already as-given normativity - the 
collusion accusation.  Since these are in effect what I complain of about codified value 
talk, the irony lays down some obvious crucial themes to examine in the exploration of 
social work identity.   
 
There are in moral philosophy some acknowledged seminal VE texts by eminent 
philosophers representing different schools of virtue ethics.  Of equal interest are the 
on-going critical commentaries.  In the modernistic corner, proponents of Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism dual with advocates of reprised VE theory.  The aetiology of the 
latter is dubbed either pre- or post- modern depending on just how much its classical 
and even theological roots are emphasised.  Irrespective of the provenance of the 
underpinning theory, moral philosophers have long argued the difference between act 
appraisal models of right action, which privilege abstract universal principles, and 
agent-based or agent-prior accounts, which privilege antecedent moral character as the 
primary source of value.  It is important to stress at the outset the link between this 
seemingly arcane philosophical debate and social work practice, since Kantian 
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deontological and Utilitarian consequentualist derived discourses have dominated social 
work's value talk.  
 
Deontology stresses moral rules such as Kant's Categorical Imperative; 
consequentualism pays attention to outcomes such as Bentham’s Utility Principle for 
maximising happiness.  Social work derivatives of these - albeit of that piecemeal and 
simplified variety - form the lynchpin of code language.  At the commencement of the 
philosophical paradigmatic wars, now some sixty years ago, a VE charactereological 
anti-code perspective was presented very much as an antidote to the other two, and that 
is how I have come to treat and research the subject matter.  In my view, not to do so is 
to miss the theoretical thrust of VE as a counter discourse diagnostic for social work.  It 
challenges the deontological and consequentualist mind set, which I claim has 
legitimated all those rules, procedures and targets, sanctioned by the Code of Practice.  
It is no coincidence that such a mindset is favoured by the neo-liberal and neo-
conservative ideologues who now control social work and its language-in-use.  
 
These days, any undergraduate moral philosophy primer will probably contain an 
introduction to virtue ethics, although not so likely in the social work equivalent, 
despite the sixty odd years of high-level debate.  The on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy is an easily accessible entry point for an overview of virtue ethics, key texts, 
themes and topics within it.  The more theoretically advanced critical philosophical 
literature is expansive.  Amongst all the postmodern renderings, the voluminous early 
classical and theological virtue accounts have never been quite forgotten.  I have ended 
up proposing some theologically sourced notions, as it happens consistent with our 
narrative, given British social work's early Christian influences, but there is no 
necessary obligation to be either religious or spiritual to assimilate my arguments.  
Focusing on the revival of virtue ethics that ushered in the paradigmatic wars, and 
searching in particular for social work compatible accounts, my major source is 
Schroth’s (2010) periodically updated web-based encyclopedic Literatur zur 
Tugendethik (Bibliography on Virtue Ethics).  Its current list of 450 or so substantive 
books and articles on the subject of virtue ethics is laid out chronologically with brief 
summaries of new key additions.   
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My aim is to is to move from the high-level technical VE debate and its concomitant 
ontological and epistemological presumptions down to the swampy lowlands of social 
work practice, negotiating the sticking points through a social work language derived 
from but also capable of adhering to VE throughout.  A key practical text for me is 
Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems edited by Walker 
and Ivanhoe (2007).  While none of the contributors write about social work, their ideas 
illustrate the feasibility of transfer.  
 
Altruism themes underpinning several VE positions need to be complemented by 
supportive sociological, socio-biological and psychological perspectives.  Here, another 
of my key texts is Peterson and Seligman's Character Strengths and Virtues: a 
Handbook and Classification (2004), a meta-survey which provides a psychological 
foundation to the moral domain.  
 
Organisation and structure of material  
 
Perhaps the best test of veracity, synthesis and authorship is the explicit research focus 
on what aspect is most likely to undermine the story that I want to evince.  My thesis is 
presented as and through an identity-conferring VE framework.  The framework is 
argued through a presentation of a number of linked conceptual themes including, 
where apposite, some existing supportive empirical studies.  Since these themes are 
interrelated, there is no easy linear way to present this sort of iteration, so previously 
discussed ideas reappear later with different emphases and implications. 
 
To assist navigation, I set out a VE social work journey.  The narration moves from lay 
person to expert professional social worker, intertwining metaphor and allegory to carry 
the story along and to identify the conceptual and theoretical milestones.  I seek to 
elucidate these through some VE vignettes drawn from the philosophic academy, 
alluding to social work practice.  The formative VE material that I have selected for the 
first half of my dissertation focuses on a construction of social work value in a way that 
is intended to engage with the first major criticism of VE theory mentioned above - the 
casuistry problem.  The material that I have selected for the second half is intended to 
engage with the second major criticism of VE theory - the status quo collusion problem.  
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The framework thesis which I draw out is intended to address both these challenges in a 
way that is at least good enough for social work.  
 
In Chapter 1 I explore the view that social work identity is to be found in a VE defined 
alternative moral world to the standard one.  I distinguish between the moral and the 
ethical, sentiment and reasoning, and highlight essential social worker integrity as a 
commitment to protecting the naive moral impulse towards the distressed other in the 
course of sophisticating it.  The arguments rely on a distinction between 'big' and 'small' 
virtue ethical discussion and the moral primacy of agent appraisals over act appraisals.  
This distinction lays bare those critical challenges to the theoretical coherence of the VE 
paradigm.  
  
Chapter 2 focuses on codification of value and its pernicious effects.  I put forward the 
claim that any code will occlude the free authentic expression of social work identity.  I 
argue how official text flattens and closes down value discussion, which can only be 
fully liberated through a-categorical thought.  Conformity to the regulator's Code 
makes for what I call an alienating, infantilising 'proto-ethics'.  I draw on a critical 
notion of  'concept amnesia' and an all but lost language of value to account for our 
ennui. 
 
In Chapter 3 I update my previous review of the social work virtue ethical and related 
literature.  Building on the idea of supererogation, 'going beyond duty', I introduce the 
theme of the social work paragon and a paradoxical notion of non-obligatory obligation 
within a laudatory sacred ethical space.  I describe that space through a theory of 
paradoxicality, using some classical riddles from the field of logic to account for the 
search for moral order out of moral chaos.  I link the world of paradox to the  'doctrine 
of double effect' and 'moral remainder'.  In this peculiar world social workers respond to 
those extra-vulnerable others left unattended by those who would or should normally 
look after them. I introduce into the discussion the idea of a detrimental  'bystander 
effect’.  This occurs when morally attuned observers in a crowd stand by as someone 
desperately needs assistance. 
 
Chapter 4 argues for a natural conceptual affinity between this social worker world and 
the virtue ethical paradigm.  Drawing on some seminal philosophical texts, I introduce 
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the neo-classical idea of VE as an elective ethical community.  I describe morally active 
practitioners as 'ethical labourers' operating in the 'gap of omissions' left by natural 
carers.  Surveying some VE positions from within the philosophic academy, I make the 
argument for a set of if and only if [iff] statements to lay down some threshold 
components of characteristic social work motivation and ethical labouring.   
 
In Chapter 5, conceptualising social work identity as a distinctive form of ethical 
friendship, I explore the idea of philosophical 'self-effacement'.  The technical as well as 
intuitive rejection of formulaic rule-bound reasoning in favour of a more natural 
discourse, about being there for the distressed other, sits well with my anti-code 
position.  However, research obligation requires that I unravel an awkward  'tu quoque' 
argument.  The claim is that if interrogated hard enough, behind the display of any form 
of moral naturalism and apparent spontaneity, there will be revealed a set of sovereign 
hard rules for decision-making.  I look at standard learning theory to begin to engage 
with this.  
 
In Chapter 6 I examine another relatively recent fundamental attack on VE in general 
and friendship in particular, coming from a different angle but just as potentially 
devastating, where moral theory encounters experimental psychology.  This 'situationist' 
challenge queries the stability and unity of virtue to function under adverse external 
pressure, just when virtue is most called for.  The tu quoque and situationist challenges 
have led me to an exploration of theories of moral pedagogy, and to a formulation of 
tacit knowledge as a skills-based fluent moral expertise.  I argue that the moral expert 
continually checks on her reliable self as part of authentic social work identity, so, if 
reflexivity is a rule, it is a non self-effacing one.   
 
In Chapter 7 I engage with the collusionist/status quo critique of VE to show how a 
historised account of professional tacit knowledge does indeed immerse social work 
identity in the management of functional virtues pertaining to a well-ordered society.  I 
highlight the interventionist role of social work in relation to dysfunctional households 
and the amelioration of someone’s extra-vulnerability through the production of what I 
call 'surplus exchange-value'.  This sets out everyday virtue to be in accordance with the 
customary rhythms, cadences and mores that make up what is deemed to be a normal 
way of life.  Social work theory long ago ceased to speak of the client world in terms of 
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virtue and vices: my VE framework invites a reprise.  I introduce the prospect of 
creative social work beyond tradition built into the tradition itself.   
 
In Chapter 8, using an idea of 'prototype' and 'role-contoured' virtue, I offer another 
riddle to describe the personalised pattern of social welfare exchange as a 'little-by-little' 
movement from 'moral fuzziness’ through to 'supersharp' evaluation.  I invoke moral 
satisficing theory to describe this movement, played out through well-being, care and 
control motifs.  I argue that there is scope for a VE generated stability standard which 
can take the virtuous practitioner beyond merely servicing the as-given to critically 
examining it as part of her practice.  The argument centres on two social work signature 
clusters or modules of virtues qualitatively expressed as 'righteous indignation' and 'just 
generosity’.  
 
In Chapter 9 I draw upon a little-known hero to illustrate these clusters.  The test of 
social work veracity is to give what is 'morally owed' to the client, according to, but not 
curtailed by, the normative standards of time and place.  The exchange must generate 
value that minimally must be at least no less (but maximally greater than) what is taken 
away from the client, so that through ethical labouring the transaction can also exhibit 
the feature of a gift.  Such a view leads to considerations of hermeneutical and 
communitarian dialogue but moral relativist theory indicates the problematic nature of 
patterns of exchange relationships in non-consensual cases.  
 
In Chapter 10 I construct a social work specific minimal-maximal virtue stability 
standard to anchor correct expression of the two modules of righteous indignation and 
just generosity.  The righteously indignant social worker scans and scrutinises the moral 
horizon for vicious circumstances in which people live and for the intolerable vices of 
neglect, harm and abuse.  I describe what is social work good enough but is also 
potentially expansive to go beyond the minimum, provided we embrace rather than 
wrestle with the moral chaos, distinguish between the means and ends of practice and 
commit ourselves to the truth of moral uncertainty through an undogmatic fusion of 
horizons.  I suggest that this stability standard is embedded in an historic care and 
control, supersharp-fuzzy dialectic.   
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In Chapter 11 I summarise the threads of my thesis in order to explore the scope for any 
practical application.  I raise the prospect of a network of discourse sanctuaries for VE 
fugitives.  These sanctuaries can re-privilege social worker identity in the very act of 
speaking of its absence.  Drawing on relevant research, I suggest that some social work 
education regulatory training rules can be re-examined in light of my framework in 
order to inform a VE justified little-by-little praxis.  I conclude by reflecting on my own 
professional research journey. 
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Chapter 1 
The logic of VE inquiry  
 
Introduction 
 
I outline the standard moral world which sees traits of virtue as auxiliary to principle in 
the process of reasoning.  A VE defined moral world locates the source of social worker 
identity in core virtue supported by reason.  This approach exposes the critical 
challenges to the theoretical coherence of the paradigm.  I do not believe these 
criticisms have been answered as far as social work is concerned, partly because the 
questions they pose are difficult practical ones.  One way of responding is to argue for 
an alternative mode of theoretical inquiry to the one presupposed by questions derived 
from the perspective of the hegemony.  Developing three descriptors under the rubric of 
an essentialist approach to virtue, I hold that each of these is implicated in social work 
practice and, to the extent that they are left unresolved, social worker identity is also 
negated. 
 
Character traits and virtue 
 
According to Rachels (1999), the five necessary conditions for a satisfactory virtue 
ethical discourse must, sequentially, (i) explain what a virtue is, (ii) list those traits that 
are virtues, (iii) explain what these traits mean, (vi) justify why they are desirable, and 
(v) address whether these virtues are the same for everyone or differ from person to 
person, group to group, culture to culture, society to society.  Methodologically, 
Rachels is laying down a typical ‘top-down’ ‘outside-in’ phenomenological approach to 
inquiry, moving from a search for primary definition through a conditional sequence to 
applied specifics.  This results in hiatus at any given level of inquiry where a given 
position yields no consensus, just unresolved disputation.  That is not to say we should 
never ask Rachel's questions, only that they need not be answered in that particular way, 
let alone that order.  
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While there is some consensus as to the range and terminology of social work 
compatible virtues, we must avoid an eclectic and parochial list.  From the realm of 
positive psychology, Peterson and Seligman (2004) provide an empirical classification 
and measurement of twenty-four widely valued globally ubiquitous traits.  These are 
categorised under six broad banner virtues of wisdom and knowledge, courage, justice, 
humanity, temperance, and transcendence.  The authors claim that these have 
consistently emerged across all history and all cultures and are constitutive of the 
generic human well-being of individuals and their communities.  This makes the 
possession of these traits desirable, both to the possessor and to beneficiaries.  I attach 
an Appendix providing a summary of their framework.  
 
Methodologically, to examine the application of each trait to social work would be 
painstaking and in any case not required for my purpose.  I will take them as given in 
general and begin to fit them into social work selectively.  We might look at the claim 
that social workers have more of at least some of these than other people do, or 
alternatively that there is a distinctive type of overall virtue applying to social workers 
because of their particular activity, a matter of expression rather than quantity.  My tack 
is to explore the idea of a distinctive combination of traits that encapsulate social work 
identity, as opposed to the traits of a virtuous person who happens to be a social worker 
but might instead be, say, a nurse or teacher.  
 
I take it as given that a social worker is neither nurse nor teacher although much might 
be held in common and role boundaries may overlap.  It is the difference as to 
ownership and signification of some particular traits that interests me.  I will 
concentrate on aspects of three of Peterson and Seligman's global traits, humanity, 
justice and transcendence, although social workers also need to be wise, courageous and 
temperate.  The overall virtue of humanity includes traits manifest in caring 
relationships, and in those loving and kindly dispositions to tend and befriend which are 
brought to bear in intrapersonal one-to-one relationships.  The virtue of justice, whether 
of a redistributory or restorative kind, is a strength focusing on impartial and fair 
interpersonal civic relationships.  The virtue of transcendence is a strength that provides 
meaning to life, looking into the future with hope, optimism and a vision of a better 
world.  A nurse or teacher may legitimately claim these traits as their own too 
(alongside wisdom, courage and temperance), but not, I suggest, in the specific way that 
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social workers can.  The journeys of the former would be, I am sure, different ones, 
each requiring its own analytical research inquiry.  I commence the peculiar social work 
journey by beginning to describe a VE moral world. 
 
My VE framework of social work value relies on a distinction between two very 
different ways of seeing and thus of speaking about the moral domains of humanity, 
justice and transcendence.  As argued by Norton (1988: 181-182) and Kupperman 
(1988: 115-125), these two ways conjure up two very different models of the moral 
world and hence of moral decision-making.  The modernistic way is a matter of 
deployment of appropriate moral principles which are universally available to all 
reasonable thinkers with the 'right' mindset.  The codification of moral behaviour as 
foundational statements privileges much of this model of thinking.  This model veers 
towards simple linear logical thought and the determination of cause and effect to 
produce a position divested of personal predilection other than following through the 
principle.  The normative hegemonic construction of reality similarly presumes a 
clockwork-like system that, once discerned, is assumed to be constant and predictably 
reliable enough to know and use.  However, when actually confronted by the sheer 
complexities of real practice situations, this standard model of professional expertise, 
which C. Clark (2007: 61-64) summarises as the 'Popperian hypothetico-deductive 
method', is in need of much refurbishment. 
 
In the other model, a pre-modern way of thinking, an agent is assumed to have a formed 
character, or to be in the process of forming one, where moral decision-making is a 
situated instantiation of the present self.  This model therefore intimately connects with 
an agent’s past or future character development.  Here, moral decision-making takes 
place against a background of habits, inhibitions and patterns of self-satisfaction.  The 
agent has the desire (or lack) to become a certain kind of person and has the satisfaction 
(or lack) in being a certain kind of person in and through her actions.  In the test of 
whether someone really possesses the necessary correct moral navigational attributes, 
what is crucial is whether or not she relishes behaving in the manner corresponding to 
them.  
The two models may not logically directly conflict:  it is possible to hold that the second 
model gives the best account of how someone can be prepared to make moral choices 
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and can integrate these into a sense of self, whilst holding that the first model is correct 
in pointing out that a rationally derived method is needed for the actual decision-
making.  However, the two pull in opposite directions. 
The standard model 
In the modernistic model, using the radar of some untethered abstract principle, the 
impartial agent detects and demarcates a dilemma in which two (or more) courses of 
moral action are available.  The agent then tests these against the principle.  Any option 
that fails the testing is rejected.  The one finally left standing becomes a duty.  On this 
score, the accepted agenda of modern ethics is to formulate a supreme and universally 
applicable moral principle, together with a complete list of derivative rules representing 
the application of the supreme principle to all possible moral situations.  The duty is to 
obey an appropriate maxim that is reasoned out to prevail in the particular moral 
situation.  The right thing to do is unlocked by such ratiocination, and practical ethics 
becomes a mechanical discourse about how to turn some sort of encoded key to open up 
the combination lock.  Much of social work's standardised value training is of this sort, 
revolving around pros and cons case studies. 
There is logically always only one right combination to the lock that when turned 
should fully satisfy the principle, difficult though that search might be in practice.  To 
facilitate that search under pressure of time and fast moving sequences of events, a 
suitably endowed key-holding ratiocinator, one with a virtue-like attribute such as 
perspicacity, will no doubt be advantaged in decoding the answer and be quicker.  
However, as Cohen (2006: 50-51) suggests, these attributes are better called 
instrumental virtues.  I call these small 've', to be contrasted with big 'VE'.  Adams 
(2006: 32) has as a similar term to my VE - 'capital V Virtue'.  With small ve, the 
attributes of virtue are simply proffered in the more efficient heuristical pursuit of the 
supreme deontic or consequentialist principle which virtue is to serve.  A person 
disposed to promote the Categorical Imperative or Utility Principle can  'make a virtue 
out of it', or be made to do so.  Making someone virtuous, in this sense of becoming a 
better supplicant to a normative deontic or consequentialist axiom, is an ageless form of 
social engineering.  
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On this account, all v-language is really just another second-order way of stating or 
instantiating first-order moral rules established by other theoretical means.  Virtue really 
depends on and is defined by those rules which it supports.  A virtuous person honours, 
promotes and lives by the Categorical Imperative, so is derivatively respectful of others, 
non-judgmental, honest and courageous in its defence.  Such small ve talk haunts big 
VE theorists, the entrapments intruding into the discourse.  One entrapment, in 
particular, is that in spite of all the theoretical huffing and puffing, big VE must 
perforce acknowledge independent moral precepts in order to give its own internal 
argumentation conceptual volition.  This makes it, in effect, an idle cog in the moral 
universe.   
 
Known as the redundancy argument, the challenge needs unravelling since VE for 
social work will depend on some sort of social work accommodation, if not refutation 
of it.  However, powerfully in favour of VE and a pre-modern way of thinking is a 
common sense view that virtues and morally right action are directly connected.  People 
expect those with the requisite virtue to act morally rightly more often than those 
without.  A person endowed with the disposition of moral courage is more likely than 
one who is not to act correctly in morally charged situations demanding moral courage.  
Whistleblowing is a standard example.  I expand on this perspective by distinguishing 
between act appraisals and agent-prior or agent-based appraisals.  
 
Theoretical moral philosophers ask which logically comes first in terms of explanation: 
morally right action, here the actual whistleblowing, hence a stress on act appraisals; or 
moral virtues, here the personal recognition of the need to and then the drive to 
whistleblow, hence a stress on agent-based or agent-prior appraisals.  The latter two 
commit an advocate to something like the statement by Louden (1998: 491) to the effect 
that:  
 
Virtue ethics is a theoretical perspective which holds that judgments about 
the inner lives of individuals, (their traits, motives, dispositions, and 
character) rather than judgments about the rightness or wrongness of 
external acts and/or consequences of acts are of the greatest moral 
importance.  
 
Referenced as a definition by Webster (2008a, 2008b), Wright and Webster (2008: 112) 
and Banks and Gallagher (2009: 34), the point of Louden’s summation is to contrast the 
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heterodoxy of agent-based and agent-prior construals with standard orthodox moral 
construals that an action is right if and only if [iff] it is in accordance with an act 
appraisal moral rule or principle, typically deontic or consequentalist, Kantian or 
Utilitarian. 
 
The main difference between agent-based and agent-prior approaches is the degree to 
which external value criteria are allowed conceptual leeway.  Either way, critics of VE 
theory sooner or later lead us to an awkward position for social work, namely that some 
actions are absolutely required (or forbidden) irrespective of the motive or character of 
the agent.  We really ought to prevent certain types of moral digressions that produce 
harm of incontestable magnitude.  Consider, for example, paedophilia, which surely has 
not much to do with agent appraisal other than the obligation of the moral agent to 
prevent or stop it.  No doubt being endowed with some small ve attributes such as 
courage will help the practitioner succeed but that is not the point.  
 
Features of the redundancy charge 
 
The general theoretical redundancy charge arrayed against VE theory is that, 
indubitably caught up in inner motive conversations, of itself aretaic agent appraisal 
theory lacks the conceptual wherewithal to generate public, reliably validated, right-
making moral acts.  As Louden (2001: 235) puts it: 
 
It has often been said that for virtue ethics the central question is not ‘What 
ought I to do?’ but rather ‘What sort of person ought I to be?’  However, 
people have always expected ethical theory to tell them something about 
what they ought to do, and it seems to me that virtue ethics is structurally 
unable to say much of anything about this issue.  If I am right, one 
consequence of this is that a virtue based ethics will be particularly weak in 
the areas of casuistry and applied ethics.  
 
VE accounts of right action are vulnerable to the ‘insularity’ objection.  Evaluating 
action surely requires attention to worldly matters external to the agent, whereas it is 
said that virtue ethics is primarily concerned with evaluating an agent’s inner states.  
Insofar as VE accounts are successful in meeting the insularity objection, they then 
invite the ‘circularity’ objection: they end up relying upon virtue-ethical considerations 
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that themselves depend on unexplained external judgments of rightness.  They become 
intuitively plausible to the extent that they lose their distinctive virtue ethical features. 
 
Right action becomes that which a morally virtuous agent would or should do, getting 
us nowhere fast.  It seems that to establish virtue as the precursor to moral action we 
must refer to the idea of a virtuous person, but, tautologically, in order to identify such 
we must have some idea of what virtuous action is in the first place and why it is right-
making because the virtuous person exhibits or displays it.  No matter how hard we try, 
we cannot logically prove the moral rightness of an act from the mere fact of being a 
certain sort of person, even assuming it could be demonstrated she is one.  It does not 
follow that Mother Teresa's every act is good just because she is Mother Teresa.  These 
sorts of insularity and circularity objections may be linked to VE's peculiar ‘inerrancy’ 
thesis.  According to this, if a virtuous person can ever be proved to have not been, say, 
just, then she was not, at least on that occasion, the sort of person we thought she was.  
An ex-post facto defence could be that the agent was on that occasion simply unlucky.  
Alternatively, we could say that we made a mistaken judgment as to her capacity for 
justice in the first place.  Either way, the apologia smacks of a rather too convenient 
conceptual plasticity. 
 
Such criticism of VE's inflationary claim, that elusive personality-trait psychology is the 
source of moral value, is a troublesome one for social work, hardly the stuff of some 
sort of redemption - perhaps more a misguided excursion into Utopia as Louden (2001: 
243) puts it.  Although I am, say, by disposition a just person, that disposition in itself 
will not provide specific action guidance and even if it does, then surely we need some 
other standard by which to evaluate the action other than its emanating from the 
possessor of that disposition.  If so, more colloquially put, this would mean that VE 
cannot provide clear guidance as to what a social worker morally ought to do - or at 
least not without letting in again principle-based moral theory and its abstract maxims 
through the conceptual backdoor, always threatening to relegate any big VE talk to the 
small ve league.  Louden (2001: 238-243) summarises what he calls these 'vices of 
virtue ethics' to also include the prospect of pernicious 'moral backsliding' and self-
deception (‘I am a fundamentally honest person') because a focus on long-term 
character may allow me many instances of minor dishonesty, all of which, of course, 
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add up.  The triumph of 'style over substance' is where the appearance of virtue comes 
to count more than actually being virtuous.  
 
This sort of analysis invites engagement with another persistent criticism of VE: 
namely, that locked up in personal charactereological attributes and lacking any 
universal moral reference point, VE is by default liable to resort to a particularistic - that 
is conservative, even reactionary - 'status quo' perspective in the attempt to prescribe 
right action.  Put slightly differently, there is a tendency in VE discourse to drift into the 
impasse of moral relativism to ground its moral psychology.  If that is the case, actual 
virtue (and indeed vice) will be restrictively defined in historicised terms of time and 
place.  This either makes virtue and vice talk the bastion of those very same 
establishment power holders who control knowledge and normatise definition and 
usage, which I have claimed VE would seek to deconstruct; or VE becomes an exercise 
in social anthropological observation, where one community's lived-world virtue is 
another's vice and there can be no further arbitration. 
 
If either charge holds, then the whole point of VE as a counter discourse is undermined, 
leaving a confused social worker in the middle.  A stark, polarising example of this is 
'female circumcision', a practice which any social worker might encounter in a putative 
child protection case.  Is it a celebratory ancestral right of passage or offensive 
patriarchal female genital mutilation?  I offer up the dilemma as a background test case 
to be born in mind as my thesis unfolds.  
 
An alternative model 
 
So far, I have looked at VE from the viewpoint of its rivals, in particular the model of 
reasoning they employ.  Virtue talk for social workers has usually been presented only 
at best as a moderating counterbalance to the dominant principle-based Kantian and 
Utilitarian social work value discourse because of the sort of criticisms I have sketched 
above.  The thrust of my thesis is likely to be contentious since some might consider it 
ultimately revisionist, harking back to social work's own pre-modern days.  The charge 
of revisionism is a foremost consideration in the choice of my material and structure of 
my argumentation.  It is not one which I am at special pains to refute since my view of 
social work history recognises that while history may not repeat itself, the rhymes of the 
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narrative do.  I seek to work with and so deflect the revisionist criticism, linking it to the 
cadences which have animated our historic narrative.   
 
My framework foregrounds social work's historic mandated care and control mission in 
a manner that fully acknowledges and indeed thrives on the uncomfortable duality. I 
believe this makes virtue and vice talk very apposite.  I argue that the social work remit 
has always been morally loaded because whilst the two dimensions of care and control 
are likely to elide, in truth the latter is more often than not in the ascendency at any 
given time even when we call it care.  Social work self-identity will always vacillate 
between the two, shifting one way or the other between the call of vocation and 
obligations of profession.  Any applied social work moral theory must comfortably 
accommodate that swing as part of the theory itself.  
 
To this end, I will now draw out some social work orientated descriptors to capture the 
essential social worker in a way that the standard model and method of moral reasoning 
struggle to recognise.  I earlier described the alternative model to be one where the 
agent has (or lacks) the desire to become a certain kind of person, and has (or lacks) the 
satisfaction of being a certain kind of person in and through her actions.  The 
descriptors offer a way of reframing the moral appraisal debate in terms that explain this 
starting point.  
 
The moral impulse  
 
Bisman (2004) argues that social work values form the moral core of the profession, 
perhaps suggesting that social work is also something else.  I maintain that social work 
is none other than moral activity, making social work, value and moral core 
synonymous.  My thesis is built on a primary assumption that to be a social worker is, 
to borrow Husband’s (1995: 84) phrase, to be a ‘morally active practitioner’.  As a 
practical vocational profession which usually needs to act in the moment, especially in 
those hard cases involving life, death and liberty, the search for some sort of 
overarching directional moral order has naturally permeated social work's perennial 
value talk - as much a quest for perfectly safe as opposed to perfectly ethical social 
work.  Husband's invocation of a hypothesised morally active practitioner draws 
centrally on Bauman's (1993) Postmodern Ethics and the conception of a 'moral 
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impulse’.  Husband finds this vision of human moral identity - a personal responsibility 
driven by a wish to be for the other - intuitively appealing and persuasive.  This is fully 
in accord with my own experience and expressive of social work identity, at least of the 
sort of social worker that I among many others would wish to be.   
 
For my purposes it is not necessary to hold that the moral impulse towards the other is a 
universal human tendency, only that its exercise distinguishes a certain sort of person.  I 
believe that the very idea of a moral impulse is embedded in social work's historical 
narrative, has shaped our stories and conferred us with a sense-making account of 
ourselves.  The moral impulse is not unique to social work.  However our social work 
history has left its own distinctive footprint.  I link present day social work failure at 
least in part to the attenuation, disregard or even suppression of what should be social 
work’s own indelible version of the moral impulse.  Of course, the moral impulse is not 
without some naivety.  As Husband (1995: 99) says: 
 
By its untramelled innocence and generosity it is the creative core of caring.  
However, the pure individuality of the moral impulse would render it an 
anarchic basis for organized systems of care in contemporary society.  
 
This rejoinder serves to remind us of the complex relation between action and morality.  
Acting morally, that is being 'morally active', means a search for the social work 
contextually right response arising from any threat to the moral impulse in a world of 
competing demands.  Balancing the naivety of the moral impulse and the nuanced 
sophistication of its defence in such a world is a precarious, ambiguous task.  I 
distinguish between the two meanings of sophistication.  One connotes a highly 
developed and worldly-wise approach, a manifestation of the virtue of prudence, as 
Peterson and Seligman (2004: 477-516) suggest, being careful about one's choices and 
controlling one's emotions.  The other notion of sophistication ('sophistry') is of 
detrimentally taking away an object's natural simplicity. 
 
I contend that authentic social work identity is locked up in the fraught endeavours of 
the former and that false identity lies in perpetuating the latter.  Present day conditions 
of extreme institutional adversity muffle the proper expression of the moral impulse and 
restrain the correct exercise to the point that it can hardly be felt.  This is how I interpret 
much social worker burnout and moral fatigue.  There is no logical reason why the 
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impulse cannot be managed within principle-based act appraisal moral theory.  
However, since the impulse is sourced from inner traits and dispositions, there is no 
easy connection with abstract theory.  The dissonance calls into question the 
relationship between ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ questions, leading to my second descriptor.  
 
Ethical careering  
 
Notions of the moral and the ethical easily elide in every day language but need not be 
treated as synonymous.  For my purposes it is important that they are not.  While many 
commentators choose one or the other or use either term interchangeably, as I too have 
done up to this point, following Appiah (2008: 37), strictly speaking I hold that moral 
questions properly concern what we should do; ethical questions properly concern what 
sort of life we should live in order that we do.  In spite of the moral prefix, Husband's 
idea of the impulse conveys much that is ethical in Appiah's sense.  From this point on, 
unless it obviously does not matter, I will use each term specifically in respect of these 
differences.  I will do so in order to set up a discourse dialectic between what a 
patterned ethical life means - to become and remain the sort of person one wants to be 
in honouring the moral impulse - and such a person's specific ‘in situ’ moral responses. 
 
I therefore speak of a motivating ethical pathway or career for a social worker, 
characterised by expressive moral activity which should build the ethical career in 
accordance with the life it prescribes.  This makes social work nothing if not a personal 
ongoing journey of a distinctive professional kind according to the sum total of our 
moral acts and, when it is not, the practitioner must cease at some point to be an 
authentic social worker.  When practitioners anguish over the chronic lack of client 
contact time and endemic substitute form filling, it is, I contend, because they sense that 
they are no longer following an ethical career in any meaningful sense.  Acting less than 
morally, they are falling short of what an ethical career and its telos constantly demand.  
This leads me to my third descriptor.   
 
Sentiment and justification 
 
 I hold that there is a fundamental relationship between social work sentiment or 
'emotioning' and social work reason or 'justification'.  Each shapes identity as an ethical 
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career unfolds.  While the two are interdependent, the former connotes what it is to be a 
social worker; the latter connotes what it is do social work.  The sentimental moral 
impulse is heart-felt; its reasoned application mindful.  Our moral sentiment or 
emotioning tells a story about why we enter social work and what is wrong about the 
world we would, as impulsive practitioners, wish to put right.  Our moral reasoning or 
justification tells a coherent sustaining story about how the sentiment is to be 
responsibly exercised and enacted, evaluated or measured in that highly normative 
complex welfare world to which Husband alludes.  Any asymmetry - too much or too 
little or the wrong sort of sentiment, too much or too little or the wrong sort of 
justification - makes for a social work practice of disvalue. 
 
As numerous commentators point out, the personal social services and modes of 
delivery continue to morph in ways that are at odds with the moral sentiments for 
entering social work and the justificatory moral reasons.  It is as if the latter two have 
been parted so that social work identity is in jeopardy.  Our hegemonic language of 
value has betrayed us.  Alienation, anomie and estrangement themes reverberate 
throughout practice (Ferguson and Lavalette, 2004).  The etymological root of 
alienation stresses separation, surrender, giving up, and transfer to a foreign allegiance; 
it also alludes to a sense of pretense or disguise (alias or alibi), being what one is not for 
the purpose of subterfuge.  Alienation also picks up the idea that something akin to what 
is rightly ours has been taken away and in its place is something foreign, out of 
harmony and hence repugnant to the estranged (Schacht, 1972: 1-29). 
 
Thus alienation describes a state of ‘dis-order’.  This disorder is, I contend, a pretty 
accurate picture of social work, a state of monumental loss, ‘not to be oneself’, derailing 
any prospects of an ethical journey.  A sub-theme is of dispossession, the taking away 
of authentic identity, both our clients' and ours.  This expostulation of mine leads to an 
examination of what I consider to be the moribund language making up our everyday 
act appraisal value discourse.  In the next chapter I draw on an account of  ‘concept 
amnesia’ to argue why codification is anathema to the moral impulse. 
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Chapter 2 
VE and codified value  
 
Introduction 
I argue that codes occlude the free authentic expression of social work identity, which 
can only be fully liberated through a-categorical thought.  I make an association 
between the imposition of Kantian and Utilitarian derived formulaic code language, the 
rise of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative regimes and top-down, outside-in control of 
the practitioner's ethical space.  I draw on a notion of lost language and its relationship 
to integrity in support of the moral impulse.  Codes are typically portrayed as the apex 
of professional maturity but I claim the opposite: they make for the infantalisation of 
social work identity.  
 
Concept amnesia 
 
I regard our present day rule-bound, target-driven practices to be at least in part the 
unfortunate legacy of social work's over-reliance on act appraisal precepts.  The 
normativity with which these have come to be associated decentres the moral-cum-
ethical impulse.  Many commentators (for example, Webb, 2006a; Jordan, 2004, 2007; 
Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007) explore how neo-liberal market forces push the impulse 
aside, how neo-conservative welfare ideology pathologises it, and how the concomitant 
bureaucracy strangles or criminalises it.  VE implores us to get beyond today's language 
of ‘homo economicus’ (Houston, 2010a) and the flawed moral grammar now so 
dominant in our piecemeal and simplistic value chatter.   
 
As an organ of the state, the historic role of social work in perpetuating the hegemony 
has always been an uncomfortable one.  I suggest that over time social work's 
commonsense and rich language of value centering on protecting and nurturing the 
moral impulse has been supplanted by today's impoverished moral grammar - a 
grammar by and large comprising ersatz versions of Kantian and Utilitarian act 
appraisal and small ve precepts.  
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My argument is that as the personal social services have undergone transmutation under 
the neo-liberal and neo-conservative hegemony, the piecemeal simplicity of our value 
language has proved inadequate to arrest our slide away from - never mind refurbishing 
and reconnecting with - our sense of historic self.  The seemingly steadfast principles of 
Kantianism and Utilitarianism have lent themselves all to easily to the word colonising 
proclivities of the neo-liberal and the neo-conservative normative agenda with its 
categorisation of the population as either successful or failed 'atomised' market players.  
Historically associated with the political philosophy of acquisitive material 
individualism, abstract principle bends all too easily to reprised capitalist led 
constructions of well-being, reshaping social work as a profession.  Such has been the 
context of codification as a way of classifying social work value.  As Diamond (1988: 
255), one of the VE's early commentators put it, at the commencement of the 
paradigmatic wars: 
 
Our habits of classification of ethical theories and modes of ethical thought, 
based on false and oversimple notions of the aim of ethics, impede our 
understanding and distort our perception.  No principles of classification are 
forced on us by the nature of ethics; we shape what ethical discussion is in 
part by what we choose to bring together, by the patterns of resemblances 
and differences in ethical thought that we trace and display.  
 
Using the word 'ethical' in my looser sense to also mean moral, Diamond (1988: 275) 
poses the question: how can we judge whether we are worse off or better off when 
concepts change?  I speak of the loss that the threadbare current normativity instills, 
depriving us of being able to name things properly, leading to mis-expression or no 
expression at all.  We have deep commitments to social solidarities which require for 
their expression a vocabulary that we now lack.  The contrast is not just between our 
present use of words and that of a social work tradition from which we have been cut 
off, and which still shapes our experience at some profound level, but between the 
present use of words and one adequate for the social work core moral task.  
 
It is as if we have forgotten all that we know of what moral thought and moral 
discussion could be like because we have ceased to see ourselves as ethical beings.  We 
have lost the capacity to use with conviction an older vocabulary such as 'helping 
others', by which we as social workers should be able to make sense of our relations 
with those in distress.  As Diamond (1988: 255) says, such pre-modern concepts live on 
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as 'kind of folk-words - potent but unacknowledged - long after they have ceased to 
form part of respectable speech'.  We have such words from an older moral vocabulary 
still used with commonsensical conviction but without legitimating approval.  Instead, 
we have vocabularies of late modernity such as personalisation and consumer choice 
that cannot be used with any conviction at all.   
 
We no longer see a spread out substantial picture of what it is to be human, set against a 
background of solidarities that transcend each individual yet delineate each of us.  In 
this impoverishment the true social work story and our knowledge of its possibilities, 
weight and mysteriousness have no proper means of expression.  To reconnect, I 
suggest that we must recall  'old concepts in our life still, as a standard, as something we 
can still use in our understanding and assessment of our own situation' (Diamond, 1988: 
275). 
 
Integrity  
 
Against this backdrop, at the heart of the matter, is the issue of professional integrity.  I 
draw on Banks’ (2010) threefold distinction between issues of conduct, commitment 
and capacity.  Professional integrity is often construed to mean no more than 'morally 
right conduct’, which would mean these days focusing on code-conforming behaviour 
rather than anything else.  The result is rule-bound, defensive social work, the very sort 
that has been implicated time and again in our social work failures.  Much of the 
piecemeal simplicity of which I complain is pitched at exploring this type and level of 
integrity.   
 
However, outwith any code, professional integrity also means a life-long commitment 
to and standing up for a set of identity-conferring ideals.  Here personal commitment to 
a morally worthy project springs from a deep conscionable sense of what is worth doing 
and why.  It is potentially at odds with a formal code since the commitment to being a 
certain sort of person, doing what is worth doing and doing it well, may not coincide 
with what a code requires or indeed permits.  To the extent that this primary 
commitment is not projected in the code, an agent may be odds with it.  It is this 
disjunction that prevails today in respect of the state controlled General Social Care 
Council's regulatory Code of Practice (GSCC, 2002), but even any voluntary 
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professional Code of Ethics such as the British Association of Social Workers' (BASW, 
2002) is susceptible to such bifurcation.  Both are an amalgam of deontic and 
consequentualist axioms supported by platitudinous small ve instructions such as being 
honest and reliable.  The former prescribes 47 and the latter some 125 value statements. 
 
Banks' third notion of professional integrity describes 'capacity' or 'competence' in the 
sense of an integral obligation to always work on one's own fragility in the search for 
self-improvement.  Dealing with all the deafening contextual noise that would divert us, 
reflexive self-management must be a constitutive part of the commitment, otherwise 
that commitment would be less then it should.  In an ever-changing, confusing world, 
this non-static notion of competence points to a process of continuous readjustment in 
order to affirm the stability of the original commitment.  To balance the singular 
demands of discrete moral activity and the holistic requirements of ethical existence 
requires what Cohen (2006: 63-74) in his account of the nature of moral reasoning 
describes (after Rawls) as reflective equilibrium, a constant reworking of self in pursuit 
of some sense-making reliability.  Also critical in my view is the notion of collegiality 
as a source of strength.  The reference point for acting well is a steadying community of 
like-minded individuals, giving any shared project purpose, volition and direction. 
 
Perfectly ethical and perfectly safe social work  
 
Integrity is also sometimes described as having an executive function holding together 
other desirable attributes.  Peterson and Seligman (2004: 249-272) describe it as 
authenticity and honesty, making for a form of courage which entails speaking the truth, 
but more broadly as presenting oneself in a genuine way and acting in a sincere way; 
being without pretence; taking responsibility for one's feelings and actions.  Good moral 
self-governance has always been historically bound up with the idea of the virtuous 
living a life of integrity towards some public good (Macaulay and Lawton, 2006).  
Invoking VE's pre-modern classical language, our historic quest for integrity is to stitch 
together a normative mosaic of scientific knowledge ('episteme'), theoretical wisdom 
('sofia') and skills ('techne') nurtured by practice wisdom ('phronesis') in order to ‘do 
things properly’ ('eupraxia').  Just how all these can be transmitted through obeying a 
code, whether it be the voluntary one such as BASW's or a compulsory one such as the 
GSCC’s, is a question which illustrates how simplistic language can obscure any 
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answer.  These classical descriptors of good moral self-governance make for 
sophisticated discourse markers in promulgation of the moral impulse.  Their absence 
would make for, to borrow Rossiter’s (2006: 139) dramatic phrase, ‘the promise of 
ethical death’ or less terminally perhaps, the blocking of any possibility of ourselves as 
moral beings (Irving, 2006: 135). 
 
The social work establishment has been mithering about codification ever since it began 
to consider itself, and wanted to be recognised, as a profession.  Reamer’s (1998) 
schematisation of the history of social work ethics offers an evolutionary, almost 
triumphalist view of code.  Cataloging any history into neat discrete chunks is a 
methodological form of story telling that unsurprisingly seeks out and privileges the 
present as a culmination of achievement.  As to any perceived maturity, the obsession 
with the language of competency geared towards technical-bureaucratisation 
(Dominelli, 1996; Malin; 2000; Gibbs and Gambrill, 2002) and the professionalising 
nostrum of a ‘bias-free’ evidence-based social work (Sanderson, 2003; Houston, 2005) 
make for the categorisation of the social work role into a series of identifiable hence 
more accountable behavioural tasks.  Bisman (2004: 112-114) captures the 
historiographical angle to all this when she describes the early press for a knowledge 
and skills base towards a scientifically based philanthropy.  This was followed by the 
search for a distinctive method and scientific body of knowledge, and an appeal to 
empiricism, measurement, sociological and psychological truths, all of which feed into 
the so-called ‘what works’ movement (Jordan, 2004).  This preoccupation with metrics 
has secreted itself into value talk.  Bisman notes how this focus on scientifically based 
practice has diminished the moral basis of social work, or at least distracted us from the 
need to protect and nurture it.  
 
It would surely be foolish for us to return to something akin to the so-called ‘mental 
hygiene' period and our early pseudo-psychoanalytical proclivities (Payne, 1999; 
Forsythe and Jordan, 2002; Jordan, 2004).  However, compliance with tick boxes and 
performance criteria falsely equating to moral efficacy makes for a hollowed out 
discourse (Malin, 2000).  The morally attuned street level bureau-worker described by 
Lipsky (1980) sought to buck the trend, working fleetly within the discretionary, 
alternative moral-cum-ethical space that agency policy and rules had not yet foreclosed.  
Lipsky’s street-level social workers are still contesting control of the moral frontline 
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(Ellis, 2007; Ash, 2010) but the terms of contestation have much changed.  One of the 
GSCC's rules (4.2) is that a registrant 'must follow risk assessment policies and 
procedures to assess whether the behaviour of service users presents a risk of harm to 
themselves or others', on pain of suspension, admonition or removal from the social 
care register.  The issue is not whether a practitioner follows the rule well or badly, or 
even feels compelled out of conscience to surreptitiously usurp it; rather, it is the very 
idea of simply following such rules which has lead to what I call the hubris of 
professionalisation and all that codification stands for. 
 
The hubris of code language  
 
As a template for moral decision-making a code owes much to that theoretical top-down 
inside-out model described in Chapter 1.  It is not clear whether actual codes are much 
use in practice at all, as a study by Rossiter et al. (2000) indicates.  Banks (2003: 133) 
advises that it is important not to take codes too literally since they are rhetorical, 
educational and regulatory devices as much as they are guides to practice.  As she says 
in her critical review of social work ethics, the inefficacy of codes is not a surprising 
finding (2008: 1241).  Congress (2010) provides an update on the (usually small-scale) 
research findings to that effect, nevertheless arguing generally in favour of codes as a 
form of status enhancing accountability.  
 
Codes of various types have shared features but are disunited by situational differences 
of provenance, theoretical outlook and political perspectives in relation to time and 
place.  The difference between what the social work establishment calls codified ethics 
such as BASW's and codified conduct such as the GSCC’s might be said to lie in who 
controls the agents subject to the code.  Here the effect of the difference is, I suggest, 
not just a matter of rhetoric.  The first one strives to create the conditions for reflexive 
professional insider ethical space.  The other privileges outsider forensic scrutiny of its 
moral activists.   
 
Elsewhere I have argued that a code of conduct exposes the inherent dictatorial logic of 
codification and the written word  (Webster, 2010).  As a surveilling process of the 
agent, all codes define failure and errant conduct as much as critical pathways to 
success.  Applied to social work, the standard lighthouse metaphor (Clark, 1999) is 
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more searchlight than beacon, sweeping the profession for instances of infractions and 
disorderliness.  
 
In our unhappy times, this is as much about the management of bureau-worker 
malfeasance as it is about wayward moral imagination.  A code is a formal type of 
sanctified value chatter where the written word (codicil, codex, manuscript, ledger, 
tablet) carries extra gravitas.  While all codes are an essay in what might be called 
authoritarian calibration, any particular code says as much about the authors and 
custodians as the message itself.  The root notion of code as a covenant perpetuates a 
kind of formulaic mindset since it offers up a revered systematic body of law compiled 
by, written down and revealed through some inerrant source authority contained in the 
predictive text.  It captures moral thought and then reveals what it has caught through a 
set of conventional symbols used to transmit, receive and decipher messages.   
 
The power of codes  
 
Any code claims to be sanctified, neutrally posited text, elevated to a position outside 
and above competing counter worldviews.  Advocates approvingly see a code as a 
homogenising ‘screen through which worldviews must be drawn to create constraints on 
professionals’ behavior’ (Spano and Koenig, 2007: 13).  Antagonists see it as little more 
than a blunt ideological enforcer (Adams, 2008: 6).  Any code is really a bullying 
philosophical autocrat although its form might dissemblingly suggest otherwise.  
Exegesis replicates and reinforces its authority.  By their nature codes tend to persist 
because once written they are ensconced as a given so that their very form moulds 
moral substance.  However, each one is conceived and gestated at a particular point in 
history and is a product of its time; so whatever else it is, a code is manifestly a cultural 
phenomenon, a way, but not the only possible way, of organising the construction of 
value.  
 
Codes embody myriad rules, sometimes hierarchically organised into pryamidic 
segments, other times just catalogued.  It is really the following of these rules which 
count, so that the act of compliance with the rule is construed as the substantive 
engagement with value.  However, code truth is only a clumping together of the 
procedures used to establish it, under what Irving (2006: 132) calls the ‘thin carapace’ 
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of modernity, where form falsely dominates ethical essence and assumes its moral 
mantle.  In many ways, a code functions as the modernistic version of hallowed 
scripture re-presented as secular action-binding commands.  Behind the modernistic 
phantasma of pure reason still resides the pre-modern assumption of some sort of 
external higher order fixer, only here it is presented as the unabridged power of the 
untethered principle that our own self-governing insight compliantly makes us obey.  In 
this sense, we construct ourselves as modernistic prescription-maker but in substance 
we are still really pre-modern prescription-taker.  Doing what we are told by a higher 
infallible order, because that is what 'being ethical’ is, suits the times in which we live 
as social workers.  
 
Acting well and acting correctly 
 
A modern code of conduct surreptitiously employs an ancient notion of ethics as 
'consuetude', a conduced order of mind and behaviour, socially determined in 
accordance with function, rank and status, and with connotations of discipline, 
compliance and subordination to the infallible given.  Here, well-moulded character and 
obedience are mutually interdependent.  The well-ordered person reflects a well-ordered 
society: ethics and the ethos flow to and from each other. 
 
In this sense, a code could constitute shorthand for a public bundle of prescribed goods 
that help a tradition to live.  A social worker has to be a publically validated person of 
good repute, therefore she must be of irreproachable character.  The edginess of the 
mandate requires that social work identity becomes a discourse about not only what you 
must be and do but also what you must not be and not do, a fusion of agent and act 
appraisals.  Our impeccable bona fides and our conduct must be separated out by some 
fiducial line below which a fall from grace is ever present but supposedly self-
correcting. 
 
As social workers, we pledge, profess or make a kind of promissory oath to ‘heal’ or 
‘advise’ in unimpeachable good faith.  The antithesis is misconduct (Clark, C., 2007: 
60).  A code as text could perhaps be a convenient vessel to enhance our precautionary 
story telling.  A code of conduct legitimises role by scrutinising for any violations of the 
code itself by those subject to it.  This involves not just guidance but compulsion and 
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coercion, being escorted along the straight and narrow.  Jettisoning the prescription-
making versus prescription-taking convolutions caught up in a code of ethics, a code of 
conduct zooms in on what is not to be tolerated and so bluntly tells us who we must not 
be and what we must not do.  I prefer to call that ‘proto-ethics’, a stentorian text that is 
transmitted through the alarming language of calumny, blame, punishment and 
defamation.  
 
In all spheres of public life today there is to be found a Foucauldian ‘centrifugalising’ 
motif, which in our case heightens governmental concern to monitor and control social 
work, questioning its legitimacy and credibility.  This purview looks askance on a self-
regulating professional code of ethics as not even so much a complementary adjunct as 
an irrelevancy.  In this sense a code of conduct colonises and then banishes a code of 
ethics.  A code of conduct militates against professional autonomy and ‘misdirected’ 
use of front line discretionary time and space.  Healy and Meagher (2004) document the 
insidious processes of deprofessionalisation (the oft-called ‘proletarianisation’ process) 
created by the routinisation and technicalisation of social work tasks.  The parallel 
codification of social work conduct represents a subtle transformation from engagement 
with ethical desiderata to conformity with service standards - the transformation 
described by Hugman (2003: 1030) from acting well to acting correctly. 
 
I describe the codification of value as some sort of flawed, fixated, two-step ethical 
dance, one step above and one below an artificial moral dividing line.  A code of ethics, 
which aims at the codification of an expansive mandated beneficence while also 
privileging ethical self-autonomy and self-governance, struggles with the resulting 
issues.  A code of conduct, which aims at the codification of maleficence, targets and 
closes down disorderly conduct. That is its rationale.  Scanning for well-behaved social 
workers where virtue is synonymous with obedience, it patrols the fiducial line for 
slippage below it to ‘out’ the digressers.  As a regimen of discipline, subjugation to a 
code of conduct has less to do with professional ethics and more to do with defensive 
and defensible practice (Orme and Rennie, 2006).  A liberal code of ethics struggles 
with this conflation, wrestling individual conscience, consensual collegiate ethics and 
the demands of the employing agency.  I maintain that a code of conduct removes the 
need to wrestle with moral complexities simply by arresting moral development and 
fixating moral responsibility.  It is therefore ethically infantilising.  
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The tyranny of infantalisation  
 
A code of conduct eliminates moral complexity - the heart of social work moral practice 
- at a stroke, by making full compliance with its own precepts the extent of being 
ethical, muting a discourse of value.  Much is made these days of the erosion of old 
fashioned tacit trust in professionals by the public, managed and brokered by the 
profession itself, and a move to contractual confidence in public systems of 
accountability managed by bureaucracies of the state - in effect, as Smith (2005) 
suggests, making for a seismic shift in perception.  The latter foregrounds 
institutionalised confidence in regulatory systems to provide safe, reliable and effective 
service delivery but comes with some burdensome transaction costs imposed on the 
individual practitioner, skewing moral identity.  
 
In the apparatus and paraphernalia of risk minimisation, the construal of professional 
conduct as the ‘ordered well’, subverts to little more than a discipline of the workplace.  
A code of conduct isolates the workplace as a site of fractious misconduct to be 
controlled by checklists, formal processes, policies, procedures, rules, regulations, and 
instructions.  The would-be morally active practitioner is construed not as ethical fluent 
risk-taker but as assumed risk-maker.  Conduct rules, as regulated moral panic, serve 
then to illustrate Foucault's contention that the agent herself becomes a conduit of the 
regulator's capillary power where ultimately the disciplinary gaze is continuous, 
automatic and internalised. 
 
The sorry tale of the ‘modernisation agenda’ in social services redefines the deserving 
client as a litigious market price-taker and the trusting relationship to be a kind of price-
fixing measured market consumable.  That agenda also targets what McLaughlin (2007) 
calls an atavistic social care workforce, one which is adjudged inherently risky, in a 
mirror image of the construction of ferile clienthood that the neo-conservatives 
perpetuate.  In this hostile environment, the professional is relegated to remain the pre-
ethical bogey bureau-worker brokered by the restraining reins of an implacable, 
unforgiving overseer.  
 
In this sense, as an adjunct to registration, a code of conduct becomes a technology of 
control for the regulator.  Mimicking the Leviathan enforcer, it imagines that 
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malfeasance not just may happen but will happen unless it generates a prophylactic 
regimen that seeks to foreclose the eventuality.  Each infraction that challenges the 
regulatory purview requires ever more interrogative diligence.  In a vicious remoulding 
of that essential self-other symmetry, social worker behaviour is logically driven not by 
intrinsic regard for the other but by short-term preservational self-interest.  
 
The empirical evidence is slim but one suggestion, made up of in-depth case studies of 
fourteen social workers, indicates that the advent of code and registration has a 
tendency to curtail or silence dissentious collegiate debate because registrants are 
frightened to stand out for attention, be different, and be reported (Meleyal, 2009).  A 
poll of 293 social workers suggests that a colleague who has witnessed inappropriate 
professional conduct is likely not to formally report the matter (Community Care, 
2008), itself a registration offence.  Code of Practice rule 3.2 requires that social 
workers 'challenge and report dangerous abusive discriminatory or exploitative 
behaviour'.  A culture of deterrence and fear of retribution lead to ethical-cum-moral 
paralysis.  
 
Some social workers should always be accompanied with a health warning, as 
illustrated by an endless number of misconduct hearings churned out through judicial 
process.  However, the critical point is that our social work bona fides are only a 
prerequisite for commencing an ethical career.  Rather than create a vigorous expansive 
ethical environment, a code of conduct perpetuates an enfeebled, enervating one.  In the 
absence of safe, honest and open discussion, following agency procedures, instructions 
and written conventions becomes a form of moral mimesis in the defensive task of 
reputation management.  The GSCC's catechism of 'upholding the public trust and 
confidence in social care services' means little more than this.  Out of this dispiriting 
form of consuetude and its ordered superficialities, its opposite subsists.  Desuetude is a 
falling apart, a depleted identity in a moral world of ethical chaos masked by the 
superimposed order of regulatory obeisance.  This does not make for eupraxia, the 
doing of things properly in any ethical sense.  
 
Codes are made, but as moral artifacts they are already broken at the point of usage.  
Our present day conduct version is the logical concomitant of a befuddled, bedraggled 
profession that has lost its way.  Our present day Code of Practice is not a panacea for 
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our ailments but a symptom.  VE offers both a substantive theory of how we should live 
and also an explanatory theory of why we should live in that way (Crisp, 2010: 23-24).  
In the next chapter I describe a VE inspired vision beyond code based on the idea of 
supererogation beyond duty, introduced by Webb (2006a, 2006b) into social work 
discourse.  
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Chapter 3 
VE supererogation and moral paradox  
 
Introduction 
 
Updating my previous review of the social work literature, I argue that, beyond a list of 
'feel good' virtues, the key to satisfactory VE discourse is to build on the idea of 
supererogation - the social work paragon - and a notion of non-obligatory obligation.  
This introduces a theory of paradoxicality.  Out of a charactereological moral world I 
develop an enhanced laudatory notion based on the doctrine of double effect and moral 
remainder.  In this peculiar world, social workers respond to those extra-vulnerable 
others left unattended by their natural carers.  I introduce the phenomenon of moral 
bystanding which threatens the moral impulse. 
 
Updated social work VE theory 
 
Until recently the mainstream social work specific value literature has generally lacked 
the intertextual interchange to make up a satisfying virtue discourse, partly due to its 
sparseness.  There has been no consensus even regarding basic terminology, the 
difference, say, between 'virtue theory' and 'virtue ethics'.  My employ of big VE is an 
attempt to combine a tight theoretical description with a common sense evaluative 
stance of virtue and vice.  Simply espousing various traits such as reliability, 
equanimity and honesty does not get us very far.  They are dispositions which many 
would regard as no more than necessary prerequisites for practice - components of the 
fiducial line - rather than an insightful account of our distinctiveness.  It is a bit like 
being  ‘anti- this or that’, a common enough posture in social work.  There are many 
knock down lists of desirable qualities circulating in colloquial debate, but they tend to 
be much of an adjectival muchness, matching all and sundry that we value and hold 
dear, then aggregated and somehow juggled into a composite idea of ‘good social 
worker'.  They are not unimportant, just that it is hard to imagine anyone ever seriously 
proposing the opposite. 
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Explicit talk of virtue is encumbered by the taint of anachronism ill-befitting an 
unconfident profession forever trying to project itself into the future.  In an attempt to 
distance ourselves from our philanthropic charitable origins, virtue talk invites 
ambivalence if not hesitancy.  However, some of the more parochial objections are 
derived from simplistic misrepresentations of virtue ethics rather than through an open 
engagement with the paradigmatic disputes.  Within the philosophic academy, VE has 
generated a torrent of high-level technical repudiations, so we might expect this to be no 
less true for any proposed applied social work perspective, wedded as the profession is 
to its protean ideas of Kantian and Utilitarian universal right-making principles.  A 
change in the linguistic register is only just beginning to be recorded within social work 
discourse.  
 
In my 2006 critical analytical study I identified and reviewed the emergence of what I 
now have come to recognise as two specific social work discourse threads under a broad 
rubric of virtue ethics.  One aims at an integrative perspective alongside principle-based 
theory.  The other is a less conciliatory radical politico-ethical approach, although the 
two can cross over.  With regard to the former, the meld might be characterised as a 
‘common morality’ approach frequently advocated in the medical/health care literature 
(Oakley and Cocking, 2001; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001; Leathard and McLaren, 
2007), combining deontic and consequentialist principles but where moral character is 
given its due.  This trend, a kind of adjustment approach to hitherto standard moral 
theory, has now jumped the professional gap and is working its way through the social 
work literature. 
 
Since my original review, contributions by Bowles et al. (2006), Clark, C., (2007) and 
Clifford and Burke (2009) have appeared along these lines.  However, the Banks and 
Gallagher (2009) publication represents the most comprehensive mainstreaming of 
virtue-based theory.  It owes much to an interprofessional provenance although clearly 
it is intended for and has much to offer a social work audience.  After highlighting the 
theoretical underpinnings and a history of virtue ethics, the authors explore practical 
accounts of professional wisdom, courage, respectfulness, care, trustworthiness, justice 
and integrity. 
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With regard to the second radical politico-ethical thread, in beginning my own research 
into virtue ethics as a redemptive project I was inspired by McBeath and Webb’s 
seminal article Virtue ethics and social work: being lucky, realistic, and not doing one’s 
duty (2002).  This irreverent article employs a distinctive line of politically charged 
inquiry which can be traced to an earlier work, their Political Critique of Kantian Ethics 
in Social Work (Webb and McBeath, 1989).  There, they described a social work 
political historical narrative the authenticity of which was being savagely short changed 
by the juridical imperatives of state mandated welfare activity.  It was also being 
ruptured by the disciplining control exercised over the profession.  They argued that the 
actualities of social work were beginning to sit uneasily with the drone of the Kantian 
universal Categorical Imperative, and invited an examination of alternatives.  In my 
view, theirs is the first social work specific account to express the idea of an applied 
radical counter theory of virtue ethics.  It produced an immediate strongly worded 
response from Downie (1989) in support of the establishment.  This theoretical spat was 
laconically commented on by Gould (1990) who at least usefully aired the difficulties of 
conducting meaningful exchanges between advocates of separate paradigms.   
 
Houston (2003) was the first sympathetic theorist to respond to McBeath and Webb's 
2002 article, pointing out that the challenge was to establish the relevant virtues for 
social work and what these might mean in practice.  I draw on this politico-ethical 
discourse thread in developing my framework, with particular reference to Webb’s 
concluding chapter The Practice of Value in Social Work in a Risk Society: Social and 
Political Perspectives (2006a: 200-234).  Since my 2006 critical analytical study, and 
while I have been authoring my own text, what I consider to be VE complementary 
critical theoretising has appeared, mostly within a broadly hermeneutical, 
communitarian, sometimes Habermasian, moral interactive framework (Hayes and 
Houston, 2007; Houston, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Gray and Lovat, 2007; Lovat and 
Gray, 2008; Gray and Lovat, 2008; Gray, 2009; Garrett, 2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b).  
The dialogue is sustained and exchanged through themes around self-realisation, 
identity formation, moral recognition, the right to difference, redistribution of social 
capital, symbolic interaction and interlocution between significant others.  The 
Houston-Garrett interchange is indicative of the richness of the debate. 
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Gray and Webb's (2008, 2009) reassessment of critical analytical social work steers the 
conversation towards the merits of a reprised perspective.  The preoccupation with 
affirmative identity politics and the othering process in relation to social work's 
constituency is being critically re-examined as a discourse category (Webb, 2009).  This 
has generated another exchange thread (Sohlberg, 2009; Jose, 2010; Imre, 2010).  I pick 
up on some of these issues in building my own VE account which focuses on the 
problematic nature of otherness and an 'ethics of other'.  As Webb (2009: 312) suggests, 
an excessive reverence for otherness is a recipe for hypocrisy insofar as no politics can 
accommodate every other.  Gray and Webb's (2010) recent book contextualises the 
broader counter discourse, including Webb’s (2010a) chapter on virtue ethics and my 
own on Codes of Conduct (Webster, 2010).  
 
Supererogative character  
 
Virtues have to be embodied in somebody, or at least in the notion of someone, to be 
meaningful.  I claim that while a social worker may possess a virtue shared with other 
professions, that may not make the social worker in her.  Peterson and Seligman (2004: 
24-26) write about the ‘consensual paragon’, or whom they call a prodigy, someone 
who embodies those global traits that others admire and look up to. This invites an 
exploration of supererogation.  Although, for example, Beauchamp and Childress 
(2001: 40-43) mention supererogation for medicine and Pukinskiene (2006: 41-42) for 
nursing, Webb (2006a, 2006b) is the first to explore it for social work.  More exactly, 
what he does is put a name to something the idea of which is embedded but, for want of 
words, long lost in our narrative.  Further discussion of its expression, especially of its 
conceptual subtleties has, I believe, been inhibited by concerns about the charge of 
elitism, since supererogation gives rise to the notion of a 'moral expert'.  In pursuing that 
notion I echo here Foucault’s aphorism which is that not to know and take care about 
our own professional self is a self-deception.  
 
A theological concept, supererogation is about doing more than one’s duty - in our 
secular case, to get beyond the salaried obligations of rules, procedures, instrumental 
efficiencies and technologies of care - performing beyond what is owed or required.  
This invocation depends on Webb’s introduction of another key notion, that of 
individuals as strong and weak evaluators, giving rise to two types of people.  Strong 
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evaluation may be construed as the exercise of an enduring psychosocial conscience; 
low evaluation is about short-term egotistical desires and wants.  There is a supportive 
body of small-scale empirical studies through the voices of practitioners (for example, 
Lindsay, 2006) which shed some light on strong evaluators.  Reported emotions of 
embarrassment, disappointment, regret, guilt, frustration and anger have also figured 
(Banks and Williams, 2005).  These reactions can be interpreted as distressed responses 
to the experience of character violation in situations in which practitioners cannot be 
true to themselves.  
 
Webb invokes Taylor (1985, 1989, 1992) who speaks of having strong attachments to 
certain valued ends which cannot be repudiated since the agent would therefore be 
repudiating herself.  Taylor can be understood as a neo-Hegelian who identifies the 
good life in the dispositions of individuals linked to the well-being of community, one 
of those thematic anchors for VE from which Gray, Lovat, Garrett and Houston have 
helped develop the discourse.  Webb maintains that the 'real self ' is constituted in and 
through the taking of moral stances; hence the social worker has an ethical disposition 
to do the best for her clients insofar as she has the resources to do so.  She uses these to 
maximise ethical ends in the production of social capital that may be accessed by the 
client to overcome distress and assist in life planning.  Critically for VE, the social work 
self is, or should be, the most important resource.  Webb’s concern is that social work 
has almost lost, but retains the potential to be, a reflexive moral source for the 
articulation of strong evaluative goods.  
 
Webb argues that it is the dispositional vocational commitment to higher constitutive 
goods which defines social workers.  This commitment has action-guiding force and it 
has a central role in self-understanding and identity.  Echoing Taylor, Webb noted what 
might count for strong evaluations: in every socio-cultural formation we find practices 
that express some aspect of concern, love or respect for other people.  In line with 
Peterson and Seligman’s global findings, this group of goods includes tenderness, 
caring concerns and compassion.  Strong evaluation also includes the aspiration to 
human flourishing and living a meaningful and fulfilled life that is opposed to a shallow 
or empty life.  Social workers want a meaningful fulfilled life for their clients and, 
through their clients, for themselves too.  
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Social work is a natural arena in which those so disposed can exercise being their higher 
selves, forming attachments to certain strongly valued dispositions that are legitimised 
and constantly renewed though practice.  As Webb (2006a: 207) asserts:  
 
In the broadest sense we can argue that social work is a constitutive 
socioethical good that has generative power for the social worker, in that it 
permits an ethical life to be articulated and channelled towards that which 
has intrinsic worth.  
 
Types of supererogation 
 
Webb is of course describing social work's moral impulse by another name.  As with 
many apparently stable philosophical constructs, supererogation invokes different 
theoretical takes.  These are well documented in the on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy on which I draw.  The historiography of supererogation (outwith the 
original theological debate exemplified by the Christian Good Samaritan parable) is 
comparatively recent, starting with Urmson’s (1958) seminal article Saints and Heroes, 
although Urmson did not use the precise term.  The elementary idea of supererogation 
as ‘paying out more than is due’, as employed by Webb, invites a tricky debate full of 
theoretical entrapments as to whether there can be any morally good actions that are not 
required, and even if there are such actions, why they are optional (Driver, 1992; 
Zimmerman, 1996; Haydar, 2002; Kawall, 2003).  Known as the paradox of 
supererogation and the ‘good-then-ought-to-tie-up’ debate, Louden (1988) gets to the 
quick in asking the basic question, ‘Can we be too moral?’  I will draw out some aspects 
relevant to my own project.  
 
The baseline supererogatory position identifies a distinct class of moral action in that 
there are admirable praiseworthy actions that are good to do and ‘not bad not to do’.  
Thus, moral goodness and moral rightness need not be co-terminous, introducing the 
idea of moral merit adhering to some kinds of individuals.  Wrapped up in this notion of 
merit, the supererogatory good is a source of triple value, namely, (i) the motivational 
force of the agent to inform decision-making in the selection of choices, (ii) the optional 
voluntary nature of the act undertaken, and (iii) the good consequences the first two 
promote which otherwise would not have occurred.  The good promoted must be of an 
altruistic intent and other-regarding, even if in the free making of choices there are 
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subsidiary compelling duties to oneself (the sort of person one wants to be).  Moreover, 
such actions beyond the call of duty cannot invariably be expected.  Just envisioning a 
good state of affairs does not create a reason for every moral agent to bring it about.  
She must stand in a particular position to the hypothetical desirable state of affairs to 
make her have a conclusive reason to try and bring it about.  
 
Supererogatory behaviour may be desired in a world of inexhaustible moral 
imperfections (if it is ever to be challenged and improved) but it is not required of 
everybody to attempt to do so - the opt-out clause.  It can be expected only from those 
who subjectively feel the commitment to do it and who choose to revoke any opt-out 
clause, but then they must be blessed with the necessary strength of purpose, that is 
requisite character, to see it through.  This declarative exemption view of 
supererogation is both very subjectivist (the individual deliberately chooses her 'elective 
duties’ out of sentiment) and aristocratic, since it distinguishes between classes of moral 
agents, the few who are meritorious and the rest who are not.  
 
Lay people may indeed acknowledge the primary benefits of a first moral premise (such 
as to abolish hunger, disease, homelessness, child and elder abuse) but on a second 
order interjection are allowed, that is excused from, personally seeking to act on it.  
Supererogation foregrounds self-sacrifice in the sense that, in spite of permission not to 
act, the agent is prepared to do so whereas others are excused, often in contexts where 
there may be some personal risk involved.  That is why we usually admire 
whistleblowers but tend to recognise that for many people this is understandably a 
courageous step too far.  Various commentators have sought to dissolve the paradox of 
supererogation.  The technical literature is typically dense, giving rise to some basic 
classifications.  I will adapt them for their applicability to social work and its moral 
impulse. 
 
The 'anti-supererogationism’ school argues that since all morally good action is 
infinitely expansive in a fundamentally flawed world, redress must be obligatory at all 
times and in every circumstance by all morally charged agents.  Thus, there cannot be a 
separate class of action the omission of which is not wrong.  There has always been a 
fluctuating strain of this over-demanding version in our social work narrative associated 
with certain social justice radical perspectives that would cast the social worker as a 
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political superhuman activist.  Seeing behind every personal private trouble a systemic 
social ill in need of rectification is one matter; an overloaded ambition to overhaul the 
system is another, although the pioneers of our tradition sought to do so.  
 
‘Qualified supererogationism’ assumes that there are some ‘perfect duties’ - 
prescriptions and prohibitions - which must be undertaken by every moral agent unless 
there is exceptional mitigation (such as loss of faculties), but not every moral act is of 
this obligatory nature.  On this basis, there are actions which lie beyond the call of 
obligation where their value is derived from their being hypothetical, subjective, 
‘imperfect’ duties, from which one may be excused.  They are duties in a weaker 
conditional sense.  Let us say it is obligatory to care for your own children but not for 
your neighbour's when in need, although you might.  
 
An agent acts in a qualified supererogatorily way if, despite the general permission 
afforded to people to ignore the reasons, she decides to act on them in a particular 
instance (Raz, 1975).  On this account, qualified supererogation is a limited class of 
moral action that arises in certain circumstances and is carried out by certain kinds of 
people when they encounter those circumstances invoking the moral election to act 
morally.  From this class of actions there are, then, hybrid ‘supererogatory duties’ that 
will distinguish one person from another in relevant situations.  Here opt-out 
permissions are based on a second order reason that allows the ordinary moral agent to 
disregard the balance of the first order reason. I suggest that if someone wants to 
become a social worker she must learn that there is no excuse for not doing what 
ordinary people are allowed not to do.  The difference is that when a neighbour's child 
needs care we intervene.  To become a social worker, any second order reasoning must 
reinforce the first, not vanquish it, since she cannot only casually exercise her imperfect 
duty in propitious circumstance.  This moral threshold begins where ordinary people’s 
ends.  However, some such minimal social work threshold of qualified supererogation 
can only be the start of becoming a social worker. 
 
This hybrid, part-time status can be compared to the school of ‘unqualified 
supererogationism’, which states that supererogatory acts lie entirely and without 
qualification beyond the requirements of moral duty, imperfect or otherwise, and that is 
the source of their unique value.  In this case, moral options promote a freely chosen 
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compulsory way of life.  This entails the good will of the agent operating in a special 
field of liberty, ‘licentia’.  Her altruistic intention lies not in just intermittently actively 
exercising moral obligation, but in a systematic full-time engagement with the 
consequences of the failure of others who neglect their perfect duties, or those who opt 
out of their imperfect duties.  
 
The idea of unqualified supererogationism tells us that action can be a personal 
initiative occupying an extraordinary moral world beyond impersonal duty, making for 
a 'freeing- up' of the agent to do what she has to do.  Thus an unqualified supererogatory 
act is the source of extra-special moral value, in effect another moral world beyond the 
requirements of lay morality, since the inhabitant actively seeks out distress left 
unattended.  Such acts are spontaneous, that is to say, originating in personal choice 
rather than from external demands.  Unqualified supererogation allows for the life-long 
expression of care or concern for others and the creation of a special sort of dedicated 
personal space for that purpose.  I suggest that on this account if and only if [iff] 
someone commits herself to a higher threshold life of unqualified supererogation will 
she ever become a full-time morally active practitioner.  This aspiration or vocation 
becomes an authentic fiducial promise to oneself.  
 
One ought to fulfill one’s promises but making them in the first place is not required 
(Kawall, 2005; Heyd, 2005).  Promising is an act of freely given obligation but then 
becomes a non-negotiable commitment to do the best possible in discharging that 
promise.  Doctors, nurses and teachers will, or ought to have, such a commitment and 
so too social workers but in their own ineluctable manner.  Demanding a much higher 
threshold of reliability, all this is a far cry from conduced regulation. 
 
All theories of professional value purport to establish some sort of order into the 
management of moral chaos, a kind of (often sublimal) ‘triage’ notion into which the 
beginning professional is occupationally habituated.  Green (2009: 118) speaks of those 
professional ‘virtues of formation’ required so that we may make wise judgments within 
our given métier - a fusion of ‘magisterium’ (mastery) and ‘mysterium’ (something into 
which one is initiated), which helps structure our thoughts and practical reasoning and 
by which effort ethical goods are to be realised.  To temporarily lose sight of and feel 
for one’s characteristic métier is a careless moral aberration; to lose it to the extent that 
	  	  
48	  
we have forgotten that it ever existed is not only a transgression but also a renunciation 
of ethical being. 
 
The doctrine of double effect and moral remainder 
 
To act in its original sense means to take an initiative, to begin, to set something in 
motion for a purpose, to lead, take control of some raw substance and therefore 
eventually ‘to rule’ over it.  Such is the ‘vita activa’ (Arendt, 1958: 177).  To act in this 
sense is also the beginning of becoming and thus to act is not just to change and rule a 
disorderly hostile world but also to change it and rule our own destinies.  Every 
individual moral action in this sense is an articulated disclosure of a person’s own 
image.  
 
The doctrine of double effect (DDE), which distinguishes between moral acts and moral 
omissions, and between unintended and foreseen harm, helps illuminate supererogatory 
theory.  In social work, in any moral transaction there always exists a shadowy realm of 
other possibilities, some foreseeable, each of which have not come to pass but perhaps 
ought to have.  This is especially likely with moral omissions when we do not (re)act at 
all, generating another immoral state of affairs off the back of the first.  DDE also 
awkwardly reminds us of moral remainder, the unresolved residue of moral decision-
making when our nagging conscience does not let us forget what we have ignored, left 
unturned or incomplete.  Banks and Williams (2005: 1011-1012) raise the issue as one 
of regret or guilt.  Armstrong (2007: 66-72), in his approach to nursing ethics, explores 
DDE through the associated idea of ‘moral breathing room’.  As supererogatory theory 
tells us, not to intervene is itself a moral decision being played out either by active 
choice or by default.  Fitzpatrick (2008: 40) captures the idea of DDE in his rather non-
social work language: 
 
At every moment of my life there is an endless number of things I am 
omitting to do.  While typing these words I am not sending any money to 
charity, not helping grannies across the road and not finding a cure for 
AIDS; in fact not doing an endless series of laudable acts to the nth degree 
of infinity.  Does this mean I am partly to blame for underfunded charities, 
stranded grannies and the continuation of AIDS?  This is either too stern an 
allocation of moral failure or a trite observation that we are all partly 
responsible for everything.  
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I will use Fitzpatrick's allegory as a point of departure from being a lay part-time moral 
person to a metiered full-time social worker.  Fitzpatrick’s scenario is hypothetical 
musing but imagine someone similar undergoing some sort of Pauline conversion and 
deciding to become a social worker.  I will link this to the idea, as described in Chapter 
1, of two different moral worlds arising out of two different value mindsets.  Any 
ethical journey begins with an analogical imaginative quest which invites a discourse 
about moral horizon, scanning, focus, distance and proximity.  As developed by 
Smilansky (2007: 77-89), a proximal laudatory as opposed to distant deprecatory view 
of morality celebrates moral worth as a vital opportunity actively worth pursuing.  
Morality is not an unfortunate obtrusive disturbance generating an inconvenience to 
bear as a felt loss.  The more proximal that moral world is envisaged and the deeper the 
engagement with it, the more fraught the conscionable dilemmas and greater the moral 
remainder - the supreme social work paradox since we can always do more and better.  
This is what Baron (1988) refers to as a constant feeling of insufficiency - in VE terms, 
remorse and agent-regret.  It is the impossibly demanding paradoxical world of the 
moral impulse. 
 
Paradoxicality and a laudable moral world  
 
All supererogatory ethical journeys begin with troubling encounters with paradoxes. 
These paradoxes subsist, hardly recognised, in the deprecatory moral world; they 
intrude starkly in a laudatory moral world.  A paradox is not the merely perplexing, nor 
is it a conclusion that at first sounds absurd but that has an argument to sustain it.  In its 
stronger form it is an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently 
acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises, making for some sort of 
acceptable absurdity (Sainsbury, 1996: 1).  Quine (1976) distinguishes three kinds of 
this stronger version.  A falsidical paradox involves the defence of false results and can 
be dissolved through the rejection of a premise or argument.  A veridical paradox is a 
seemingly absurd result that is shown to be true and hence reasonable.  A paradox of 
antinomy entails two chains of arguments leading to contradictory results each of which 
seem well supported, so that we cannot give up on either side.  To say that a state of 
affairs is unacceptably absurd is to say something about the fundamentally alien 
relationship between this state of affairs and our sense of moral order.  
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Nowadays, altruistic helping hand motifs in social work invite automatic opprobrium. 
This is a bizarre posturing from a profession that absurdly but reasonably embeds itself 
in two such moral paradoxes described by Smilansky in Fortunate Misfortune (2007: 
11-22) and On Not Being Sorry about the Morally Bad (2007: 59-66).  Smilansky 
elucidates the conflict between the purpose of true morality to eliminate suffering and 
grievous wrongs, and the fact is that it is those very same detriments needing to be 
eliminated that call forth the moral actions that confer value.  Put simply but boldly, 
social work derives its worth from the misery of others.  ‘Morality ends up being like 
one of those mythological animals that swallows their own tail’ (Smilansky 2007: 7) - 
getting that helping hand dirty, not hand washing or hand wringing.  Our stories have 
always really been about how we would go about holding out our hand with a modicum 
of equanimity as we consort with that paradoxicality and its brouhahas.  
 
The laudatory world states there is little of significance for which an undefeated moral 
response could not be proposed to intervene.  Unlike lay people, social workers are 
indeed committed to an endless series of laudable acts to the nth degree.  Attending to 
and making up for other lay people’s immoral commissions or moral omissions - abuse, 
mistreatment, neglect of others - serve to generate the momentum.  Social work begins 
when lay people’s responsibilities (as parents, offspring, relatives, neighbours and 
friends) have failed, ceased or have been overridden, for whatever reason, and the 
morally active practitioner responds to fill the void.  The difference between being a 
moral hero and moral defaulter is heartland social work territory.  Social workers' 
concerns and their laudable moral world begin where lay people’s self-interests or 
preoccupations intervene to crowd out deliberations of moral intervention, leaving some 
people in need of care and protection extra-vulnerable.  
 
The bystander effect  
 
I introduce from a standard social psychology primer such as Hogg and Vaughan (2005: 
549-60) what is typically called prosocial behaviour theory and, in particular, the 
‘bystander effect’.  The bystander effect states that only under certain optimal 
conditions will even a genuinely altruistic individual intervene to assist another 
obviously in distress.  Individuals are less likely to take the initiative and help out in an 
emergency when they are with others in an anonymous crowd, rather than being present 
	  	  
51	  
on their own.  That is hardly unsurprising if the bystander has no helping inclination at 
all, but it is perhaps shocking if she has, even more having made a vocational 
commitment to confidently intervene.  
 
The lesson for anyone (especially clients and carers) anticipating the need for urgent 
help is to avoid seeking assistance from an amorphous group of strangers who do not 
know sufficiently who they are themselves to do something about another's plight.  I 
argue that our vocational inclination to intervene to help distressed others has in many 
ways been collectively ‘crowded out’ (Webster, 2009).  It is all too easy to become a 
moral bystander because, amongst all the rules of operation, we have lost our distinctive 
identity as unqualified supererogationists and become strangers not just to our clients 
but also to ourselves.  
 
A stress on modernistic calculative reason will always invite the intrusion of non-moral 
prudential arguments such as cost accounting or worker compliance.  Today, much of 
what passes as social work is run according to such deprecatory pragmatism.  Yet the 
movement from that deprecatory world to the laudatory world marks our rite of passage 
as social workers.  To seek and build an ethical career out of the thin material of the 
former is to invite inevitable repudiation of the effort, and to grasp the enormity of the 
latter is to commit oneself to a way of life and language that is way beyond what passes 
as normal obligation and duty. 
 
In the peculiar language of the supererogatory world, an authentic social worker is not 
obliged to follow the rules at all except for one, which is the obligation to go beyond 
them.  She cannot stand by.  In different ways, I have been speaking about what I call 
the gap of moral omissions.  An analysis of any social work case tragedy will reveal, I 
suggest, such a gap.  As bounded artifact, by its very nature code leaves unattended, 
indeed generates, gaps of omission.  In the next chapter, I adapt some VE technical 
theory from the philosophic academy to revitalise our language of paradoxicality.  I do 
so in order to reoccupy those moral-cum-ethical spaces in between the rules.  
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Chapter 4 
VE ethical labouring and theoretical synthesis  
 
Introduction 
 
I develop the neo-classical idea of VE as an elective moral (that is ethical) community.  
I suggest that the social work community is a socio-cultural manifestation of the 
laudatory moral world of supererogative agents concerned about those extra-vulnerable 
people in the wider society this community serves.  I describe morally active 
practitioners as ethical labourers operating in the gap of other people's omissions who, 
through their endeavours, serve the moral impulse towards the other.  Drawing on some 
present day VE theoretical positions, I make the argument for a social work compatible 
synthesis to lay down conceptual threshold components of ethical labouring. 
 
Virtue ethics' postmodern neo-classical revival  
 
The revival of latter-day virtue ethical discourse is usually attributed to Anscombe 
(1958).  It would be a great improvement, she suggested, to cease endless debate over 
the impossible application of modernistic notions of objectified moral duties and their 
infractions.  Rather, we should begin once again to name a moral genus such as the 
‘generous’ or the ‘benevolent’ as exemplified by a virtuous person possessing such 
qualities and see where that may take us in the management of moral dilemmas.  
Anscombe makes the point that reified moral formulae are reasoned substitutes for 
discredited faith-based axioms but tßhat in an age of atomised individualism and 
anomic secularism there is no longer any consensus, let alone final higher being, to 
arbitrate and tell us what to do.  
 
Anscombe called for the rejection of deontological and consequentialist theories, 
shifting the focus of moral evaluation away from actions on to agents - what it is to be 
an excellent person and what qualities excellent people ought to have.  The root 
meaning of 'ethika' from which the word ethics is derived is ‘matters to do with 
character’.  This is connected to the flow of society and its fabric, the ethos, the other 
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derivation from ethika.  Moral-cum-ethical strengths are often referred to as correctives, 
meaning that some temptation or weakness needs to be resisted or that some motivation 
needs to be re-channeled into something good or better for the benefit of both that 
society and that individual.  
 
In the early days of the revival of virtue ethical discourse, the VE opening shots were 
directed against the pretensions of orthodox normative theory and its artificial 
connection with the ethika.  Following Anscombe, Murdoch (1970), Pincoffs (1971), 
Foot (1972, 1978), McDowell (1979), MacIntyre (1981) and Williams (1985) all 
proceeded on the basis that the concept of a virtue is the concept of something that 
makes its possessor good (for that society) rather than the maquillage of abstract rule of 
principle.  
 
The original baseline VE claim was that it is quite unrealistic to imagine a set of rules 
that preempted considerations of biographical moral sensitivity.  Desensitised abstract 
concepts of the morally good or bad and concomitant ‘ought’ notions are far better 
explicated in terms of being a good or bad person.  This engagement may begin with the 
idea of like-minded good persons belonging to a cohering and unifying moral 
community; as Foot (1972) puts it, an army of volunteers, composed of agents who 
commit themselves to such moral ideals as justice and generosity, striving together to be 
the sort of people exhibiting those qualities.  As with supererogational theory, moral 
imperatives become hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical: there are things an 
agent ought to do, if as part of her journey, she desires justice and generosity for those 
denied, but there is nothing an agent morally ought to do if she is neither first 
committed to these moral ideals, nor to the personal journey in engaging with them.  On 
this early Foot model, what distinguishes VE from principled paradigms is that it 
construes the real moral agent as acting from real desires, or, as Foot (2001) later 
revised it, as at least acting from real motivating thoughts.  What is deemed despicable 
or contemptible or admirable or honourable, rather than proscriptive or prescriptive, 
gives us the key to the problem of determining moral action. 
 
Any VE account of social workers as morally self-organising within an elective ethical 
community will likely pay homage to the much quoted early work of MacIntyre (1981) 
with his notion of sustaining virtuous practices which are internal to the sentiments of a 
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tradition.  Reminding us of Diamond’s homily to lost discourse, virtues are those 
dispositions which enable us to achieve the goods internal to those practices (Macintyre, 
1981: 219).  In his postmodern reprise of neo-classical virtue ethics and appeal to real, 
embedded moral histories, MacIntyre's account invites us to speak of stock characters 
immediately recognisable to the audience as in morality plays.  So it is with certain 
kinds of historically constituted socio-cultural roles where formation and function 
according to psycho-social types are fused.  The character-type morally legitimises a 
mode of existence for its bearers.  Knowledge of the stock character provides an 
interpretation, meaning and signification of the actions of those who have assumed the 
character.  The role places a certain kind of moral direction and constraint on the 
personality of those who inhabit it (MacIntyre, 1981: 27-30).   
 
The gap of omissions and extra-vulnerability 
 
I see VE for social work as the search for some such lost stock character defined by 
unqualified supererogative, strong evaluative, self-other identity.  As such, a social 
worker sees her own moral agency threatened, yet also animated, by the imbroglio of 
weak evaluative tendencies all around her.  I adapt from Sellman (2005), who writes for 
nursing, the notion of extra-vulnerable or ‘more than ordinarily vulnerable’ to describe 
the laudatory world’s heightened susceptibility to the suffering individual where other 
lay people’s concerns do not materialise to intervene naturally.  On my account, social 
work ministering to the extra-vulnerable is necessarily mandated to the extent that 
natural or spontaneous care and protection afforded by otherwise preoccupied kinship 
networks are absent, distorted or perverted.  
 
By identity-conferring social work I mean those typically hard-core, often non-
consensual interventions to assess and then assist any client who is exposed to 
preventable harm or at least to the likelihood of it.  While it is true that a social worker 
may undertake other meritorious tasks, these do not make the social worker in her. 
(Similarly, other professionals may undertake associated tasks but that does not make 
them social workers.)  Social work identity arises in the concern for others deemed to be 
in a state of 'normative abnormality'.  This concern emanates from a kind of emotioning 
which, adapting a phase from Wright (2005: 92), 'brings forth our [social work] world’.  
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By normative abnormality I mean a construct of what social work on behalf of society 
deems to be morally repugnant - child and elder abuse for example.  The concern, and 
the concern about this concern, arises not in compliance with rational argument but 
from emotion because, although we may reason out the compliance, we first encounter 
the world in emotions (Maturana and Varela, 1992; Bilson, 2007).  To this we may add 
history and ways of life.  In this sense, moral practice and what I call the sophisticated 
defence and management of the moral impulse entail also what I call moral petitioning.  
Moral petitioning - meaning to assail, entreat, urgently request - is in order to bring 
about something morally desirable or to have prevented something morally undesirable.  
 
Thus, social worker practitioner-petitioners are typically embroiled in the minutae of 
disrupted everyday functional living and social relations.  This can be phenomanalised, 
using Webb's (2006a: 15) phrase, as decisive ‘fateful moments’ in the particular lives of 
distressed individuals and their families whose helplessness results in the need for 
support.  Colloquially summarised as care versus control (although we forever seek 
alternative less paternalistic and less pusillanimous descriptors), our endemic 
uncertainty stems from the realisation that any restitutional or restorative social work 
theory of moral repugnance will never work unless it beds itself down in a specific 
consensual way of life.  Neither the moral agent nor the recipient of moral agency will 
easily adhere to any theoretical moral precepts unless the precepts weave themselves 
into the texture of lived daily existence and the cadence of what passes as normal 
existence.  I refer to this commingling of precepts and daily life as practical working 
morality or, as I call it, ethical labour, making social workers reconstructive ethical 
labourers who aim to rebuild fractured lived ordinariness.  
 
The social worker’s relentless moral world of care, control and protection begins when 
the lay person’s has for whatever reason failed.  This demands not only vigilance over 
the deprecatory moral world which the social worker must transcend but also investiture 
of her laudatory one.  The double effect of a social worker's own omissive non-
interventions can permit an existing sequence of evil to persist or even initiate a new 
sequence, as serious case inquiries all too easily demonstrate.  Omitting to address some 
reasonably foreseeable wrong, such as child abuse, is the social worker’s worst moral 
nightmare and perhaps the ultimate moral failure, an utter repudiation of her own 
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identity.  Seeing the wrong but then not doing anything, or not enough, about it is 
equally so. 
 
Outwith principle and beyond code, the question then becomes just how applied VE 
might conceptually describe the authentic ethical labourer and the produce of the moral 
impulse nurtured in the labourer's sacred domain.  Virtues are considered traits of 
character that involve appropriate motivation, emotion and perception towards a moral 
subject.  There are four strands of VE analysis.  I have already mentioned two (in 
Chapter 1) as agent-based and agent-prior accounts of VE in relation to right action.  
Agent-basing theory takes the virtuousness of motive to be determined independently of 
rightness of act, an evaluation of which is to be comprehensible only in terms of motive.  
Agent-prior theory requires good motivation but presupposes that virtues are qualities in 
order to attain good moral ends.  The other two strands distinguish between long-
standing character and occurrent states of virtue.  The former deems a person's 
occurrent motives virtuous only if they issue from primary virtuous traits of character.  
The latter treats occurent states of mind as primarily virtuous, so that character is the 
disposition to have or be in those states.  I can have an occurrent compassionate desire 
to relieve your pain now, and long-standing traits of character such as compassion 
(Hurka, 2010: 58-59).  Which is cause and effect establishes the relationship of virtue to 
right action. 
 
Depending on how the four stands are combined, derivative consequentualist or 
deontological themes may be introduced, as in linking moral motives to good ends and 
occurrent states to a feeling of right action.  In terms of VE, there are many ways of 
elaborating on all four strands in terms of if and only if [iff] statements depending on 
which theorist is foregrounded.  I will concentrate on four theorists whose different 
positions I consider have much to offer the notion of social work ethical labour.  From 
these, I will draw an outline of the 'essential social worker'. 
 
VE motivation and Slote  
 
Slote (1992, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001) defends an agent-based view that acts are only 
ever morally right if in fact done from virtuous motives, using the criterion of being 
admirable.  Slote highlights the difference between doing the right thing (say preventing 
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child abuse) but doing it for the wrong reasons, and doing the wrong thing (failing to 
actually save the child) but for the right reasons.  In more complex cases, wrong motive 
(for example, obediently doing as one is told) will ultimately tell, and this is where the 
fully virtuous person and especially her motives come into their own (van Zyl, 2009).  
Consider a case of whistleblowing with malevolent as opposed to beneficent intent.   
 
If we act, as it turns out for the better, but only to protect our backs, that is surely 
unsatisfactory since a vital part of being moral is omitted.  A social worker motivated to 
help a vulnerable mother because he finds her physically attractive is not to be tolerated, 
even if successful in the help and unsuccessful in realising his ulterior motive.  Any 
code should try to tell us that.  However, consider more discrete but also surely illicit 
‘attractiveness’ motifs, which either exoticise or pathologise the client.  After Slote, I 
argue that a social work act is morally right [iff]:  
 
The social worker exhibits or expresses a virtuous (or admirable) social work motive, or 
at least does not exhibit a vicious (or deplorable) one.  
 
Critics point out that strict agent-basing accounts can make for the self-centred or 
egotistical objection to VE explored by, for example, Williams (1973), Annas (1993) 
and Toner (2006).  Caring for myself and not to hurt others, I may become a recluse for 
the very good reason of avoiding a greedy capitalist world.  The criticism is that it is not 
the desires that the agent expresses, nor that they are her desires, but that all these 
desires are for the agent and not for others.  At the very least, this raises the spectre of a 
well-intentioned operator lacking insight, whose practice really revolves around 
meeting her own needs.  The standard riposte is that a caring person is capable of 
choosing many actions some of which may fail to express or exhibit a proper inner state 
of caring.  Therefore both making and acting on the correct choice of kinds and quality 
of motives are central.  
 
To act well, the properly motivated agent is concerned to determine all salient facts and 
an agent desirous of being, say, fully admirably caring is concerned to ensure that help 
is provided in a useful, suitable way on each occasion caring is called for (Slote, 1998: 
171-94).  Salient facts would include not just who exactly is needy and why, but also an 
agent's unresolved inner conflicts.  One could say that this is what social work training 
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is or should be about.  Thus an ethical life is a matter of securing good motivation and 
acting on it but is not independent of ascertaining facts about what is needed out there in 
the world (Slote, 2001: 17-18).  Shades or quality of motive (well-informed, outward 
looking) can make a difference to evaluation of rightness (Sverdlik, 1996: 327-49).  
Slote (2001) himself has come to speak of other-regarding care and compassion motives 
to be some of those most admirable motives eponymous of virtue.  In Slote’s latest 
view, properly caring people are guided by ‘a good heart that seeks to do good for and 
by people' (Slote, 2001: 42).  
 
The criterion of admirability, a public sentiment, mitigates against the private world of 
self-centeredness.  Despite this, the charge against agent-basing of morally supine laxity 
sticks.  Driver (1995: 281-88) calls the convoluted attempts by strict agent-basing 
theorists to build in some external success criterion for right action ‘monkeying with 
motives'.  A simple enough social work VE position might be that if an agent cannot be 
convinced of correct motivation towards her clients in accordance with social work 
tradition, then there is no place for her.  However, this does not avoid the possibility 
that even though generally admirably motivated towards her clients, outward looking 
and so on, a social worker may not actually be occurently admirably motivated in a 
particular instance. 
 
There is in the Slote position not only the positive of admirability but also the negative 
of deplorability.  This invites further debate about occurent states of minds in relation to 
standing character; hence a further debate also about characteristic behaviour and acting 
out of character.  Recognizing human frailty, a modified version of Slote’s motivational 
stance, as defended by Hursthouse (1999), identifies right acts counterfactually: only 
those done by an individual would count if, hypothetically speaking, they are what a 
fully virtuous person would do or would have done in the situation.  To ensure that an 
act is to be truly admirably caring in this sense, the agent will have to look beyond 
herself and at least consider ways in which others considered to be truly caring people 
would characteristically act.  This idea leads to a discussion about perfectionism and 
paragons and therefore, by another theoretical route, what attaining or falling short of 
full virtue entails.   
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VE qualified motivation and Hursthouse 
 
We tend to infer motives from actions simply because people’s actual motives are rarely 
known to us, so we make reference to the right motives from which right actions might 
typically proceed.  The Hursthouse position begins to address the enigmatic nature of 
actual motives and the links with right action and standing character through her 
‘qualified agent’ account of rightness.  After Hursthouse, I argue that a social work act 
is morally right [iff]: 
 
It is what a virtuous social worker agent would not just do but characteristically would 
do in the circumstances. 
 
However, the idea of a hypothetical characteristic agent acting characteristically leads 
us to the recognition/inerrancy problem outlined in Chapter 1.  The notion of a 
paragonic character owes much to the ancient VE idea of ‘exemplarism’ as reprised by 
Blum (1988) and, for example, recently examined further by Zagzebski (2010).  This 
position introduces the notion of deference to our more experienced moral betters.  We 
may indeed like to think that we are caring enough, but then, hypothetically at least, 
another could always surpass us.  We are destined to strive to do better against some 
ever higher hypothetical reference point.  Moreover, a question arises as to what other 
virtues a fully virtuous person characteristically must possess, since the virtue of a 
caring disposition would presumably need to be balanced with, say, the virtue of a 
disposition to justice.  
 
One less ambitious approach could be that the higher exacting maximal vertical 
threshold for generic overall rightness of characteristic virtue is dropped and we confine 
that standard to specialisms within life, since no one is ever likely to be virtuous 'tout 
court'.  Hence, there might emerge an idea of what a fully virtuous social worker, as 
opposed to, say, a nurse, would characteristically do as a social worker.  This approach 
also allows for the idea of threshold specialisms even within a particular way of life.  In 
these instances it follows that non-specialists should defer to one who is identified as a 
specialist expert.  In medicine, while I may value the virtues of my caring general 
practitioner, if I have a serious heart condition, all other things being equal, I am likely 
to value more the virtues of my caring cardiologist.  I assume that both are admirably 
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motivated towards me characteristically within their roles.  Another way to describe this 
threshold relationship is to use the VE metaphor of a target at which different 
professions, and within them generalists and specialists, might characteristically aim.  
 
VE target theory and Swanton 
 
Building on Audi (1997), Swanton (2001, 2005) argues that a critical dimension of 
virtue is the characteristic target it aims at, allowing for the idea of characteristic and 
varying social work targets.  Swanton uses a notion of good enough as a variable 
threshold concept.  In a world of catastrophe and neediness, being target-centred 
embraces the good enough issue of how broadly or how narrowly we should understand 
the notion of moral virtue.  A virtue’s field consists of those items that are the sphere of 
concern of the virtue, and to which the agent should respond sufficiently in line with the 
virtue’s demands (Swanton, 2005: 19-20).  Hitting the target of virtue is a form of 
success in the moral acknowledgment of our responsiveness to items in its field.  It is 
appropriate to the aim of virtue in the given context and the remit and capabilities of the 
aimer.  For example, benevolence will be expressed in many forms depending on who 
the particular moral agent is and her mandate, and who the particular recipient is and 
why she is one.  
 
Hitting the target will involve several modes of nuanced moral response.  A good friend 
does not merely promote the calculated material good of her friend: the friend also 
appreciates, respects and loves her friend in infinitudinous expressions of friendship.  
Swanton refers to these modes of moral responsiveness which comprise the virtuous 
disposition in action as the profile of a virtue.  The various modes of moral 
acknowledgment comprising the profile of, say, justice, reflect the demands of justice in 
a complex moral world.  This idea gives rise to prospects for a profession-specific 
profiling of a virtue.  This has several features that are relevant for social work.   
 
Profiling and modality of acknowledgment envelop the Hursthouse idea of moral 
expertise characteristically discharged but allow for acceptable variation.  The particular 
hit to be aimed at may be exactly in the centre, an expert’s moral bull’s eye so to speak, 
but need not be so precise where a beginner's hit is considered good enough.  
Suspecting child sexual abuse, a teacher or a non-specialist, inexperienced social worker 
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may rightly refer to a child sexual abuse expert.  That we should at least know enough 
to know we do not know enough, but that others do, might be an instance of the trait of 
humility beloved of VE theorists.  Of course, deference comes with high expectations.  
Far more morally sophisticated precision in the management of that child's suspected 
abuse is to be expected of the expert.  We assume the expert to be even better at spotting 
child sexual abuse (the target) in the first place, whereas others might be excused for not 
spotting it.  Such permissible variation in accuracy is a key feature of VE target theory, 
enabling us to have a view about the moral adequacy of acts according to the context 
and the type of possessor of virtue (Lavin, 2004).  After Swanton, I maintain that a 
social work act is morally right [iff]:   
 
It acknowledges or responds to items in the field of virtue in an excellent or good 
enough way.  
 
One of Swanton’s key points is that what precisely counts as a virtuous act is more 
heavily contextual and person specific than what counts less exactly as an action from 
virtue.  While an action of giving, arising from the disposition of beneficence, is 
generically virtuous (an action from virtue), there are many occasions when to simply 
give would actually contribute to the wrong-making features of the situation.  Here, 
only the much finer attuned specialist benefactor, familiar with the demands of the 
situation and the context, will generate a virtuous act.  This has implications for just 
how the social worker's care and control remit is to be played out in a sophisticated 
way.  It also perhaps explains why inexperienced newly qualified practitioners who are 
given premature responsibility for demanding case loads, requiring absolute precision of 
aim and target, are likely to fail.  
 
Any means-end success imbued notion of virtue display and targeting makes for 
exploration of uneasy virtue predicaments.  Swanton recognises that the target of some 
virtues, their modes and profiling, are not just other-external but self-internal.  The 
target of anti-racist practice is not just an external endeavour to change an unfair 
belittling world that diminishes its victims.  It is also an internal one, to change an 
unfair belittling attitude diminishing of ourselves as unwitting perpetrators.  The target 
of courage is to take control of an external danger but it is also to control inner fear.  
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A line of thought by Driver (2001) takes the success argument to one extreme where 
moral virtues are ever only those traits of character that actually systematically produce 
good consequences, whether or not these be known to or planned by the agent.  While a 
charming counter to the egotistical claim, not knowing just why, if or when we might be 
successful, and how that may differ from a lay person or another professional, is hardly 
a recipe for replicable social work practice.  Adams (2006) holds the non-
consequentualist view that pursuing ‘virtue for virtue’s sake’ is intrinsically desirable 
for anyone.  However, in social work our particular moral aim and target set a far more 
stringent test than that of virtue for virtue's sake.  In some theoretical permutations, 
particularly discussion about virtue display, virtue as a means to an end and virtue as an 
end in itself coalesce, giving rise to complex moral epistemological and ontological 
debates.  One practical answer, at least for social work, is an idea of baseline and 
higher-level  'V-clauses'. 
 
VE axiological theory and Hurka 
 
Hurka’s (2001, 2010) ‘recursive’ notion of causal explanation argues that the 
connection between right action and overall virtue need not rely on the assumption that 
one is to be derived from the other.  Instead, each involves a relation to a shared third 
moral property which links them.  He gives an example.  It may be that smokers drink 
more than non-smokers and drinkers smoke more than non-drinkers.  But the 
explanation of this correlation need not be that smoking causes drinking or vice-versa.  
Some third factor such as sociability or fondness for partying may cause people both to 
smoke and drink without any causal connection between the two.  The same possibility 
exists for right action and virtue.  They may be connected not because either is 
identified in terms of the other but because each involves a relation to some third moral 
property, which explains their frequent coincidence (Hurka, 2010: 59-60).  
 
Hurka calls this third axiological moral property an intrinsic moral baseline or ‘base-
clause’ towards which a virtue, as a recursion-clause higher-level moral concept, is 
identified by its intentional relation.  A base-clause starts by stating that certain states of 
affairs other than virtue are viewed as intrinsically good.  A recursion-clause is then 
added about the intrinsic goodness of a certain attitude to what is base-clause good.  So, 
if an abuse- or neglect-free childhood or a happy fulfilling old age for all elders are 
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deemed intrinsic goods, then loving or desiring or taking pleasure in their achievement 
and in eradication of their counterfactuals are also intrinsically good.  
 
Not all who concur with the base-clause then commit to it, as the Fitzpatrick scenario 
described in Chapter 3 suggests.  Committing to the base-clause is an independent state 
of mind requiring an independent stance, so a good in itself.  Commitment is shown in 
‘V-verbs’ such as to prize, protect, restore, and overcome.  Regardless of whether any 
V-verbing action succeeds in its aim, its origin in a desire to honour the base-clause 
makes it a form of loving that good.  Hurka's idea is that a recursion-clause attitudinal 
state of hating an evil may generate further recursion-clauses.  One may love knowledge 
(for example, of the aging process, of welfare policy impediments, of indirect 
institutional discrimination, of cultural variation) in order to be more effective in 
overcoming neglect of elders and securing for them happier, more fulfilling lives.  
Hence V terms such as curiosity and critical thinking, as described by Peterson and 
Seligman (2004: 109-196).  Yet again, love of curiosity and critical thinking is a 
relational not a conditional clause, since not every sympathetic concerned person 
commits to or has the capacity for systematic learning about elders.  
 
While knowledge here is at one level instrumental  - all the better to help elders - loving 
knowledge for knowledge itself is an independently justified virtue.  This is because the 
thirst for knowledge, love of its possession and its deploy make the owner the sort of 
person she wants to be, one who characteristically sets out to bring about a better world 
for elders.  She wants to be not just someone who sympathises with the plight of at-risk 
elders, but also one who wants to know all about and actively engage with elders in a 
sophisticated way.  These various claims employ a simple pattern.  After Hurka, I claim 
that a social work act is morally right [iff]:   
 
The social worker acquires, exercises and develops appropriate recursive attitudes to 
social work baseline evils.  
 
There are social work evils such as elder abuse.  The appropriate attitude to that evil 
should be strongly negative, so it is virtuous and intrinsically good to be pained by and 
hate that evil and to desire and seek the absence of that evil, actively looking for 
opportunities to do so.  Recursively, it is virtuous to want to stop someone hurting 
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elders but then to understand why some do, all the better to stop it.  The social worker’s 
intrinsic good end is correlated with the elimination of social work evils through a 
characteristic exercise of all relevant recursion-clauses.  Love of knowledge about the 
particular world of the elder may also then recursively generate an appetite for self-
knowledge.  The social worker will want to examine the impact of her social work self 
on the ageing client in case she unwittingly duplicates writ small what is base-clause 
wrong with the world writ large.  I examine the notion of self-effacement in the next 
chapter in order to stress the problematic developmental relationship between social 
work base-clause motivated naivety and characteristic recursion-clause sophistication.  
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Chapter 5 
VE and moral schism  
 
Introduction 
 
I present a critical notion of self-effacement to describe the negation of the moral 
impulse as an ethical friendship.  This latter requires a supererogative moral gaze, 
centred on the distressed person, a 'looking' skill acquired through a maturational 
process of moral pedagogy.  I describe this through the notion of 'moral continence'.  
Early VE theorists claimed that principle-based theory - hence any code - is technically 
self-effacing, meaning that either the person disappears from moral sight or else the 
theory does.  The tu quoque counter-attack is that VE ultimately is no different.  The 
dispute revolves around the nature of spontaneous fluent behaviour.  I introduce some 
relevant standard learning theory to engage with this.  
 
VE continence theory 
 
One of the strengths of the VE paradigm is that it invites a debate about agent effort, 
deviation and error proneness in the attainment of virtue.  In the Aristotelian 
psychological language of continence, a less than fully virtuous person could be either 
'enkratic' or 'akratic' (Stohr, 2003).  One can over-indulge or under-indulge in 
beneficence and it can even be of the completely wrong property, missing the target 
entirely.  A person may also have some coarser antithetical tendencies such as rank 
selfishness.  The enkratic person performs benevolent acts of the right kind, level and 
intensity although only through strength of mind does she overcome competing 
motivations, holding back contrary internal pressures.  She is described as continent.  
The akratic person also has competing motivations but being weak-willed fails to 
overcome them and can at best only perform much diluted benevolent acts, so is 
described as incontinent.  The vicious person does not have competing motivations - the 
agent is not conflicted at all.  In the name of beneficence she is simply disposed to 
exploit another's vulnerability because it gives, perhaps, some gratification.  I am not 
suggesting that too many social workers are of this sort, only that today social workers 
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are much preoccupied and diverted by other counterveiling pressures impairing their 
moral vision. 
 
The paradigmatic debate around the language of self-effacement is about the enigmatic 
nature of being fully (as opposed to being less than fully) virtuous, a moral perception 
gap, and the would-be social worker's movement from the deprecatory to the laudatory 
moral world discussed in Chapter 3.  This movement aims for the idea of ethical 
labouring as ultimate moral fluency - the journey from naivety to sophistication.  This is 
problematic, not in the obvious sense of being a personally daunting error prone 
journey, but because it encounters those conceptual challenges arising out of the broad 
redundancy charge introduced in Chapter 1.  McDowell (1998: 73) captures well the 
moral perception metaphor which informs much VE:  
 
Occasion by occasion one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying 
universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees 
situations in a certain distinctive way.  
 
I equate supererogative modality with the development of moral perception, leading to a 
characteristic social work look or gaze.  Our intrusive, ever urgent curiosity should 
make for a distinctive 'spectacular' regard for the distressed other, looking at and 
looking again with due deference at that person in her predicament, hence our value 
discourse about who we make out, how and why.  We project how, through elimination 
of the distress, the client could be restored to some sort of human completeness.  On 
entering into the life of another, a social worker must always stare intensely in order to 
recognise and give a name to that distress, and a value regarding its elimination.  She 
must deal with it, exit, and as far as possible leave behind a restored person.  To fail to 
work this complex moral mean - being there for the other person, for the right reason 
and in the right measure - is to violate not only the client but also the social worker’s 
authentic self.  In the transformation between motivation and action and the production 
of value through ethical labour, to lose the balance, that is the pivotal centrality of the 
client, is to void the point of being a social worker.  
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Self-effacement 
 
To efface is to rub out, erase, obliterate, or eclipse.  I will refer to self-effacement 
technically and also analogically, expanding it imaginatively to mean that form of moral 
blindness where we fail to see our clients and who they are because we fail to see 
ourselves and who we should be.  A moral theory is said to be technically self-effacing 
if it tells us that at least sometimes we should not be motivated by those considerations 
by which its own inner logic would have us justify our acts.  This gives rise to an 
unreasonable absurd paradox where the argument turns in against itself.  With 
mainstream social work discourse still fixated in 1960s and 1970s moral formula talk, 
this momentous self-effacing claim has passed us by, but surely we feel it through our 
lived experience. The paradox is perhaps most famously put by Stocker in a much 
quoted article, The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories (1976), one of the 
important early position statements in the virtue ethics movement.  Stocker uses the 
story of a hospital visit and the motivation for it to try to show the superiority of virtue 
ethical moral vision over deontic and consequentalist ones.  However, thirty years on, 
Keller (2007) put forward an alternative hospitality scenario, to illustrate why he 
believes virtue ethics is also technically self-effacing - the tu quoque argument. 
 
I will lay out the baseline Stocker position, drawing on Keller's own phraseology before 
outlining my interpretation of Keller's tu quoque riposte and its relevance for social 
work.  In building his own argument Keller helpfully selects some illuminating quotes 
from Stocker which I replicate since they seem to me to capture the issues in contention.  
As Stocker (1976: 459) puts it of deontic and consequentualist paradigms: 
 
What is lacking in these theories is simply - or not-so-simply - the person . . 
. . . . The person - not merely the person’s general values nor even the 
person-qua-possessor-or-producer-of-general values - must be valued. 
 
Stocker's basic claim is that these theories do not retain plausibility because their 
accounts of how people should be motivated differ from their accounts of what gives 
people reason to act or makes their acts right, hence defeating themselves as theories.  
They are therefore self-effacing.  Stocker (1996, 2003) subsequently developed his 
original moral schizophrenia argument to a position which locates value firmly in 
emotions, emotional identification and the closeness and size of the target.  Armstrong 
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(2007: 51-52) for nursing, Webster (2008a, 2008b), Wright and Webster (2008: 110-
112) and Webb (2010a: 114) for social work, and Banks and Gallagher (2009: 67) for 
health and social care, discuss or mention Stocker but I do not think Keller’s technical 
riposte and its implications for practice have been anywhere fully articulated.  I will stay 
with but embellish Stocker’s allegorical hospital visit to illustrate and expand the 
argument because it applies just as well to any social work scenario. 
 
A friend comes to visit you in hospital.  She tells you that her motive for visiting is not 
some expression of concern but rather to conform to a moral rule ('visit hospitalised 
friends'), or to bring about the best available state of affairs, which the visiting does.  A 
hospitalised Kantian or Utilitarian philosopher may feel comforted by this display of 
theory at work but surely most emoting patients in a state of vulnerability would not.  
The visitor does not really value you so much as the moral prescription to visit and, as it 
happens, paying you a visit was the best way for her to serve that value today, rather 
than, say, staying at home and writing up her doctorate.  Having decided to visit, she is 
not paying her friend a visit but paying a call to the moral prescription after costing out 
the inconvenience.  Here, the moral ‘debt’ and its discharge are to the moral rule, or to 
the conduct, not to the person in need.   
 
A visitor might know that there are putative benefits to the patient accruing from a visit, 
but I hold that the good consequences are conditional on the primary motivation of 
being there in the first place.  Just as it is hard to imagine a true friend saying to me that 
her friendship is actually conducted in line with a reified set of rules, it is no less so for 
a social worker’s transactions.  True friendship (paying one’s respects) is not according 
to a rulebook and its procedures but is a composite of mutual histories and shared 
directions projected into a jointly constructed future.  As Smilansky's account of the 
paradoxical reminds us (Chapter 3), our interdependency is deeply affirming since 
without it each could not be the person we have become and would like to be.  While 
not necessarily borne out of adversity, friendship is mutually helping each other through 
the vicissitudes of life, a weaving of each person’s pathway.  For friends, the inevitable 
misfortunes of each afford the opportunity to affirm their friendship. 
 
To the extent to which social workers are motivated by following codified rules they 
cannot be genuine friends.  Yet as Stocker (1976: 462) puts it, the action-guiding 
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immediacy of genuine friendship is surely one of the most morally valuable things there 
are.  The connection with social work is that it bespeaks a very special intense type of 
person-centred, self-other moral transaction.  If social workers are forced to be moved 
by some alien logic lacking the person, our value discourse is bound to be also self-
effacing, of our clients and of ourselves.  
 
Implausibility of standard moral theory  
 
Stocker’s basic technical position is that if it is argued that people should be moved 
directly by consequentalist or deontological concerns then no room is allowed for 
genuine friendship, or for many of those other personal relationships that play an 
intuitively essential part in normal life.  Invoking the language of Keller (2007: 222-
223), for the consequentalist, cases like Stocker’s therefore give reason to absurdly 
conclude that the best consequences will not necessarily be brought about by people 
who are motivated to bring about the best consequences; hence there are sometimes 
good consequentialist reasons not to recommend consequentialist motives.  For the 
deontologist, the task is to explain how someone can engage in valuable personal 
relationships while being moved by deontic rule considerations.  As Keller notes (2007: 
223), on the Stocker argument, the deontologist may prefer to embrace self-effacement 
by saying that deontic moral rules are such that sometimes in order to follow them the 
agent must be moved by a rule of consideration other than that of following the rules.  It 
seems to me that many social workers can relate to both conclusions. 
 
Either way, the consequentialist and deontologist are skewered, making for the double 
bind moral schism that I claim is encapsulated in codified conduct and that nowadays 
we feel as social workers.  Stocker's parable tells us to grapple morally and act in ways 
that are not schismatic, where a social worker’s heightened careful emotioning and 
careful reasoning are in harmony, where there is no headlong flight into the false 
security of rules, policies and procedures but instead an encounter with the distressed 
other as a human being.  As social workers we do of course want to eliminate or reduce 
real harm as a matter of principle and because of the undesirable consequences; we may 
even want to try to measure that harm, prioritise it and cost out the remedies, but it is 
neither the harm nor the costs that should drive us to act but the real person, the one 
who is being harmed.  All the rest is, or ought to be, supportive paraphernalia.  
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A rebuttal might be that our service ideal is purposely not about personal friendship but 
a professional relationship better managed by impersonal cold reason.  But this is 
exactly what I have been criticising.  Affectivity or feeling for another is nowadays 
reduced to codified instruction about impropriety.  In losing the person as friend, such 
risk aversion inevitably privileges a bureaucratic perspective where good encounters are 
to be measured by slide rule panjandrums.  We sometimes literally do not see a bruise 
on a child because the accusation of intimacy in looking is far more powerful than the 
evil that is rendered invisible.  
 
Self-effacing theories are of the falsidical paradox type described in Chapter 3.  They 
cannot tell us as social workers what should properly motivate us, so they do not fully 
tell us how to live and be as social workers.  Self-effacing principles preclude the 
attainment of an important good, namely the good of a psychologically harmonious 
social work life where the high evaluator agent is motivated by, and acts on, the things 
she takes to be genuinely important.  Being there for the other person begins where the 
ties of benevolence of natural sorts of friendships (parents, offspring, family 
neighbours, community) fail.  As Stocker  (1976: 454) puts it:  
 
We should be moved by our major values and should value what our major 
motives seek . . . . . such harmony is the mark of the good life. 
 
The term ethical friendship is of course a tautological one.  In the reunification of word 
and deed, on a laudable proximal account one cannot be a social worker and not be a 
friend, just as one cannot be a friend and then, morally, not respond.  Social workers 
have failed to pay attention to the language of friendship underpinning their historical 
narrative.  This is the real nature of our deprofessionalisation.  It is as if we no longer 
have a self-referential standard of friendship internal to our practices by which to 
evaluate and measure ourselves, and which is of intrinsic value itself.  
 
An internalism argument 
 
To see with perspicacity the misfortune of a distressed extra-vulnerable other and to 
address her fully and the misfortune proportionally are the hallmarks of social work 
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friendship  - the sine qua non of our professional being.  These hallmarks emanate from 
and sustain our good traits.  Their obverse can only make for bad traits.   Rephrasing 
Adams (2006: 3), such good and bad traits are a major factor in how well our social 
work life, not just our day, is going morally.  These traits are commonly seen as 
determining the extent to which each of us is a reflective self-directing ethical person as 
revealed through our chosen projects and allegiances over time.  
 
VE brings forth the language of moral spontaneity, amounting to, in Adams’ sense, 
virtue for virtue’s sake.  Surely, first and foremost, we want to be there for our clients 
and not for implausible rules.  The question is to what extent all this spontaneity - the 
hypothetical ‘moral party for two’ syndrome  - flatters only to deceive.  The issue goes 
back to just how the naive moral impulse is or can be defended in a sophisticated 
manner by a morally active, fully virtuous practitioner, and to what extent those not yet 
in fully virtuous states (akratic or enkratic) can survive the journey.  
 
We have seen with Hurka in Chapter 4 that there is a necessary but not sufficient 
connection between value and motivation (the internalism argument) since people need 
not be fully motivated to act even by those values that they embrace.  Moreover, only 
some will fully engage with the full range of, say, benevolence.  Epistemic qualities of 
excellence, such as intellectual open-mindedness (Riggs, 2010), and those related self-
management ones such as humility, arise out of full awareness of our fallibility as 
human beings.  Such qualities should enable us to work with an acceptance of moral 
complexity and ambiguity, humbly entering our clients' private worlds.  A person with 
the quality of open-mindedness is motivated to attain the whole picture truth yet be 
willing to consider alternative ideas even as a truth is established.  A social worker will 
never be complete, therefore if she thinks she is done, she would be completely finished 
as a social worker.  Hence a fundamental VE acknowledgment that our ethical journey 
never ends no matter how morally fluent we would like to think we have become.   
 
As with moral virtue, our intellectual qualities may fall short, so that we do not know 
what we need to know well enough to function correctly towards our ends.  Knowledge 
needed to be VE-standard excellent requires its own grammar of expression (Battaly, 
2010a).  The resultant discourse revolves around habituation or 'habits of the mind' and 
the direction of moral movement.  The Hurka position tells us that a fully caring agent 
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must also care about the truth of that caring and its various modes.  Reliability, itself a 
candidate recursion-clause virtue, invites a discourse about what is epistemically 
constitutive of reliability.  Reliability is not just trivially doing what one said one would 
do, but, for example, unravelling the knowledge required to always do the best possible 
for the particular client in any situation.  Whereas a vicious social worker will have a 
closed mind, it would be hard to imagine a virtuous one who does.  
 
Lacking temperance altogether, counterfactual corresponding cognitive states such as 
‘epistemic self-indulgence’ (Baehr, 2010) and even ‘epistemic malevolence’ (Battaly, 
2010b) are not just analogues of akratic or enkratic states of mind but of two sorts of 
moral vice.  The indulgence one is manifest in social work as, say, more or less any 
moral stance goes so long as it is effusively declared upfront.  The malevolence one 
thrives on deep personal enmity and permits us, using a term coined by Baehr (2010: 
191), to ‘enemize’ our clients, as with racist or gendered negative constructions of 
clienthood and in our periodic moral panics.  Bearing such internalism arguments in 
mind, Keller's (2007) tu quoque argument challenges the very idea of full virtue in an 
epistemic sense.  It can be linked to the broad redundancy argument against VE 
described in Chapter 1.  
 
The tu quoque response 
 
The continence argument that renders only the right sort of internalism plausible as the 
basis of ethical friendship also renders VE vulnerable.  This undermines those features 
of internalism that make it an attractive doctrine in the first place, namely the 
connections it forges between values and the explanation and the justification of action 
(Johnson, 1999).  In this vein, Pollard (2003) poses the question of whether virtuous 
action can be both habitual and rational since acting habitually without thinking about it 
is hard to reconcile with the idea that actions are for deliberate good reasons. 
 
We should not need to think hard about visiting a friend in hospital.  Bearing this in 
mind, Keller describes a hospitality scenario in which three friends observe a family 
struggling to erect a tent in a storm.  The scenario is intended to question whether the 
very idea of full virtue is epistemically plausible.  His three moral agents agree to 
provide the family with shelter and sustenance.  Keller proposes that the three hosts 
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enter into rescue mode for a different mixture of reasons and sentiment.  The first one is 
automatically motivated to relieve the family's misery; the second person is motivated 
to act generously and deduces that supplying shelter is the correct way.  The third 
person is motivated to do what the fully virtuous person would do, and reasons that the 
fully virtuous person would indeed offer this kind of hospitality in this very situation.   
Keller's point is that what this third moral agent is really motivated to do is in effect to 
emulate such a person.  She is driven by the thought 'here I am acting as the virtuous 
person would' (Keller 2007: 226). 
 
As Keller (2007: 227) says, from a virtue ethical perspective there is something 
deficient about the latter two moral agents since their motives would seem to preclude 
them from being fully generous.  In order to be fully generous, a moral agent needs to 
be moved in action by thoughts that are neither about her own generosity nor indeed her 
resemblance to a fully virtuous person.  Keller suggests that having the governing 
motive of acting like a virtuous person logically precludes the possibility of being one 
in the full sense of moral immediacy of the sort Stocker envisaged.  At the very least, 
Keller (2007: 229) maintains, anyone being fully virtuous would have to make sure that 
the thought of acting like a fully virtuous person is not the motivation when she comes 
to perform fully virtuous acts of her own.  Keller therefore concludes that even having 
that consideration as a governing motive is structurally, in Stockers' own term, 
'schizophrenic'.   
 
Just what might be the implications of this seemingly pedantic conclusion for a social 
work practice of value?  It at least illustrates how knowing just what a fully virtuous 
person would actually do in the circumstances in order to be one is inevitably 
contestable and an error prone exercise.  However, Keller does allude to the possibility 
that if we are making an honest effort to improve ourselves then it is helpful to focus on 
our own thoughts, qualities and some guiding ideal.  Recasting this theme, I adapt and 
embellish the Keller scenario in terms of moral pedagogy.  The Keller allegory, a 
symbolic comforting the stranger rescue, is in line with the VE position that a moral 
agent does not rationally act benevolently in order to be benevolent (a deontic rule), or 
even to produce benevolence (a calculated outcome).  The agent acts intuitively 
benevolently because the sudden situation she faces fits a description of one that elicits 
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this quality in the right measure and the agent has the requisite moral capacity to feel, 
know and respond appropriately to that situation.  
 
Redefining Keller's hosts, I propose one to be a moral novitiate (my term) who, 
requiring instruction, is learning by doing as she is told.  In this case, she didactically 
imitates the act of a paragonic master who spontaneously exhibits fluent hospitality.  
Seeking to please by obeying (or imitating) is reasonable since, after all, she is only a 
novitiate.  I designate the second host as a more advanced moral sophomore (also my 
term) who observes the expert’s exhibitions of fluency over a period of time and 
extrapolates from them what typically to do.  She has internalised what to do as a 
mental blueprint to apply to similar situations. This is not dissimilar to rule-based 
deontic and consequentalist theoretisation because the sophomore needs some sort of 
mental structuralisation.  She has acquired some handy rules such as ‘if you were in that 
situation wouldn’t you like somebody to offer you help?’ 
 
The VE ethical trajectory suggests that one learns to be correctly hospitable by passing 
through the two formative stages, eventually attaining a summative moral perceptual 
capacity.  This marks out my third type, the fully mature kind person whose hospitality 
is one moral card in a long suit.  In this seemingly straightforward helping hand case, 
the outcome is the same by all three, but that will not always be so in more complex, 
morally ambiguous situations, the sort social workers typically face.  The VE argument 
is that kindness itself is a capacious, contextually sensitive phenomenon, requiring a 
particular mode of acknowledgement and hence a proportionate response.  
 
Motivation to this sort of kindness does not require thought because it is an immediate 
context sensitive moral response which if reasoned out would therefore likely miss what 
is usually a transitory target briefly in focus.  This sensitivity is, as McDowell (1998: 
51) says, a sort of expansive perceptual capacity and the morally attuned person sees 
and extrapolates the specific demands of kindness by feeling them according to the 
situation.  Sometimes, as common sense tells us, the kindest act is not to be kind at all.  
By way of contrast, the novitiate or even the sophomore will be prone to exhibiting 
what are sometimes called faux virtues, forms of virtue expression which through lack 
of moral maturity may lead to situational error of judgment.  The VE idea of akratic and 
enkratic states is linked to this.  
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My Slote-Hursthouse-Swanton-Hurka VE template, described in Chapter 4, would be 
activated by employing some similar pedagogy as set out above but this hits a snag.  
Getting back to Keller's scenario, one implication of his technical point is that, at least 
on some occasions, even the master expert must first consider and only then act.  
Prudence seems to require that you would at least pause to check out your expert 
inclination and make sure that being spontaneously kind is the correct course of action, 
even for apparent like-for-like situations.  You will therefore still have to have call on a 
guiding Hursthouse-like thought such as 'right action in this instance is that which a 
fully virtuous person would perform'.  This surreptitiously lets into the expert's equation 
a necessary consideration of emulation yet again, thus providing a reason for action that 
is not the same as the motive to help.  Yet if we are committed to actually being a 
virtuous agent, not just acting like one (even though on the Keller argument we must 
not have the thought of either when we do act), the VE story about good motivation 
seems to come apart. 
 
One implication for analysis of the source of value is that to delay spontaneity for even 
one second to reflect, no matter how briefly, on options, is to be referring to some 
extraneous maxim.  The fact that this checking out may be undertaken enigmatically, 
leaving no external epistemic markers, does not change the substantive point.  In critical 
dilemmas, the very sort encountered by social workers, it is good spontaneous habit not 
to be habitually spontaneous but to appeal to some organising principle to check 
whether the situation is subtly or soberly different from all other previous encounters.  
If the demands of morality require us to interrogate good moral habit to ensure it is 
good, then we need a standard other than the habitually given by which to measure it.  I 
further explore aspects of this position through some standard learning theory.  
 
Standard learning theory 
 
The Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986, 1991, 2004) model of learning outlines a process of 
five stages of capability acquisition - novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient 
through to expert.  The process is characterised by the balance of context-free and 
situational rules.  The learner begins by taking instruction, often by copying the 
behaviour of the more experienced.  She progresses to more intermediate, detached, 
abstract and consciously analytic behaviour applied to a particular situation.  Finally, 
	  	  
76	  
she exhibits skilled behaviour, which is based on intuitive, non-stereotypical recognition 
of similarities with, and differences from, past experience.  Moving through stages, the 
learner gradually develops situational rules which cannot be objectively defined free of 
the situation or context.  
 
The trainee is increasingly able to prioritise correctly the importance of situational 
factors in her decision-making, generating a chosen perspective to deal with the 
situation.  Eventually, the perspective and analysis are intuitive in that no conscious 
choice or plan is needed.  Actions follow from understanding which has been developed 
through recognising patterned similarities to past experience, only pausing to reflect on 
and incorporate what is novel and thus banking ever more refined precedent for future 
action.  Benner (1984) speaks of a continuum of skill acquisition from rule-bound 
beginner fixated on slavishly following the rules even when they do not appear to fit at 
all, to learning how to apply and adapt the maxims to particular cases and eventually 
knowing when and why to ignore them altogether. 
 
Dall’Alba and Sandburg (2006: 399-405) describe this understanding as a critical 
movement of difference arising out of a horizontal dimension of skill acquisition (which 
consolidates capability based on learning from like-for-like situations) and a vertical 
dimension based on transformative variation in understanding (arising out of 
interrogation of not like-for-like situations).  The capacity of non-routine thinking to 
perceive what has never before been encountered, and hence is unique in any situation, 
requires an unrehearsed and creative response.  This might be said to be the apotheosis 
of insouciant expertise.   
 
Applying this to the moral domain, consider the view that interrogating moral habit is 
an actual excellence of mind.  A ‘reasons internalism’ view makes room for some 
habitual actions to count as motives for reasoning where reasoning itself is a habitual 
action.  In VE terms, moral creativity sets apart the expert, one who recreates herself 
anew in each act as an affirmation of enduring self.  The habit of always looking again 
more deeply at the distressed other after the first emotive glance, to see beyond 
restrictive conventions of engagement, is essential if we are to see the authentic face of 
the hidden real person.  Making a moral rule of embracing careful spontaneity is what I 
described in Chapter 3 to be, after all, a reasonable absurdity in the acknowledgment of 
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another’s unadorned uniqueness.  It is surely part of respect (to look at with esteem, so 
in a non-injurious, non-insulting or non-degrading way), the aim of which is the 
diametrical opposite of effacement.  Behind all the sophistication, this interhuman 'rule 
of uniqueness' aims to make for a decluttered moment of recognition, one of Levinas-
like pure non-indifference to the call of the other pure and simple.   
 
The internal target of knowing oneself fully by suspending one’s as-given responses is a 
part of the peculiar self-correcting V-method and an ethical skill in itself.  This is 
characterised by a lifelong commitment to reflexivity, punctuated by endless pauses to 
the nth degree, in order to become a less error prone person.  I maintain that an 
internalist based narrative for dealing with the ever-present prospect of moral failure is a 
reasonably absurd accommodation of Keller’s challenge.  To develop this argument, in 
the next chapter I look at the idea of moral expertise as a special, demanding, 
accountable sort of knowing reasonableness.  To contextualise this for social work 
practice, I first examine the recent social science situationist critique of VE theory that 
would derail any such biographical journey.  The situationist challenge makes for 
another sort of self-effacement charge against VE but from a different direction.  Any 
internalist reasonableness argument intended to counter Keller's charge also needs to 
accommodate the externalist one.  
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Chapter 6 
VE fragility and situationism  
 
Introduction 
 
The situationists’ deflationary critique of VE is the second major attack on the 
credibility of VE moral psychology, this time about the fragility of virtue.  I suggest that 
the sophisticated defence of the moral impulse against situationist claims lies in context 
sensitive moral knowledge formation as part of ethical labouring.  I explore the idea of 
phronesis in this way.  However, for some, this makes for a confused and confusing 
story about what is entailed in attending to ethical friendships.  They argue that being a 
friend to a particular other must also involve adjudication of competing external moral 
demands.  This brings us back to the conservative-particular/radical-universal 
dichotomy said to affect VE.  
 
The situationists' deflationary claim  
 
The situationists' deflationary claim is that VE fails as a theory of moral action because 
of the flawed assertion that behavioural moral consistency can be explained through the 
cultivation of indefatigable personality traits.  This claim hooks up with Keller’s 
internalist inflationary claim but hits from a different, externalist, direction.  Taken 
together, they cover the two basic criticisms of VE - internalist casuistry and externalist 
conformity - that I outlined in Chapter 1.  
 
The situationist argument is that if our good moral acts are ordered by robust traits 
protected by ongoing self-correction, systematic observation should reveal behavioural 
consistency.  At best, the argument goes, what passes as virtuous action is elicited only 
in narrow, well-traversed settings, not in shifting situations of moral ambiguity where 
good character fragments and becomes unstable.  This social psychological critique of 
VE, based on a fundamental attribution error, is associated with Harman (1999, 2000) 
and Doris (1998, 2002, 2005).  It challenges VE’s claim to be a unifying normative 
theory as empirically unsound.  Presented as a fault-line that sunders VE, situationists 
claim that under experimental conditions people’s apparently steadfast character-
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dependent behaviour is not found to hold cross-situationially.  They do not act morally 
as they would like to have acted but behave immorally in ways that they would not 
before or after approve.  It is as if Stocker's hospital visitor obediently did some harm to 
her friend because on arrival she was told to do so.  
 
Borne out of Arendt’s (1965, 1973)  ‘banality of evil’ Holocaust thesis, the situationists 
refer to Milgram’s (1963, 1974) series of obedience experiments which induced naive 
subjects to inflict pain on decoys.  They also refer to the Stanford simulated prison 
exercise (Haney et al., 1973) where those in role as warders quickly and gratuitously 
brutalised those in role as prisoners.  Across a range of situations it is claimed that a 
person’s behaviour will tend to converge on obedience to the collective norm for the 
situation, irrespective of the intrinsic good or evil of that norm.  The social psychology 
of group conformity is a contested one but well researched and documented (Hogg and 
Vaughan, 2005: 244-273).  I have already alluded to this in the bystander effect in 
Chapter 3, where confused ‘good people do nothing at all’.  One step further, summated 
as the Lucifer effect (Zimbardo, 2007), and colloquially put as ‘good people do bad 
things’, the protective armoury of moral character seems to fail completely when 
subject to an authoritarian regime and the pressures of group dynamics. 
 
This abductive argument posits that the variability of human behaviour, much of it 
conflicted or failed, if not vicious in VE terms, is best explained by the conclusion that 
moral traits are not robust but inconsistently instantiated.  People's actions are 
determined by the overwhelming external circumstances (especially group pressure) in 
which they are immersed.  Behavioural reliability of what we traditionally call virtue is 
not revealed in systematic observation of behaviour.  Situationism makes explicit the 
occurrence versus standing character strand in VE, as described in Chapter 4.  
 
It is far-fetched to suggest that nowadays social work is a bit like an obedience 
experiment.  However, just how a person draws on her reserves of redemptive character 
strengths in those very situations when she is in most need of them, but which get 
overwhelmed because of the situation, is a moot point.  Situationists say that VE is 
based on too exacting a standard which few, if any, people can or will attain because of 
the cognitive and emotional dissonance between one’s preferred and actual acts.  VE 
suggests that we learn to be good in those very situations of moral peril that would put 
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us to the test and surely if we fail to act well, we are not good after all.  To be a strong 
social worker in those very circumstances when our personal weaknesses are most 
exposed is daunting, querying the efficacy of any VE moral pedagogy.  The situationist 
debate continues (Merritt, 2000; Miller, 2003; Kamtekar, 2004; Solomon, 2005; Annas, 
2005; Webber, 2006; Adams, 2006; Kristjansson, 2008; Jost and Jost, 2009).  To date 
only Webster (2008b, 2009) and Banks and Gallagher (2009: 55-56) have 
acknowledged it for social work.  
 
Motivational self-sufficiency  
 
One aspect of the situationist debate is whether virtue or its lack is a matter of 
voluntariness (Montmarquet, 2008).  Appiah (2008) provides a succinct response for the 
conciliation between moral philosophy and moral psychology.  He sees virtues as ideals 
that regulate our moral choices, so philosophical accounts of the normative character 
ideal need make no assumption about how easy or widespread the necessary 
dispositions may be.  Difficult is not the same as impossible and perhaps we can ascend 
the V-gradient through aspiring to the full-fledged ideal (Appiah, 2008: 48-49).  VE 
tells us that although we may trespass as moral agents we should continually work on 
changing the kind of person we are currently, learning from our failures.  So long as we 
are humble, that is surely part of what being virtuous means.  As Machery (2010) says 
in his account of the bleak implications of moral psychology, Appiah’s remedy has 
done much to exorcise the basic situationist threat.  However, for social work, there are 
still three points to bear in mind which do not permit too casual a dismissal of the 
critique. 
 
The first one is whether we can take seriously an ideal that many individuals must fall 
so far short of attaining even after trying.  This is the flip side of any perfectionist 
account which builds in elitist tendencies, creating a moral meritocracy - but then why 
should our clients suffer with anybody less?  The second point is about the ‘unity of the 
virtues’.  I do not mean here the usual debate as to whether, say, courage, justice and 
temperance must go together in the one person.  I am referring to whether being a 
certain kind of person one wants to be can be separated from everyday second-order 
transient moods and emotions.  At any given point in time virtuous character is not 
something one might have in addition to these.  
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Mood, especially feelings of self-confidence and self-worth, hopefulness and 
successfulness (and of course their opposites) may act independently on type and 
quality of action, subverting the very sort of person we ideate, so that in our angst and 
anomie we simply cannot be compassionate or caring.  The prospect that our moral 
agency can be at least partly disunified in this way is always a possibility.  Given my 
depressing account of social work today, having resilient strength of character does 
indeed call for a moral meritocracy if we are to arrest our fall. 
 
The third point is that an obedience to conformity syndrome can also easily be disguised 
as a justificatory discourse about the virtue of loyalty at the expense of justice.  This 
would reinforce the charge that telling us what we ought to do, other than merely 
endorsing the hegemony, is something virtue ethics cannot reliably do.  Satisfactory 
answers to these three points about difficulty, compounded by low mood and 
conformity, involve motivational self-sufficiency of character (or MSC).  This begins 
with regaining control over our inner lives in the determination to be the sort of person 
we want to be.  Such 'self-containing' optimism advances a strong ideal of MSC.  It 
calls for the possession of virtue not to be independent of adverse factors outside of 
oneself, but for those factors to be an inspiration rather than an impediment to acting 
virtuously.  
 
A narrative for checking failure 
 
Thus, in response to situationism, VE invites a heightened discourse about the 
unedifying prospect of personal moral failure.  Its conceptual underpinnings and 
engagement with vice lead us to explore what it is to be as much unsuccessful as 
successful.  A focus on character will always spotlight the ways character could and 
does go wrong since we are all mere humans.  However, an authentic social worker 
should hold true in situations that would distort her reasoned sentiments, seeing those 
situations as an opportunity to exercise them.  This in turn leads us into a discourse 
about transcendence.   
 
As Peterson and Seligman (2004: 569-582) argue, the strengths of transcendence forge 
connections to the larger universe and provide meaning, expecting a good future as 
something that can be brought about.  This built-in compass is a redeeming strength of 
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VE, making for a dialogue with oneself and others about tracking personal 
responsibility for what we can and therefore should change.  As Becker (1975) notes, 
agent appraisal theory provides the very language and conceptual wherewithal to see 
what may have gone wrong.  VE allows us to differentiate between tragic heroes and 
naïve fools.  We can view the foolish or dangerous behaviours that flow from personal 
biographies in their proper light and weigh up whether any foreboding circumstance 
should have been foreseen or whether the pressure of a genuinely unpredictable 
situation came into play. 
 
Surely the first step in repudiating the situationist account is for a social worker to learn 
about its dynamics and be always aware of its externalities, including any 
instrumentalities of control to which she might be subject.  Knowledge of vice and 
viciousness is itself a virtue.  That is what an ethical journey is about, taking control of 
the situation and not being controlled by it.  Situationism only demonstrates that there 
are many covert influences external to the inner self-shaping ones.  Since we are subject 
to both, we need to be ever conscious of each.  Seeking to overcome the situation as 
well as one’s incomplete self exposed by the situation is the journey.  That is why we 
must always pause to consider before we act, not just reflect in shame and regret and 
beat ourselves up afterwards. 
 
Our social work group norms, which should heighten group identity against the threat of 
outsider influence (Hogg and Vaughan, 2005: 81-111), may be failing, yet I see in that 
very analysis scope for a revalorised framework.  Today, it is as if the social work 
community of practitioners has opted to become self-effacing and then, as with the 
situationist argument, behave as if it is bound to be true, confirming the truth of the 
argument.  By way of contrast, as rationally emotive moral beings we must always be 
fully in charge of and responsible for our character and our dispositions.  We must 
negotiate the chaos, drawing on our integrity to do so.  Contra Keller, this very much 
means pausing to consider.  I examine in more detail the requisite moral expertise as a 
skill in itself.  
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Moral expertise  
 
Standard professional learning theory as outlined in Chapter 5 describes an end state 
fluency.  The development of moral expertise as a skill in itself, although it is rarely 
called that, is strongly associated in our social work tradition with epistemic virtues 
such as reflexivity.  Annas (1993, 1995, 1998, 2003) has perhaps done most of all VE 
theorists to recover the ancient idea that virtue is structurally similar to a skill.  I have 
argued that VE epistemology invites us to accept a reasonable social work paradox 
along the line 'it is good intuition not to act on intuition'.  Just how the sophomore 
makes the skilled transition to enigmatic master expert level, so that moral blueprints 
may be discarded, invites further consideration.  Acquiring, say, kindness, seems to 
require practice, imitation, and habituation of raw feeling into sophisticated patterns 
guided by growing emotional intelligence and social feedback.  This in turn requires 
developing attention to the concrete particularities of actual persons and their situations.  
It involves overcoming moral simplification by an increasing capacity for sharpened 
moral perception, freed up imagination and enhanced sensibilities.  It engages with the 
idea of paragonic inerrancy, yet one where the paragon must always learn anew so is 
always also a beginner as well - a reasonable absurdity.  The fully virtuous person has to 
elide super swift habituated responses derived from some tested action with critical 
reflective caution.  This requires suspension of habit and deliberation.  
 
The paragon-as-beginner argument leads us back to a debate which leaves virtue 
looking suspiciously like just another form of abstract principled theory, albeit one 
locked up in inscrutability (Keller's point), balanced with one which can look 
suspiciously like functional conformity to the given (the situationists' point).  The 
question for social work is just how an acculturisation process builds in a capacity to 
challenge itself, so that being acculturated demands a critical examination of what is 
being acculturated.  This can be re-presented as the conservative-particular versus 
universal-radical debate.  Our social work tradition seeks to combine and work both 
(Forsythe, 1995; Payne, 1999, 2005).  To explicate this I now return to the VE 
epistemology of an advanced moral practitioner. 
 
Keller’s challenge at least suggests that an ethical journey can never be completed since 
the moral practitioner is always learning.  The situationist challenge at least suggests 
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that whatever we may learn is easily unlearnt under duress.  An endless journey where 
there is no final destination only another departure at the very point of arrival is an odd 
concept of progression but may be construed as one of moral thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis.  It stands in stark opposition to that short course called code of conduct and 
its backwards pull.  Every moral gesture, no matter how much nuanced, will leave a 
moral residue in need of resolution.  VE both refines and expands moral perception ad 
infinitum as the agent encounters new moral experiences and new ways of recognising, 
and therefore honouring, the moral impulse and engaging with the distressed other.  
 
Tacit reasonableness  
 
VE theory claims that at some point the kindly disposed person will see in her mind’s 
eye what to do to be kind and respond appropriately to what she sees, at the same time 
continuing the learning.  However, recalling the insularity and circularity charge 
described in Chapter 1, it will not suffice simply to declare that only the virtuous can 
see what to do and that is what makes them virtuous.  Aristotle referred to the kind of 
tacit practice reason or wisdom acquired from engaging in practical action, whether this 
be the governance of states or households.  Thinking of Diamond’s forgotten conceptual 
language here (Chapter 2), this idea of practical reasoning, or phronesis, is not easily 
grafted onto today’s world of a different time and place to classical Greece.  
 
Banks and Gallagher (2009: 72-95) discuss phronesis as one of their key virtues for 
health and social care, as also does C. Clark (2007: 67-72) for social work.  Phronesis 
combines knowing what is good or bad, what can and cannot be done, and should or 
should not be done and also how to do it.  It differs from scientific knowledge 
(episteme) which social workers certainly need, and from technical knowledge (techne) 
which they also certainly need.  Phronesis is not just about what is true but what would 
be good to do in, or truthful for, the circumstances (eupraxia).  It is not equivalent to 
grasping some theory (sofia) or just having command over a set of skills.  It is more 
than both since it forms an intrinsic part of a person’s mature character and helps define 
who she has become and hence what she can do.  
 
My VE for social work is committed to something similar. The politico-ethical 
discourse thread which I identified in Chapter 3 interrogates phronesis as praxis.  Even 
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in classical language, Aristotle offered several versions.  I use the term in conjunction 
with VE partner concepts such as 'eudaimonic' ones that relate to a well-lived life in 
pursuance of some intrinsic good.  An indicative range of theories and critical 
summaries, all of which may be considered relevant to social work, might include 
Stichter (2007) on virtue as a skills model of ethical expertise and Jacobson (2005) on 
virtue and moral perception as both seeing and feeling.  Subject specific analyses of 
practical reasoning include Svenaeus (2003) on virtue, hermeneutics and medicine and 
O’Dea (1993) on virtue and musicality.  Lavin (2004) examines the link between 
practical reason and the possibility of error through insistence on the normative 
character of such reasoning.  Lavin’s argument is that for it to be correctly said there is 
a practical rule, it must allow for the possibility of being able to break that rule.  Here, 
reasoning is activity governed by some norm, so the very idea of this activity must 
contain the distinction between correct and incorrect, although deviation need not be 
erroneous.  It will also allow for some flexible application of the norm.  In music, jazz 
might be said to exemplify this feature, raising the question of why not something 
similar for social work? 
 
Highlighting the possibility of error, a reasoner is only subject to a norm if she can go 
wrong in respect of it.  Highlighting the possibility of variance, a reasoner is able to 
differently go beyond that norm.  Pollard (2003), on virtue, moral rationality and 
habituality, explores what is reasonable to do through habit.  Silcox (2006) examines 
the idea that skilled agents, in circumstances where it might be inferred that agents need 
not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions, should always 
exercise a specific type of epistemic obligation, making for their own luck.  As per the 
Hurka VE position (Chapter 4), this includes the obligation to inquire, to be prepared, 
and hence a distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance.  
 
Phronesis is a capacity to explore the intrinsic good (of medicine, of music, of social 
work) deliberately, as in developing a 'feel for the situation', the intellectual-cum-
practical virtue concerned with domain specific activity.  This does not mean that 
phronesis governs moral virtues independently, as if virtue came from pure reason itself 
as in Kantian or Utilitarian ethics, only that exercising or striving to exercise moral 
virtue itself requires a certain practical wisdom in the correct balance of emoting and 
reasoning as well as exploration to find new balances.  
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The practically wise person is likely to face the charge that McDowell (1998: 132-133) 
levels against that conceptual cousin of VE, moral intuitionism, which is that it turns the 
epistemology of value into mere mystification.  (Hence the question of why any of its 
deliverances might deserve to count as moral knowledge, or at least any more so than 
those of other ethical theories it seeks to debunk.)  Keller’s argumentation is also 
centred on what he sees as a bogus epistemology dressed up in some superficially 
appealing theoretical apparel.  In deconstructing fluent hospitality, one implication of 
the Keller position is that what we have left is but in another name a set of rules 
governing hospitality, no matter how snappily applied.  All the standard 
consequentialist or deontologist needs do is think and work a bit faster, like the virtue 
ethicist is said to do, to end up in the same position.  
 
I maintain that Keller’s expert host is relying on her practice wisdom, which as Wall 
(2003) might say, is a kind of reasonableness fitted to her finite mode of being and 
characteristic of her expertise.  This type of practice wisdom is often presented in the 
professional literature, as for example scoped by Green (2009), as a group counter to 
malevolent state interference.  I will reposition it as that positive moral force needed to 
vitalise social worker sacred space, without which it can never be sacred. 
 
Keller's line of argument suggests that a moral skill, unlike other sorts of skills, must at 
some point meet the test of articulated justificatory reason.  This would be external for 
the edification of a critical audience or for any inner conversations the moral agent must 
undertake with herself.  This expectation also depends on the premise that the demands 
of giving an account of one’s actions are much higher in the moral domain compared to 
a non-moral domain.  As Stichter (2007: 193) says, this is partly due to the seriousness 
of the subject matter, partly because there are usually fewer concrete success conditions 
for acting well, and partly because there is less agreement as to who are the experts.  
These contentions revolve around profiled knowledge outwith the rules. 
 
Profiled knowledge outwith rules  
 
There are many experts in every field who are able to act well within their disciplines 
but are not able to explain it to themselves, never mind teach other people.  From an 
admirer’s vantage point each is no less an expert.  Moreover, if being an expert is one 
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who generally acts well without consciously applying rules and principles, it is no 
surprise that she will often find it difficult, even undermining of that expertise, to 
adequately explain her action in conventional terms.  As Driver (2001) reminds us, 
being virtuous is ultimately a matter of acting well, not articulating why or how it is 
well.  Bloomfield captures the conundrum as a regress.  As he says (2000: 39), speaking 
of the expert: 
 
Research shows that the process she articulates [post facto] is very often not 
the one actually used: experts are often less able to give an account of the 
justification of the decision making process they actually use than are 
beginners.  
 
In social work there are very good reasons for a virtuous social worker to be able to 
articulate her reasons for acting well, and sometimes this may be to a sceptical or hostile 
audience.  I suggest that it is as if social workers have been turned back into inarticulate 
moral beginners for the wrong reasons.  As morally active practitioners we struggle 
with the language of competencies, performance indicators, evidence-based practice and 
the new managerialism.  Deprived of a supportive language, we have grown back down 
to such an extent we almost deny having any special moral expertise at all. 
 
From the world of teaching, Luntley’s (2007a, 2007b; 2008a, 2008b) studies of 
proliferating modes of inarticulated knowing are salutary for social work.  In the 
attempt to wrestle out of inarticulate awareness some articulated defendable 
propositional knowledge, Luntley explores the ambiguity of professional expertise, its 
ownership, and the uneasy relationship that emerges with the rest of the world.  As he 
explains, professionals are professionals precisely because they know and decide in the 
moment using knowledge that is tacit, adaptive, context sensitive, fast and frugal. 
 
According to Luntley, it is not so much what professionals know but how they learn 
which marks them out - the difference between propositional ‘knowing-that’ and 
activity dependent ‘knowing-how’ statements.  Employing know-how obligates 
contemplating knowing-that, but correctly contemplating knowing-that requires know-
how.  The problem for any publically mandated activity is that if it cannot be 
articulated, that is pinned down, this makes for 'stressed' knowledge.  In search of some 
sort of de-stressed resolution, what may happen is that the tension eventually allows 
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inarticulated activity to be kidnapped or saturated by sterile covering concepts of 
knowing-that.  The concepts reach into activity and redefine it to serve the concepts.  
This, I claim, is what has happened in social work.  How then may the Bloomfield 
regress be reversed so that a social worker may articulate with confidence what it is to 
be virtuous?  
 
Phronesis and particularism 
 
It is, in fact, the elusive nature of knowing-how linked to moral creativity that underpins 
Keller’s hospitality account.  Yet the Keller story lacks an important orientating point 
for social work, namely that neither easy habit nor tortuous deliberation takes place in a 
decontextualised moral vacuum.  Along these lines, I will pick up on Wall’s (2003: 319) 
ironic suggestion (based on his interpretation of MacIntyre) that phronesis does not 
actually produce anything new at all.  What it does is perceive the good that has already 
been determined and deliberates on how to best reach it.  The wise person, the 
'phronemos', understands the nature of a good, but one that is already written into the 
fabric of human nature and the conventions of particular communities in which that 
nature is mediated.  
 
On this argument, knowing-how work has the function of applying well to the particular 
situation already socially constituted moral virtues, shaped by given moral truths 
inherited from tradition.  It focuses on the means to already traditionally embedded ends 
through its own particular historicity.  Even the advanced practitioner who goes beyond 
a historicised rule is still a supplicant to it: the connection restricts how different might 
be any new direction.  This restriction on creativity reintroduces those crude charges of 
epistemic moral conservativism and unbrokered cultural relativism laid against VE.  
The question, indirectly posed by the Keller story, is whether or not there is a 
transcendent notion of hospitality which the phronemos applies wisely, adapting it to 
any particular situation but retaining its universal features; or whether she is simply 
replicating local custom hospitality, albeit 'done well'.  Supposing Keller's rescued 
family held the unshakable view that their servant who had accompanied them should 
be left outside.  Such a dilemma for the host (I take it to be one) throws into stark relief 
VE's potential to deal with moral dichotomies.  
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Nussbaum’s (1999) ever present critique of VE puts it bluntly.  She calls the VE story 
the confused and confusing story.  She says it is told with satisfaction by some who, 
rejecting ambitious abstract theories of the Enlightenment, argue for moral theory that is 
historically grounded and worldly.  The story is told with deep alarm by others, who see 
in the ascendancy of particularity and local knowledge a grave threat to the 
Enlightenment’s noble aspirations to social justice and human equality.  With a 
reference to childcare practices that might have had social work in mind, Nussbaum 
(1999: 164) says of the VE story that: 
 
It links elements of the moral life that are not at all necessarily linked and 
that may even turn out to be in tension with one another (can one be a good 
parent for example if one refused on principle to criticize local traditions in 
the name of justice and equality?).  By accepting the confused story we 
must come to believe that in order to attend to friendship we must give up 
on universal justice, that in order to care sufficiently about history we must 
abandon general theory, that in order to care about the psychology of 
character we must abandon rational reflection.  Such conclusions would be 
as practically pernicious as they would be intellectually unwise.  
 
The question most pertinent to social workers and raised here by Nussbaum is the 
tradition dependent cultural relativity one.  It is not clear if the virtuous social worker is 
meant to bestride the world like some moral colossus in search of some vitiating 
cultural-historical breath, or more modestly go with the grain of cultural and social 
situations.  The two make for very different sorts of agent appraisal.  
 
As indicated earlier in Chapter 3, one VE discourse thread invokes ideas of dialogism 
and hermeneutics to bridge the hiatus.  Ben-Ari and Strier (2010) make a case for cross-
cultural competence within a Levinasian self-other framework.  An ethics of welcome 
(Rossiter, 2006) as much as of responsibility (Tascon, 2010), the question becomes just 
how ethical labour can be exchanged in a way that does not simply subject the receiver 
to the giver’s own frame of reference, nor vice-versa.  In the next chapter I defend a 
functional perspective to locate a morally attuned practitioner within a traditionalist 
framework, one who can be radically creative in a non self-effacing way. 
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Chapter 7 
VE exchange-value and functionalism  
 
Introduction 
 
Phronesis can be contrasted with 'poiesis', introducing the idea of creative social work.  
The amelioration of someone’s extra-vulnerability takes place through the production of 
what I term surplus exchange-value.  I recast the sophisticated care and control role of 
social work in relation to dysfunctional households using an idea of socially cohering 
virtue as the operative middle way between the management of disrupted given ways of 
life and moral principles of organised living.  Within this context, I show how a 
historised account of virtue immerses social work identity in notions of normal living 
and the management of functional virtues pertaining to a well-ordered society. 
 
Creative social work  
 
England (1986) speaks of social work as being as much art as science, emphasising the 
soft, joyous, aesthetic side of the social worker.  The sentiment is often used as a 
defence against hard empiricism and proceduralism.  However, the idea of art can 
connote idiosyncratic or non-productivist activity.  Gray and Webb (2008) stress that art 
also involves radically agnostic struggle and resolution in search of truth, emphasising 
social work as a productive endeavour, as much grief as joy.  Picking up on this point, 
phronesis can be viewed alongside the less familiar but twin concept of poiesis, which 
carries the expansive notion of that which is novel.  Phronesis seeks to fully work out 
and reveal all the hidden human commonalities pertaining to a situation - hence doing 
something well.  Poiesis is based on what is potentially unique in that situation - hence 
doing something differently.  For social work, the assumption is that over and above 
any human commonalities each situated client is unique; hence again my point that 
practitioners need to pause and then to delve beyond the similarities to differentiate and 
innovate.  Authentic social work should be about imaginative, productive artistry in 
recognition of commonality and uniqueness, a defining capability we have almost 
forgotten that should be part of our identity. 
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Today’s routine bureaucratic mode of social work mistrusts anything to do with moral 
creativity.  Our philanthropic forebears strove to create as well lived a future as possible 
for the dispossessed and immiserised.  The idea lives on as social worker subterfuge and 
what is left of moral discretion, carving out and working the squeezed ethical space in 
between the stifling rules and set play social work.  One way of responding to 
Nussbaum’s relativity comment (Chapter 6) is to construe it to be a question about 
eliminating, or at least reducing as much as possible, the moral remainder adhering to 
the situation through social work creativity.  In Chapter 1 I introduced a test case of 
female circumcision.  For some, this is a way of life, an identity-conferring rite of 
passage; for others, this is a barbaric form of child abuse.  Encountering a runaway 
young person desperate to avoid the procedure and irate parents, the question might be 
what sort of wise moral care and control decision could someone like Keller’s expert 
host make?  
 
Rachels (1999) poses this very sort of question as the final one in her set of v-questions 
which I summarised in Chapter 1.  With this question in mind, I return to the ethos and 
its normative relationship to notions of extra-vulnerability as described in Chapter 3.  I 
present the ethos as a number of pliable value membranes or normatising tissues making 
up the tensile societal fabric.  My proposed VE framework of social work right action 
flows from this metaphor.  
 
Protection and repair of lived ordinariness 
 
Any community will comprise individuals, families and kinship networks based on role 
ascription.  The historic social work specific task is to protect and repair this ethos 
where socially endorsed caring relationships (call this a moral economy and ecology of 
care) are sundered.  As I have already proposed in Chapter 4, the social work mandate is 
to locate and target the moral dilemmas exposed in the breakdown of ordinary lived 
existence and ascribed role failure.  Social work aims at the refurbishment or 
replacement of those caring membranes and capillaries of cohesiveness that have been 
fractured.  It does so through a discourse of care, safety and security stratagems based 
on what I call ‘moral tagging’.  
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Moral reactions are a distinctive kind of recognition of people, events and 
circumstances which exhibit a property that Levy (2004: 81) calls the ‘supervenient’.  If 
the ‘convenient’ or conventional is construed as suitable and not troublesome (call this 
normal routinised living), supervenience suggests some sort of disturbing variation from 
the norm.  For Levy, what makes one situation a moral concern and another not is that 
there are real differences of troubling signification; that is to say, there is some sort of 
interruption (or supervenience) to some condition or process that acts as a signal of 
moral concern and cue for moral action.  
 
Social workers tag the expressed or ascribed needs of those who are not cohering well, 
when the fractured ordinariness of people’s precarious lives reaches a point where 
individuals are in need of care or control.  All this is according to the mores of time and 
place and as defined by the standards of the hegemony.  Ethical labour, here 
maintaining and restoring the ethos, means a proxy process of ‘re-moralising’ broken 
caring relationships in a way that recreates that which is valued but which has been 
jeopardised in individual situations.  
 
Ancient Greek political philosophy refers to the private intimate realm of natural 
familial associations and the ecology of care under the one roof - the 'oikia' (Arendt, 
1973: 28-37).  This is where concerns gather regarding the lack of basic support, 
sustenance, comforts and appropriate caring kinship relationships deemed necessary for 
a normal flourishing life according to one’s expected station, age and life stages.  Hence 
social work's preoccupation with domestic normativity, household taboos, dysfunctional 
living arrangements, mistreatment, neglect and abuse of vulnerable household members.   
We are aroused when the household and the hearth, ordinarily the loci of natality and 
mortality and the basic necessities of life, protection, growth and nurturing, turn out 
extra-ordinarily abusive or neglectful of its members.  We track which responsible or 
irresponsible adult lives within or has access.  We spend much time discussing whether 
this scrutiny amounts to a form of oppression and repression or, more elusively, 
salvation of or emancipation for the client under scrutiny.  
 
Thus is social work's sacred space delineated by the moral territory of the oikia within 
which operates social work’s occupationally specific correctional business.  This 
business targets morally reprehensible supervenient states of affairs, focusing on the 
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intimacies of the household.  We may foray into the 'agora', the market place, pushing 
the client of the cloistered household into the world of respectable waged work, 
economic self-management and self-reliance.  We may even foray into the 'polis', the 
political sphere, when sometimes we contemplate the idea of an empowered client-
citizen managing her own life chances and taking control of her own destiny.  However 
at core our concern is endless iterative versions of household welfare - and, of course, 
the virtues and vices therein.  
 
Our iconic philanthropic forerunners operated on this basis, never forgetting the 
connection between the grind of vicious circumstance and the dehumanisation of their 
clients (Forsythe, 1995).  Social historians such as Himmelfarb (1995) and 19th century 
philanthropic philosophers such as Green also indicate as much.  Overholser's (1999) 
account of promoting virtue in everyday life offers a contemporary psychotherapeutic 
take on this.  Van den Bersselaar (2004) speaks about virtue ethics and the moralising 
empowerment of clients in the art of life.  A step too far for some, Schwartz (2000) 
argues how the poor can fight poverty with the virtues of thrift and providence.  A step 
too far for others, Lister (2004) and Tessman (2005) argue that those who battle against 
oppressive conditions require virtues which embody the goal of liberation. 
 
The social work gaze 
 
Social work has its origins in the ‘domestication of stranger relations’ (Webb, 2007a, 
2007b), the client’s immediate private concerns, contributory environmental living 
conditions and sometimes the public troubles that may have generated them.  
Permutations of the terms respect, respectability and inspection emblematically describe 
the fraught and morally loaded complexity of our defining social work gaze.  Erikson 
(1963) reminds us that in life we all need to move through psychosocial stages and 
develop those maturational qualities (loosely virtues) to achieve their successful 
resolution.  Society provides institutions associated with rites of passage from cradle to 
grave for cultivating these qualities as individuals progress through life stages.  The 
provision may fail some people, or they fail the provision.  Beginning with the pre-natal 
and ending with the move into senior age and even dying itself, social workers 
faithfully patrol the norms of family life which prescribe the life cycle relations of 
society. 
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Ferguson (2008, 2010) speaks of 'liquid' social work and welfare interventions as the 
flow of 'mobile practices' between public and private worlds - the office, the car journey 
and the client's home - as personified by the social worker on the move.  Much of what 
is described as social work stems from negotiating the doorstep in tracking down the 
domestically supervenient.  We wrestle with a language of conditional permissions to 
justify our literal and metaphorical entry into the normally sacrosanct private realm.  
Our casework orientated knowledge base is grounded in the home visit and assessment 
of householders’ characters.  Putting aside the entry etiquette, variants of which we 
share with probation officers, midwives, community nurses and doctors, this mandated 
social work gaze permits us to speak of a tradition dependent ethical-cum-moral 
encounter for social work.  Contiguous with the client's ordinarily private realm, this 
encounter needs to be cherished, protected and nurtured.  
 
The social work gaze and ethical labouring are as much about a good encounter with 
oneself as with the other - the endangered, marginalised, immiserised, dispossessed, 
unlucky, incapable, maladjusted or dangerous - in the discharge of our mandate.  Our 
profession takes its life-breath not then from atop the rarified peaks of detached, 
disinterested reflection but from the thickly descriptive, indubitably messy, swampy 
lowlands.  The politico-ethical tectonic plates that have determined that landscape grind 
out the moral faultlines that entrap the unwary or naive practitioner.  They are the 
location for that passionate endeavour in rescue and hope we call social work, 
historically a profession which has insinuated itself into the grittiness and rancour of the 
human condition.  In their moral encounters, practitioners pursue purity and innocence 
while forever sullying their ethical hands, treading ever so diligently through the 
morass. 
 
Patterns of exchange welfare 
 
By morally good encounters I mean generation by the social worker of ‘surplus moral 
exchange-value’ through the production of ethical goods in any transaction with her 
client.  I adopt this notion from Pinker’s (1979) classic analysis of compensatory 
patterns of altruistic exchange in social welfare.  As Pinker (1979: 46) says, ‘exchange 
relationships are intrinsic to all types of welfare practice’.  For social work, Jordan 
(2007) has developed a similar notion of servicing hidden value, the ‘interpersonal 
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economy’ orchestrated by social workers to build social capital and solidarities.  By 
moral exchange-value I mean that any moral encounter between two individuals 
involves both a giving and a taking.  Clients must give up at least some of their 
independence, autonomy, privacy and dignity, even identity, in the encounter: social 
workers must at least take away some elements of these in the construction of 
clienthood.  This exchange may prove to be symmetrical so that both may receive their 
worth, or it may be asymmetrical where one gives more than takes.   
 
All too commonly, the exchange is distorted by an insidious process of stigmatisation or 
pathologisation of the inherently weaker party.  It is beholden of a truly respectful moral 
practitioner-cum-petitioner - the mark of her own legitimating worth - to ensure more is 
given back than is taken from the client.  That obligation is the spur for creative moral 
engagement.  It is one of social work's absurd paradoxes that only by giving back more 
than she takes does the social worker fully discharge her debt and achieve moral parity.  
Not to generate surplus exchange-value - a bad encounter - would be to reduce the 
transaction to one of diminution, manipulation and oppression.  Nowadays, social 
workers do not easily generate surplus moral exchange-value and to that extent they are 
no longer the paradigmatic ethical labourers who once did.   
 
The idea of a nobility of self, and a longing and pious devotion to nobility, is often 
underplayed in contemporary virtue ethical accounts (Bartlett, 2002).  Solomon (1988: 
12-31) speaks of 'agape', a kind of selfless love of humanity, flawed though the latter 
may be, where the flaws are the objects of this emotioning.  The old sense of 'caritas' 
invokes a key VE idea that ethical practice cannot be construed impersonally but must 
begin with a deep emotional engagement before ending with a reasoned out 
disengagement.  Hugman (2005: 50) points out that affectivity is the very essence of 
self and any intelligent emotional response to perception of value.  Imagining another’s 
misfortune and its redress is a fraught task, especially when that person is the distant 
mythical stranger that social work would purport to comfort but who is often feared by 
society.  Reducing and hence humanising this sense of distance - which may exoticise, 
label, or pathologise, as much as celebrate, the stranger - is the fundamental social work 
ethical challenge.  To be a social worker is not just to love people but also to do so 
when they are at their strangest, most vulnerable and needy.  It is possible to speak of 
the social work specific domain as a regenerative moral economy in which, through her 
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distinctive ethical labour, the morally active practitioner procures a remedial, 
compensatory or even transformative good for the client.   
 
At their best, through their own version of the invisible hand, social workers become 
moral entrepreneurs creating compensatory social capital for those in need.  The 
semiotic visions of the noble moral citizen (Manning, 1997) and the barefoot helper 
(Hamer, 2006) are never far away.  In spite of a certain peripatetic roughshodness, our 
indelible moral footprint forever tracks our peregrinations in a slippery and often hostile 
landscape.  Reaching out and walking alongside the other, sharing her travails, surely 
makes social work what it truly is, or could be once again.  When the accompanying 
discourse is undertaken through a VE perspective, I believe that also commits us to the 
view that both carers and the cared-for enjoy virtues and suffer vices (and those in 
between states).  The lack of caring relations or the struggles to maintain them may 
themselves be derived from vicious circumstances that motivate social workers to 
intervene.  The morally active practitioner navigates between the client’s and carer's and 
other people's virtues, vices and vicious circumstances. 
 
Virtue’s middle way 
 
As the Nussbaum quote in Chapter 6 suggests, the social work debate about caring 
relations is between a teleogical account of self-other virtue towards some motivational 
higher transcendent end, compared to a restorative functional analysis of the here and 
now.  Social work aspires to both, reasserting the normative status quo and sometimes 
surpassing it.  Our tradition is replete with its own chequered history of collusive 
unfairness of a time and place in the name of the universal good society and client well-
being.  It has also been a progressive force for justice.  Early VE analysis such as 
Pincoffs' (1986) asserts that virtues are qualities of ordinary people functioning well in a 
way that is deemed appropriate to the common life, albeit a common life within which 
different individuals and groups will pursue a range of different ends.  For Clark (2006: 
84-85), the social work question is the explicit relationship between what he calls 
generic and context sensitive values and establishing the middle ground.  I will dwell on 
a historico-anthropological theory of 'V-functionalism', a perspective which is derived 
from Yearley’s (1990, 1994) comparative analysis of virtue.   
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Comparing Mencius's Confucianism with Aquinas’s Christianity, Yearley (1990: 3) 
endeavours to discover the similarities within differences and the differences within 
similarities between two very diverse societies.  He detects three moral realms always 
serving a similar purpose.  The first of these contains macro-type injunctions which 
present broad overarching rights and duties intended to deal with both the normal usual 
and abnormal unusual, similar to what I have referred to as the convenient and 
supervenient.  Broad assumptions regarding a well-lived childhood or old age could be 
said to count as macro-level beliefs.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, in the realm of ways of life, are micro-type modes of 
conduct.  These give a person’s attitudes, behaviours and actions coherence and 
direction, and which, taken collectively, compose the distinct texture of a society.  In 
the middle, what I call the meso-realm, Yearley posits virtues which contribute to 
maintaining the homeostatic order between the other two realms.  Ways of life that are 
supported by the injunctions are picked out and protected by the virtues.  Virtues 
provide a middle way of justifying overarching injunctions and prohibitions on the one 
hand and amorphous, taken for granted, ways of life conduct on the other.   
 
The value of Yearley’s middle way for comparative analysis is that it attends to the 
concrete textured specifics to avoid facile claims of similarity yet is sufficiently abstract 
and integrative in purpose to avoid equally facile claims that all similarities are illusory.  
Admired personal virtuous qualities compose the distinctive texture of any society and 
are organised into hierarchies of importance according to valued ways of life.  
Suspicious of categorical injunctions, because of their abstractions which lack important 
local detail and their conflicting claims to universality, and wary of unmediated simply 
given ways of life that we might call inherited, middle-level virtue theoretising helps us 
discern form and pattern while preserving concrete specifics of experience.  As if an 
Aristotelian mean, a meso-level virtue focus interprets and gives meaning to the 
interaction of people and their beliefs, both describing and guiding lived experience and 
linking it to a transcendent concept of existence.   
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Caring relations as modes of acknowledgment 
 
Consider Yearley’s framework for an applied ethics of social work along a Slote-
Hursthouse-Swanton-Hurka axis, now with a focus on that middle way.  The apposite 
sociologically balanced virtues will contain both embedded particularistic and universal 
transcendent features.  A meso-level discourse recognises that moral language changes 
over time (Diamond, Chapter 2).  Its vocabulary overall may expand beneficially as the 
profiling and modes of acknowledgment of a virtue increase, calling for an adjustment 
to the equilibrium between the three levels; or it may sometimes contract for the worse.   
 
MacIntyre (2006) addresses why all human beings need the universal prosocial altruistic 
virtues as central to well-lived lives.  He references virtues in terms of local 
communities of giving and receiving based on the ever-present fact of every human 
being’s constant vulnerability.  All of us are normally dependent on the care and 
concern of others.  Sometimes, abnormally, our lives can be catapulted into heightened 
dependency.  The friendship virtues are cohering of a network of compensatory caring 
relations which any dependent rational being would value.   
 
Now combine Macintyre’s core idea of a specific moral community of practitioners but 
attending to society’s middle-way virtues and their counterfactuals.  As social workers 
we are fully aware of those abstract injunctions of which Yearley speaks and around 
which society is nominally organised and normatised, whether they be modernistic 
abstract universal principles or religious fiats.  We are also aware that we must operate 
in a specific time bound society where ways of life are inherited and conduced, not 
freely chosen.  We live both realms through practical engagement with the middle way 
virtues or, more specifically, their dearth.  A Yearley-MacIntyre framework of tradition 
dependent social solidarities reminds us that social work grew out of the zeal of like-
minded moral agents working to restore some humane equilibrium in disrupted times 
(Payne, 2005; Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007; Jordon, 2007; Webb 2007a, 2007b).  
 
Meso-level analysis will always invite a prudent approach, or temperateness of habit, as 
the ancient virtue of 'sophrosune' became known (MacIntyre, 1988).  Virtue talk is, as 
Peterson and Seligman (2004:3-32) call it, ‘a manual of the sanities’.  The association of 
temperance with uncritical social conformity is a conceptual burden that MacIntyre, for 
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one, has been at pains to refute, as when describing how virtue may indeed demand a 
person to become ‘socially disruptive’.  Sometimes it is indeed appropriate that ‘the 
virtue of sophrosune like the other virtues can be a virtue of revolutionaries’ 
(MacIntyre, 1988: 11).  
 
Our social work history illustrates just how our other-regarding moral virtues 
(humanity) have always had a political hue to them (justice), more often than not in the 
name of liberation of the dispossessed towards a better life (transcendence).  
Sophrosune has at its root meaning the quality of ‘being of sound mind’ - hence a 
connection with sanity - but became understood as a virtue, the possession and exercise 
of which provided knowledge of the boundaries of appropriate behaviour.  This quality 
is functional in respect of some modes of life but not in others.  It can be the case that 
there are socially or politically determined forms of common life with which certain 
persons are in conflict in serious and long-term ways and against which they deem it 
appropriate to resist.  Challenging the given order’s own pretentions to a conformist 
value of obedience where there is only disvalue, and also knowing what is achievable, 
are what distinguish high from low evaluators.  This is why the cardinal virtue of 
courage - physical and moral - is always foregrounded in VE stories, the supererogatory 
high evaluator’s calling card.  
 
VE advocates say that we all have to make choices when faced with conflicting and 
incommensurable moral demands, exercising a composite emotive-cognitive capability.  
Nagel (1979) claims this reveals itself over time in individual decisions against a 
backdrop of external constraints, rather than in enunciation of general principles.  
Tessman’s (2005) account of burdened virtues and liberatory struggles and the 
subsequent symposium dialogue (Calhoun, 2008; Friedman 2008; Koggel, 2008; 
Tessman, 2008) provide insight into the meta-ethical vices of either indifference or 
domination, all too easily obscured by faux virtue talk.  One of Tessman’s key points is 
how people may only flourish as a member of a collectivity, but then whose well-being 
depends upon the suffering of those excluded, where someone else’s oppression is a 
condition of the another’s privileged sense of flourishing.   
 
Such oppression transects classed, gendered, religious and racialised constructions by 
clients themselves as well as more subtle forms of socially constituted abusive power, 
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sometimes perpetrated by social workers themselves.  But then social work is 
functionally anchored in an historic way of life so we need to deal with it (since that is 
in fact our job) and the resultant tension is the dynamic that informs the telos of our 
moral narrative.  VE does not just provide us with a way of checking out our 
inadequacies; it also gives us the idea of scope for improvement through an exemplarist 
thesis.  Moreover, it analyses the extent to which we individually can be held 
responsible for what we voluntarily believe, even though many beliefs underlying large 
stretches of our social and institutional life which we reproduce are not voluntary since 
we do not choose to believe them.  
 
Social workers cannot be responsible for all that is wrong with the world, only those 
parts which are their business and their own contribution to any wrong-making in the 
course of their business.  Depending on which virtues are profiled, it is those 
characteristics which make their possessor into what Peterson and Seligman (2004:16-
28) would call an excellent ‘specimen of their kind’.  There are many types of good life 
to be lived according to this pluralist criterion.  Tacit knowledge formation, its moral 
pedagogy and a self-defining standard of excellence lie in this sort of account.  For 
social work, I suggest that to be an excellent specimen of one's kind entails the precise 
shaping and configuration of prosocial virtues in line with the Yearley-MacIntyre 
functional supposition.  In the next chapter I draw upon a specific idea introduced by 
Swanton (2007) to present a sophisticated defence of the moral impulse as role-
contoured virtue.  
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Chapter 8 
VE supervaluations and modules   
  
Introduction 
 
I give an account of major and minor premisses as part of the meso-realm moral 
activity, employing the idea of prototype and role-contoured virtue to build a more 
detailed picture of social work identity in action.  Using a classical riddle about 'moral 
fuzziness' and 'supersharp' evaluation, I highlight the problem of universal moral 
predicates and their conditional relationship to the particular.  Drawing on moral 
satisficing theory, I discuss the idea of a social work stability standard.  This centers on 
two social work signature modules of virtues qualitatively expressed as righteous 
indignation and just generosity.  
 
Prototype and role-contoured virtue  
 
Swanton (2007: 207-224) maintains that role virtues are not set aside from a generic 
account of how to be a good human being overall, but are a constitutive part of being 
one.  Roles make up the complex pluralistic narratives and myriad structures of our 
social life.  We all learn about the virtue of friendship and other-regarding virtues on 
our mother’s knee as kind of v-rules such as ‘be kind,’ ‘tell the truth’ and ‘behave 
responsibly’.  They are preliminary versions from which more refined forms are 
cultivated.  The virtue of friendship will look quite different depending on whether it is 
a friendship of peers, of student and teacher, or between lawyer and client.  While 
friendship in the raw prototypical sense might manifest as a mutual desire for the 
pleasure of each other's company, the contoured friendship of a lawyer towards a client 
is closer to a contract of loyalty rather than one of affection.  The connection is not lost 
though, since the raw affection of close friends - being there for the other - also includes 
loyalty.   
 
Consistent with Yearley's sociological account of virtue and the moral realms, while 
contoured virtues do not hold categorically but get adapted and nuanced, the normative 
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idea behind prototype virtues will later on in life hold a person up short of, say, 
meanness, selfishness or irresponsibility.  It may be a contextual understanding in our 
consumerist society that a salesperson will exaggerate the superiority of her product, 
since we all appreciate that her job is to make the sale, but she is not permitted to 
actually misrepresent.  In that case she has gone beyond an occupationally specific 
normative pale laid down by the prototype virtue.  A lawyer's loyalty might require an 
adroit presentation of the facts in the most favourable light, but it does not allow her to 
lie in court on behalf of the client. 
 
The aim of role-contoured virtue is to realise institutional goals in an excellent or good 
enough way internal to the tradition of the institution.  The tradition is always tethered 
to the raw demands of the underlying prototype virtue, as in the idea of justice in the 
legal profession, but through practical reasoning the process of contouring can also 
mould the prototypical virtue.  In social work, anti-oppressive and anti-discriminatory 
practices are modes of redistributive and restorative justice borne out of 
prototypical/contouring dialectic, as both the commonalities between all humans and 
also their differences (race, gender, class, sexuality) are explored in relation to extra-
vulnerability.  The core ideas of justice and fairness move on and expand in the process, 
although not necessarily so.  Even with best intentions, there is also a risk of going 
down discourse cul de sacs in the name of justness or fairness.  
 
The social work moral community is an arena in which to develop, exercise and test out 
what may be prototypical/contoured conflicted.  Only thus can the moral impulse be 
sophisticated while retaining its source value.  Without some evolving normative 
account of contoured moral virtues we are unable to pursue good aims, but without a 
questioning prototypical moral voice we cannot do so either.  The capacity to 
communicate through moral language in an occupational learning network provides the 
opportunity for declarative learning, pushing the boundaries of the moral imagination 
beyond the as-given but at the same time not overstretching it.  
 
As Swanton (2007: 217) argues, prototype virtues provide anchors for our moral 
thinking in role contexts, alerting us to possibilities of excess and other deviations.  
However, they may also provide springboards as their potential is revealed.  As we 
grow morally we find appropriate novel ways of exercising virtues, hence revisable 
	  	  
103	  
action guidance, but it is only through action that the revision is realised.  Pausing to V-
reflect on both society's and our own moral habits, committing to reflectively explore 
and refresh the dynamic balance between Yearley’s overarching injunctions and ways 
of life in pursuance of the vita activa, are the ethical markers of the authentic social 
worker. 
 
The major and minor premisses  
 
Prototype virtues are contoured to yield role-differentiated virtues according to the 
distinctive field of concern and target.  With role virtue the field is delineated by appeal 
to the point of and purpose of the role, which in turn is understood in terms of the 
purpose of the tradition in which the role is embedded.  It is this contextualised 
understanding that yields the specificity of the virtue in terms of action guidance.  
Relevant here is Green’s (2008) description of the Aristotelian difference between a 
major and minor moral premiss.  Compare the uncontoured demands of generosity in 
general (the major premiss) to what is contoured as the variable last moral fact in any 
particular situation (the minor premiss).  A member of the public might generally 
generously give money to a beggar but not if the supplicant is raucously drunk.  A 
community outreach worker might give of her effort and time to get the drunken beggar 
to a place of safety.  
 
A minor moral premiss reveals inhibitors, rejoinders and modifiers in any moral 
situation impacting on the major moral premiss, depending on who you are.  The 
demands of honesty require us to honour the person by telling the whole truth but 
sometimes the person's situation permits us to not do so, maybe an understatement 
rather than a gross denial of the fact in question.  It might be permissible for a friend to 
underplay the seriousness of a patient's medical condition, less so for the doctor, nurse 
or social worker.  Considerations of concern correctly applied are nuanced by both 
situation and role.  The situation itself and hence its moral demands may be seen 
differently according to a role-contoured perspective within its field of concern.  What a 
nurse sees and what a social worker sees might be quite different. 
 
I have argued in Chapter 6 that a social worker is true to both clients and herself [iff] 
she routinely interrogates her own habits and customary ways of doing things, so that 
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her identity is legitimated anew by invigorating moral action, not replicated as 
deadening past behaviour.  Creative social work entails exploring to the full the hidden 
contoured possibilities of meaningful engagement while remaining true to prototype in 
understanding the particularities of any given situation.  This can generate an expansive 
moral economy though new ways of building surplus exchange-value.  An occupational 
notion of contoured virtue does not mean that it need lack depth or richness.   
Contouring is not a technical exercise but an imaginative one.  
 
As something akin to what Arendt (1958: 175-247) calls the disclosure of the agent in 
activity ('praxis') and speech ('lexis'), virtue contouring has two features germane to 
social work identity.  First of all, it allows us to distinguish social work as a specific 
other-regarding prosocial tradition.  Secondly, contouring through that tradition requires 
that the tradition itself be interrogated so that it is refined by everyday work.  A social 
worker habitually but reflexively lives in the world of other people’s moral omissions 
and everyone’s moral remainder, including her own.  It is only by constantly weighing 
up what is still omitted and remains undone that is she being ethical.  As Arendt (1958: 
177-178) says: 
 
It is the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be 
expected from whatever may have happened before.  This character of 
startling unexpectedness is inherent in all beginnings and in all origins. . . . 
Action and speech are so closely related because the primordial and 
specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the 
question asked of every newcomer 'Who are you?' 
 
I return to Nussbaum’s test case and the instance of how to respond to the runaway 
young person.  We need to ask Arendt’s question and there is no simple answer, if only 
because even a complex answer, whether about other or self, will depend entirely on the 
particularities of the situation.  Recalling Yearley's three moral realms, what an 
altruistic lay person might see and prototypically do is likely to be very different to 
what a social worker in role ought to see and contour do.  Furthermore, what a social 
worker might do now is not likely to be the same compared to twenty years ago.  The 
question of how we know what is right action becomes how we measure contoured 
success.  The need for a stabilising standard takes us back to that source criticism of 
VE.  I will elucidate a proposed VE sensitive standard by using a classical riddle which 
I believe can be employed to capture well successful social work practice.  
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The Sorites paradox and satisficing theory 
 
Known as the ‘heap’, ‘little-by-little’ or the ‘Sorites’ argument (Clark, M., 2007: 80-
87), this paradox entails a conclusion or end state of truth reached by a chain of repeated 
applications.  Take a recognisable heap of grain as a metaphor for social work moral 
truth and the addition or subtraction of individual grains.  If the final outcome is a 
recognisable heap made up of so many single grains, the addition of one more grain 
would be a little nearer to the virtuous truth than the antecedent.  To remove a grain 
from the heap makes for a tiny error which if propagated down through the chain will 
yield a wholly untrue conclusion, as surely as the continuous subtraction of a grain 
eventually destroys the heap, but just when is not clear.  As Clark explains, if a pile of 
grain N is a heap then so might be a pile of N-1 grains.  Eventually it will fall short of 
the truth by a significant degree because each of its reduced instances deviates ever so 
slightly from the accepted ideal and eventually falls all too short of what is perceived as 
a heap.  When does a heap of grain stop being a recognizable heap?  Or to reverse the 
argument, when does a number of grains become a heap, and in either case what or 
where is the borderline?   
 
The Sorites argument is about the illusion of assigning categoric values.  I hold that the 
metaphor fits well with Swanton's prototype-contour continuum.  For example, our 
ordinary prototypical moral language contains many vague nouns and adjectives 
relating to maturation, such as child or adult, even abuse and neglect and it assumes cut-
off points.  However, it would be absurd to say that there is a child at a precise time but 
one exact second later she is an adult; likewise with abuse and neglect.  One argument 
might be that though we may not know where the cut-off point is, this is simply because 
our powers of discrimination are limited and we have to implicitly recognise and work 
with margins of error.  However, this only says why we cannot easily detect a cut-off 
point; it does not show there really is one.   
I might say of someone who is aged 16 that she is a child but if she grows another year 
the claim is less close to the truth.  However, we would not consider her as more or less 
an adult or child unless society attributes some special moral significance to childhood.  
Social work contoured accounts of moral significance lie in identifying the supervenient 
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(Chapter 7) for particular life stages in terms of cut-off points and justifying what to 
pick out and not leave unattended.  
 
Of course, much of this is prescribed by the artifact of statute and policy.  One way to 
grapple with this problem morally (as opposed to what the law says) is to construe value 
borderlines by invoking ‘supervaluations’ (Clark, M., 2007: 85) to provide a way of 
making vague terms more precise  (either 'supertrue' or 'superfalse').  Anyone, say, 
under sixteen is deemed a child for a particular purpose sharpened further to those, say, 
under six to be definitely more so.  We tend to have far stronger sentiments about the 
neglect or abuse of a child or senior adult according to age, which is usually correlated 
with certain sorts of extra-vulnerability. 
 
There are some forms of mistreatment we have come to consider so evil that we regard 
them as simply inadmissible, for example, paedophilia where the notion of vulnerable 
childhood spans a wide age range.  But even here both the idea of a 'sixty-five year-old 
child’ and the idea of one being subject to a paedophile’s attention are palpably false.  
Other putative forms of mistreatment, and hence the moral gravity, revolve around less 
clear contested cut-off points.  In my example of the runaway eleven year-old young 
person still under the care of her parents, there would be a little-by-little moral (as 
opposed to legal) difference in approach depending on whether she were a few years 
younger or older.  
 
Moral fuzziness is implied in my account of moral bystanding in Chapter 3.  
Overcoming fuzziness can be re-presented as that dialogue between emotioning and 
reasoning.  We could presume a fuzzy indeterminate range where the borderline lies, 
but that would still mean that there would be cases where it is also indeterminate which 
side of the borderline they are on.  Learning to deal with this sort of moral fuzziness is 
what becoming a social worker means.  She needs to aim in practice so that borderline 
cases are simply those we start to hesitate to classify as morally salient.  The point at 
which we start to hesitate will vary from time to time and situation to situation.   
 
Admissible positive hesitation is germane to my notion of social work identity as 
reflective moral pausing.  Inadmissible negative hesitation, or prevarication, makes for 
those tragedies which afflict social work.  True ethical labouring requires that the 
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morally active practitioner must look for (but can never guarantee) some kind of 
determinate supertrue easement, so must learn to live in the moment with moral 
fuzziness as part of what being a social worker means.  On my account, a moral expert, 
one who is an excellent specimen of her kind, will be the most proficient and insightful 
in living with fuzziness, knowing when to be indifferent to it and knowing when to 
determine supersharp moral truth.  
 
Towards a stability standard  
 
The little-by-little argument helps us understand what is 'good enough'.  Another angle 
to moral indetermination is to say that we are not always in full possession of all the 
particular moral facts to make correct supersharp decisions.  Nonetheless, out of 
practical reasoning we can opt to choose the next best alternative.  This is based on 
satisficing, a well-established philosophical theme (Byron, 2004) little considered for 
social work but apt for a social worker’s moral economy of exchange-value.  Satisficing 
is intrinsic to Swanton's VE model of targeted virtue.  Hurka (2004: 71-76) suggests 
that satisficing theories require only that the moral agent bring about outcomes that are 
good enough in one of two senses.  In the first sense, an outcome is good enough if it is 
above some absolute threshold of goodness yielding what Hurka describes as absolute-
level satisficing.  In the second sense, an outcome is good enough if it is as reasonably 
close to the best outcome an agent could bring about, what Hurka calls comparative 
satisficing.  
 
Satisficing may be applied to an idea of a social work 'stability standard' as an 
expression of self-management and practical reasoning in pursuit of exchange-value 
balance.  As a deliberator, a social worker must pursue ends for good reasons which 
pick out good options linked to the reasoning.  The question is whether there is a 
reliable way of testing out whether our reasoning is good enough to produce good 
reasons.  The features which make an option reliably good or bad, better or worse, 
direct us to have reasons that are stable on appropriate reflection, where the 
considerations are evaluated on the basis of their fit with the agent's pattern of VE 
commitments.  In this light, I adapt a practical reasoning stability argument by Tiberius 
(2002), suggested by C. Clark (2007: 69) as apt for social work.  I postulate its potential 
for VE action guidance. 
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Tiberius is concerned to overcome a common view called instrumentalism associated 
with practical reasoning.  Instrumentalism holds that norms of practical reasoning may 
help us take the necessary, available and most effective means to our ends, but there are 
no rational norms that allow us to evaluate the ends themselves since ends are simply 
objects of desire or pro-attitudes.  (This recalls the insular argument encountered in the 
VE casuistry challenge, although that is not Tiberius's immediate concern.)  Countering 
the strictures of instrumentalism, Tiberius proposes a stability standard as an explicit 
satisficing norm of practical reasoning 'insofar as if we do not take violations of this 
norm to be relevant considerations in reasoning, we cannot count as engaged in 
reasoning at all' (Tiberius, 2002: 339).  Furthermore, Tiberius suggests it is a standard 
which we can explicitly employ in order to deliberate about our acts or desires 
themselves in a way that does not require that ends are prescribed or determined by 
reason alone.  
 
Tiberius suggests that we could think of practical reasoning as analogous to a game that 
we might play.  We play the game in order to find good reasons for making choices and 
decisions, so that the norms of appropriate reflection to which we are committed are the 
'rules of the game' (Tiberius, 2002: 347).  These form the standard by which we must 
proceed in order not only to arrive at an end but also to call an end the desired one.  A 
person may be engaged in picking and choosing but if she were really interested in what 
she has reason to choose then she would not ignore this standard for what counts as 
good reflection on her reasons. 
 
I will adapt an example given by Tiberius (2002: 348-349) to illustrate the stability 
standard of reasoning.  Let us say that I believe I am a fair person and am by nature an 
easy-going person, so at work I will look to resolve disputes amicably and search out 
compromises.  I consider such traits to be my main virtues, making me who I think I am 
and like to be.  When having to make choices I have a distaste for confrontation.  Thus 
my commitment to fairness and to being accommodating and to not being 
confrontational forms a stable part of my conception of appropriate reflection.  My 
deliberation is marked out by extra attention to facts bearing on potential confrontations 
in order to either avoid or accommodate them, and extra attention to facts which invite 
co-operation, such as staff shortages and the build up of unallocated cases.  Work being 
work, it is likely that I will end up ignoring some salient matters regarding fairness if 
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they can only be resolved with confrontation, so fairness will not have its proper due.  It 
is not fair to clients that I acquiesce in taking on too heavy a caseload and it is not fair to 
colleagues whose resistance is weakened by my collusion.  I am also not being fair to 
myself.  
 
If I come to recognise in my pattern of reasoning that I avoid confrontation actually out 
of timidity then, if I value the value of fairness, I will examine the part of my pattern of 
reasoning which leads me to those reasons which favour cowardly ends.  I will judge 
that timidity is a bad reason for choice.  My future deliberations will be marked out by 
special attention to facts about what should and should not count towards compromise.  
As a person given to harmonious relations, which I still hold dear, I now will engage in 
conflict but it will have to be for serious reasons.  The new me is expressed through a 
modified pattern of reasoning arising out of a revised pattern of motivations, the 
consideration of which leads to sometimes quite different ends.  
 
This story is relevant to a practice of value and the dynamic of sophrosune.  It invites a 
consideration of which options we have good reason to choose and to not choose 
against a stable pattern of commitments to choosing options and their reasons. The 
stability standard is relative to the agent's commitments, where a reason for an option in 
pursuance of an end is one the agent approves of as a good enough supporting 
consideration.  I hold that this idea allows us to link the VE idea of practice (as 
emotionally driven ethical labour which produces a good) with a reasonable way of 
evaluating both the good produced by that labour and the labour itself.  For social work, 
the stability standard for this kind of reasoning would consist in an ideal of a stable 
pattern of emotional commitments to the moral impulse, and a stable pattern of 
reasoning in consideration of options intended to honour the impulse.  When we employ 
the stability standard we are assessing our options and reasons for the chosen option 
against these patterns of commitment and reasoning.  
 
This standard has a number of stabilising features relevant to a practice of social work 
value.  Paraphrasing Tiberius  (2002: 341-342), I suggest that an ideally stable social 
work pattern of commitment to options and their reasons is such that (i) there is a 
relationship of support between sentiment, the chosen option and the reasons; that is to 
say, confidence in the option is increased by reflection on both our reasoning process 
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and those reasons which emerge; (ii) we will have emotional commitments to the 
reasons since we are confident that these considerations are favourable to those ends to 
which we are emotionally committed; (iii) neither of these two states of mind would 
change upon our appropriate further reflection.  An option is a stronger one insofar as 
we think we have no good reason to choose some other option that is also stable on 
reflection.  The option is also stronger when the pattern of reasoning does not change 
after appropriate reflection.  
 
Tiberius's stability standard tests out the strength of someone's practical reasoning.   
Appropriate reflection here means such that if an agent were to articulate what is 
involved in her reasoning, she would approve of it as a good process for making 
choices.  She would also approve of reflection on the pattern of that reasoning which 
gives rise to the reasons for an option.  We should be suspicious of any pattern of 
reasoning that is deeply at odds with our good intuitions.  As illustrated by my 
amicable, easy-going and fair example, we approve of the process of reflection because 
it reveals the parts of our committed selves that are admirably enduring and those less 
desirable parts which embed themselves in our pattern of reasoning.  Our stabilising 
deliberations take the form of reflecting on what we stand for and reflecting on traits of 
character we want to champion.  This leads us to make choices that we are truly 
motivated to follow in line with our character. 
 
As Tiberius notes (2002: 342), the judgment about stable attitudes towards our pattern 
of reasoning is not an empirical prediction but a normative judgment, since what an 
agent has reason to approve may change overtime as she learns from experience and 
improves her own capacity for self-reflection.  This idea of stability is a regulative ideal 
in the sense that we can use it to make judgments about the ways in which our own 
choices could be improved, to become even better at being the sort of person we would 
want to be.   
 
The stability standard is not an ideal that determines correct choices independently of 
the defining process of reflection-in-and-on pattern and action.  Nor will it make us into 
somebody we do not have within us to become.  I may never overcome my timidity, but 
then if I cannot, perhaps I should not become a social worker.  Since we cannot 
completely disassemble our destablising features of character and hence our pattern of 
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commitments in an instant, our patterns of reasoning will evolve slowly rather than be 
upturned through catharsis.  The point of the ideal is a minimally good enough standard 
to urge us towards improvement, not to ever describe a state of perfection.  It offers a 
way of capturing the emotive-cognitive process of an agent's moral pausing.  Love of it 
as a good in itself makes for a Hurka-like recursion V-clause (Chapter 4). 
 
I suggest that the appropriate social work stable patterns of commitments and reasoning 
can be located within certain occupationally specific clusters or modules of virtue which 
therefore provide the substance of a stability standard.  An idea used by Adams (2006: 
125), I shall be employing the notion of modularity in a different way to him.  As 
Adams (2006: 81) notes, there is something morally misshapen about caring for social 
justice without caring about the well-being of people; a commitment to justice that is 
not normally combined with benevolence is something unattractively chilling, lacking 
one of the most admirable features of motivation for justice.  I go one step beyond an 
overall unity of virtue and propose a stabilising role-specific combination of virtue 
traits.  I outline two distinctive modules of virtues for social work which, although we 
may have lost the words, I maintain have always informed the authentic social worker’s 
own inherent tacit stability standard.  
  
Righteous indignation and just generosity 
 
Building on my previous presentations of the idea (Webster, 2008a; Webster, 2009), I 
suggest that this social worker specific stability standard is to be exercised through the 
V-modules of what I call righteous indignation and just generosity.  Righteous 
indignation is, in the language of Aristotle, a concomitant of well-balanced relations 
between people, the mean of neither envying another’s good fortune nor taking 
malicious enjoyment in someone’s misfortune.  This recalls the social work paradox of 
fortunate misfortune described in Chapter 3.  Today, righteous indignation carries a 
negative secular connotation of priggishness and haughtiness, sometimes associated 
with do-gooding.  The theological term refers to that sort of properly directed anger 
which is without guilt, false pride, haughtiness or peevishness and is directed at 
injustice meted out to another human being.  Stocker (2003: 120) alludes to it as a 
feature of emotional identification.  As an affective motivational state, righteousness, 
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derived from being wise and bounteous, conveys a sense of moral uprightness and 
steadfastness with regard to correct perception about what is wrong with the world.  
 
In general, we feel disgust about perceived moral baseness in others towards others 
(callousness, indifference, cruelty, abuse, oppressive behaviour), sometimes even self-
disgust where we also recognise our own transgressions and weaknesses.  Righteous 
indignation is an attitude of affront when confronted by a disgraceful or shameful state 
of affairs constitutive of moral disorder and which remains unrectified.  Righteous 
indignation emotes to overturn what is wrong-making and is a counterfactual to the 
moral indifference of others.  Social work righteous indignation is the moral impulse 
sanctified.  
 
Just generosity is also a theological notion, originally associated in Christianity with 
Aquinas.  It is expounded by MacIntyre (2006: 119-128) in his account of what makes 
us all dependent rational animals.  Dependency modes and displays are exhibited in 
those altruistic networks of giving and receiving that communities develop over time 
and of a place.  Such communality would see each of us acting from and with a certain 
kind of affectionate regard for another’s distress.  Here, justice is both restorative and 
redistributive of beneficence owed by the community, a kind of debt to one of its 
stricken members.  Just generosity captures the idea that some measured action is due to 
a distressed other to relieve that distress and that there is a minimum required in the 
reckoning of what is due.  That requires the transaction ensures respect for and 
maintains the dignity of the distressed person.  To understand another’s distress as our 
own is to recognise the other as a neighbour.  Similarly, Aquinas’ notion of 
'misericordia' refers to grief or sorrow over someone’s distress just insofar as one 
understands the other's distress as one’s own, a form of pity but without the current 
association of condescension.  The idea of an exchange-value moral economy as 
restitution and redistribution makes full sense only as just generosity in action.  Social 
work just generosity is the moral impulse sophisticated.  
 
Various personality traits can make for righteous indignation and just generosity but it 
would be the role-contoured interaction of the eleven traits covering humanity, justice 
and transcendence (see Appendix) which are primary social work module candidates.  
They are cardinal for social work, based on the idea of identity-conferring contoured 
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‘signature strengths’.  I adopt this notion from Peterson and Seligman (2004:18-29).  A 
virtue is a good trait but not all good traits count as distinctive virtues.  A personality 
trait becomes a character virtue to the extent that it expresses a number of outstanding 
signature features making the possessor very distinctive.  I may find the humdrum 
courage to go to my viva examination - a modest triumph over temporary fear - but I 
cannot claim to be the exemplar of a student, one who is characteristically brave, since 
the student role does not typically require bravery.  I do not exhibit the signature 
courage of a Nelson Mandela who, as a freedom fighter, spent twenty-seven years in 
gaol. 
 
Evidence of outstanding signature strength includes a deep sense of ownership and 
authenticity (this is ‘the real me who I must be’) vis-à-vis the strength.  There is an 
intrinsic motivation to use the strength and a sense of yearning to act in accordance with 
the strength, together with a feeling of both excitement and determination while 
displaying it.  There is a feeling of inevitability in using the strength, as if one cannot be 
stopped from displaying it.  There is also continuous learning of new ways to enact the 
strength and so it invigorates rather then exhausts the agent.  Critically, the strength 
entails the creation and maintenance of fundamental projects that revolve around it 
(Peterson and Seligman, 2004: 18).  
 
Peterson and Seligman (2004: 23) distinguish between signature strength 'tonic’ features 
which will show themselves steadily and readily across time and place, and signature 
strength 'phasic’ features which can be intermittent, coming and going because of 
critical variation in relevant settings that trigger them.  I also distinguish ‘tropical’ and 
‘magnetising’ features whereby the agent actively turns towards and seeks out those 
epicentres of distress which fall below a certain moral latitude.  At the same time, she 
will be repelled by those immoral states of affairs at the epicentre, attracting her only in 
order to void or ameliorate them.  
 
Conjoined in these four patterned ways, just generosity and righteous indignation are 
therefore always likely to draw on qualities that gravitate towards each other as co-
terminous dependencies and will be embodied in a certain sort of person who reasons in 
a certain sort of patterned way.  The link between righteous indignation and just 
generosity is an elusive one because the connecting elements, their profiling and modes 
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of acknowledgment are not only historically contoured in the long run but also tacitly 
situation dependent.  The modular signature strengths of righteous indignation and just 
generosity cannot be decomposed into other positive traits without losing something of 
that distinctiveness which describes both attitude and action and their relationship.  
 
We might be generous in some non-threatening contexts but not necessarily always 
indignant in the face of injustice, at least not enough to do anything about it.  Here the 
unjust situation is avoided, rather than the injustice voided.  Quite properly, it may not 
be one's immediate business.  I am sure that a nurse is orientated to a generous but just 
allocation of her resources but in the normal course of work she is not primarily 
motivated by the injustice of a patient's medical condition, only its healing.  Nursing a 
neglected child or mistreated elder is of course where the values of different professions 
try to come together. 
 
According to Peterson and Seligman (2004: 22), another way of establishing a signature 
strength is that being able only to phrase the opposite of a trait in an infelicitous way 
counts against its classification as a signature one.  Assuming flexibility is a social work 
trait contributing towards the goal of just generosity, the antonym of flexibility needs to 
be not the vice of inflexibility but the virtue of steadfastness, which is what is surely 
demanded by righteous indignation.  Another way of putting this is that a signature 
strength is evidenced by the existence of other people who exhibit a lack of such 
distinctive patterning (Peterson and Seligman, 2004: 26), in some cases because they 
have their own patterning as opposed to none at all.  
 
Possessors of signature strengths make things happen which matter to them, which is 
surely demanded of just generosity.  In Chapter 4, I mooted Hursthouse's idea of a 
paragon.  In the next chapter I describe the achievement of an historic figure to illustrate 
and then develop the idea of supersharp, righteously indignant, justly generous social 
work virtue in action.  According to my account of the stability standard, her work can 
be evaluated in satisficing terms of a debt owed and a gift freely given.  
	  	  
115	  
 
Chapter 9 
VE heroism and moral indebtedness  
 
Introduction 
 
To illustrate righteous indignation, just generosity and their pattern of reasoning at 
work, I describe the prodigious rescue achievements of a little known hero who 
disobeyed all the rules and followed her conscience.  Seeing with unadorned clarity 
what must be done and finding a way of doing it, her story is a powerful example of 
supererogative social work at its most supersharp.  I examine communitarian and 
hermeneutical dialogue, moral relativism and perspectivism as considerations in 
patterns of reasoning to suggest how grappling with moral fuzziness and contested cases 
in VE social work may be undertaken.  
 
The story of Irena Sendler 
 
In Chapter 1, I explained that to establish virtue as the precursor to moral action VE 
directs us to refer to the paragon of a virtuous person.  However, in order to identify 
such a person we must have some idea of what virtuous action is in the first place and 
why it is right making, not just because the paragon displays it - the circulatory 
problem.  Peterson and Seligman (2004: 24-25) say that we can speak of consensual 
prodigies because they compellingly demonstrate a given positive trait.  Speaking 
within a nursing context, Pukinskeine (2006: 2) says:  
 
The title 'hero' is the determination of the 'high price' or value that is given a 
person by people as an attempt to show their thankfulness and admiration 
for their great generosity.  
 
According to Peterson and Seligman (2004: 21), a display of signature strengths does 
not diminish other people in the vicinity; on the contrary, it invites emulation.  
Therefore the paragon generates what I describe as an aura of the canonical.  Heroism is 
a moral concept with many dimensions.  A paragonic description of righteous 
indignation and just generosity expresses the truth of exemplary social work character.  
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As an example, I choose the story of Irena Sendler, a municipal social welfare officer 
who rescued 2500 Jewish children from the Warsaw ghetto (Gilbert, 2003: 141-142).  
Even a cursory study of her good works will illustrate supersharp working virtue on the 
very edge of moral compossiblities (Wright and Webster, 2008).  
 
The gist of the story is that after the sealing of the ghetto, Sendler obtained special 
passes from the epidemic control department that allowed her and a co-conspirator to 
enter the ghetto at will, ostensibly to help control the spread of disease.  As well as 
secretly taking in food, medicine and clothing, Sendler persuaded distraught mothers 
awaiting transportation of their families to the gas chambers to give up their children to 
her.  She provided each infant with false birth and baptismal certificates and a new 
identity.  She secreted them in places of safety (orphanages, convents, schools, hospitals 
and private homes).  In addition, she recorded the original names of all the children and 
where they were placed so that after the war surviving relatives could claim them.  
Sendler was eventually captured, tortured and sentenced to death but managed to escape 
into hiding to survive for the rest of the war, as did most of her rescued children.  After 
the war she tried to find the parents.  Almost all had of course been murdered.  
 
Sendler died in a nursing home in May 2008, aged 98.  She described her acts of 
courage over sixty years ago as ‘a normal thing to do’.  To Sendler, helping was not just 
carrying out her official health remit, itself of some benefit to the lives of the wretched.  
Driven by what I have called righteous indignation as to what she saw as evil, Sendler 
called upon her own inner resources to effect a remedy in the direst situation 
imaginable.  She concentrated on saving infants because they could be more easily 
smuggled out than older children.  Sendler's story is a dramatic one in shocking times.  
What it illustrates is the supersharp moral fact that only some such rescue mission met 
the full demands of humanity and justice and that it required at least one prodigious 
moral person with a transcendent vision and the correct pattern of reasoning to imagine 
it. 
 
The contoured gift relationship  
 
It can be said that, under the circumstances, Sendler gave as much of herself as she 
possibly could to the ghetto victims.  She felt the overwhelming burden of a personal 
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debt, the minimum feasible due, but her rescues were also a gift.  Social workers do not 
have a monopoly on righteous indignation and just generosity.  (Sendler has also been 
described as a community nurse or community worker.)  However, it is social work's 
institutional positioning which lends itself to these role ascriptions and the nature of 
their transactions.  Social work rescue themes are not normally anywhere as dramatic as 
Sendler's but I believe that her story exemplifies them.   
 
Sendler’s work leads again to the idea of satisficing: only by giving the best possible of 
herself under the circumstances could Sendler do what was at least good enough.  She 
could have carried on with her routine administrative duties in the ghetto, 'perfectly safe' 
practice, but chose to go way beyond - a maximal proximal unity of self and other.  I 
suggest it is this signature strength capacity for elevated moral imagination from the 
merely given - part phronesis and part poiesis - which distinguishes individuals like 
Sendler and makes them paragons.  In her case, doing the minimally good enough (in 
Hurka’s term comparative satisficing) and doing the maximally possible (absolute 
satisficing) converge.  Sendler had to at least and at most do what she did.  Such know-
how resides in maintaining the connection between what the situation realistically is and 
what is potentially transformative in the given.  Few of us will ever match Sendler’s 
maximal achievements yet we should at least remind ourselves who we could and 
sometimes should be.  Her moral imagination regarding distress opened up the 
otherwise unimaginable alleviation of it. 
 
Pure and applied non-indifference 
 
For Sendler there was no querying what was evil, by whom and against whom, and 
hence no querying her responsibility.  Aquinas’ notion of misericordia (Chapter 8) 
invites a supertrue discourse about moral status, pity and the need for undisputed 
protection from harms and threats.  Our deliberation in response to someone’s moral 
status assesses the gravity of the combined wrong-making features.  Moral status is 
based on an intrinsic property of the person and an extrinsic proximal harm.  In VE 
terms, this helps us to define the scope or field of our response to, say, the vice of 
cruelty and to define what behaviours, by whom and against whom, would be deemed 
cruel and why (Hacker-Wright, 2007).  The emergent responses need to be 
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proportionate to the need of the victim since sentiment unbounded by reason becomes 
cloying sentimentality (or over-identification).   
 
Jaworska (2007) speaks of an obligation to afford full moral standing (FMS) to anyone 
as a sentient creature, one who can experience suffering, or at least to whom we can 
attribute the experience of suffering.  I will borrow this idea and adapt it for morally 
active practice.  It also leads to a debate about which of the client’s selves (past present 
or future) is the salient other who we ought to regard.  Jaworska (2007: 460) argues that 
a core constituent of FMS is an inviolability of the uncared for other which transcends 
all other values.  Our obligation to recognise and respond to someone’s full moral 
standing is especially tested out through a person's disrupted life stages.  Jaworska 
describes the case of someone with reduced or impaired faculties and how the carer 
must distinguish between the contemporaneous interests expressed by the person in her 
charge (say, to go out undressed and unattended) and those vital interests (such as 
dignity and common sense) that she had at a time when she possessed normal abilities.  
It is as if there are in focus two beings with different interests, the present one with 
impaired faculties and the other who was once fully responsible for herself.  It is the 
idea of the latter (a safe person appropriately dressed) which requires our primary 
obligation and only then do we try to accommodate the former. 
 
We do not always look backwards to envisage a person in possession of her faculties.  
In some cases, say a person with an acute mental health problem unable to be her 
normal self, we project on her behalf what her normal self would like to be now and in 
the future.  Similarly with infants and young children who are too young to envisage a 
future.  However, there are two FMS social work caveats.  First of all, not all discomfort 
counts as suffering to be concerned about.  We must discriminate between prohibited 
behaviours (such as rank child abuse) which are crucial to defining our collective moral 
lives, and those which, while deemed undesirable, are not prohibited, for example, 
different sorts of child rearing.  The difference is between that which we find morally 
repugnant and that which is to be tolerated; the difference, that is, between supertruth 
and acceptable, indifferent fuzziness.  
 
Secondly, the attribution of FMS and our notion of moral indebtedness have changed 
over time.  Our moral attention has a horizontal dimension, inviting us to look wider 
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beyond the given, and a vertical dimension looking within but deeper.  The histories of 
progressively inclusive moral communities are wider horizontal and deeper vertical 
transformative accounts of who may qualify as deserving of pity, why and how much.  
Even as past injustices of exclusion are eventually recognised and overcome, 
contemporaneous new moral challenges (the plight of, say, asylum seekers) arise.  
Within broad policy and legal frameworks, the institution of social work contours 
motifs and modes of just generosity on the level of personal welfare services.  It spends 
much time examining and deciding what is crucial in the organisation of our collective 
moral lives, what is morally repugnant invoking our indignation, the boundaries of 
sentimentality, and a reasonable moral response.   
 
The Sendler story is clear.  Assuming that all life is sacred, an absolute baseline good, 
and that premeditated murder of any child is a baseline evil, Sendler’s motivation and 
action towards a good end, to redress the immoralities of the perpetrators and even the 
moral omissions of bystanders, make for a fully redemptive practice of restorative FMS.  
Through herself she gave back inestimably more than she took in each fraught and 
dangerous transaction, moral surplus exchange-value to the nth degree.  In return for 
rescuing each child, she not only saved a human life but also returned to the despairing 
family that child’s life as a type of vicarious hope for the future.  The ancient Talmudic 
expression that to save one life is to save humankind is surely apt and Sendler 
personally saved many. 
 
Here, any moral residue is, by any reasonable observer’s account of her achievements, 
objectively immaterial, although Sendler subjectively felt otherwise (‘I could have done 
more’).  This regret can neither diminish her nor her actions.  Quite simply, Sendler 
expressed quintessential social work on the rawest of unadorned moral edges; literally 
life and death ethical labour and the creation of the most primordial compensatory 
social capital of all, life itself.  In one sense that makes any decision-making and action 
beyond choice.  In Chapter 3, I discussed different types of supererogative commitment. 
In facing sheer evil, Sendler gets preciously close to validating the 'anti-
supererogationism’ school of argument.  This states that moral redress is obligatory at 
all times and in every circumstance by all morally charged agents so there cannot be a 
separate class action the omission of which is not wrong.  Here righteous indignation 
was to her inseparable from non-negotiable action.  
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The spontaneous Levinasian gesture prior to any impersonal laws, the response of the 
moral impulse without condition, is a pure supreme moment of non self-effacing moral 
truth.  Social work rescue is rarely described so uncompromisingly if only because our 
world is usually less grotesquely evil.  Sendler’s ethical story is set beyond an 
imaginable normative moral pale.  Its starkness serves to return us to everyday 
questions about resolution of morally fuzzy contestations and their causes.  
 
Contested moral fuzziness  
 
In Chapter 8, I argued that righteous indignation and just generosity are profiled virtue 
clusters allowing for an orderly discourse about modes of acknowledgment and patterns 
of reasoning which stabilise the search for not just safe but transformative practice.  By 
disorder of discourse I mean any purported language of value, the deficiencies of which 
would leave us fixated on and stuck in a zone of moral fuzziness.  What the burdened 
virtuous social worker must always do is aim to move from the borderlines of the 
morally indeterminate to a supervaluative truth of absolute moral certainty and 
intervene accordingly. 
 
Our ethical governance is such that we must always labour little-by-little to a point of 
certainty.  So, we should surely aim to know if and why female circumcision (or 
whatever we choose to call it) is to be celebrated and promoted, or tolerated as an 
acceptable cultural deviation, or prohibited as child abuse.  Social workers aim to target 
the zone of sharp moral supervaluations but more often than not hover around the 
borderlines of fuzzy moral indeterminations in search of the correct modes of moral 
acknowledgment.  We must live with the truth that for some encounters there are only 
indications of moral certainty, one possibility of which must be imposed.  Today, our 
impulsive social work non-indifference to the plight of others is heavily mediated 
through the rigid superimposition of impersonal laws, policies and procedures.  Case 
closing imperatives, performance targets, risk-regulatory and cost-saving regimes 
institutionalise the fuzziness.  Such language also militates against the moral 
imagination.  
 
I make the assumption that, outwith the laws of the time, motivated by the virtue of 
sophrosune, Sendler did not have to dwell on convincing distraught parents to give up 
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their children, making for a perfectly ethical-cum-moral covalency amidst all the 
anguish.  However, even within our own present day laws, the spectre of contested 
virtues and vices within a nexus of functional social relations is a challenging one.  The 
idea of addressing other people’s virtues and vices sits uncomfortably with current 
social work sensibilities.  I argue that such an aporetic outlook is derived from the 
fiction of neutral impartiality and the illusion of dispassionate moral intervention in 
which social work has got itself caught up.   
 
Sometimes called the ideal judgment theory, or the ideal observer or impartial spectator 
theory (Darwall, 1998: 237), and as I have already argued in Chapter 1, this positivistic 
framed myth would have a social worker disinterestedly contemplating the fuzzy moral 
scene like a judge assessing the merits of a case, weighing up the evidence and laying 
out the reasons for a clear final decision.  The modernistic neutral observer versus the 
postmodern ethical relativist has riven social work value talk, and we have come to 
oscillate between the two in search of moral relief.  How any resolution is brokered 
depends on our views of what ethical relativism, proportionalism and perspectivism 
mean.  First, I examine the politico-ethical discourse thread that I mentioned in Chapter 
3 which seeks to circumvent the myth of impartial spectatorship.  
 
Hermeneutics and communicative action  
 
The hermeneutical and communicative action discourse strand which McBeath, 
Houston, Webb, Lovat, Gray and Garrett have initiated reminds us of the theological 
origins of hermeneutics as the dialogical search for sacred truth.  They engage with 
theorists such as Habermas (1990), Benhabib (1992) and Tam (1998) to stress unified 
communitarian theory.  In some expressions of this discourse thread I detect a hint of 
something akin to liberation theology and hear the distant echo of social work's 19th 
century social welfare reforming gospel.  In contrast with mere contemplation, the 
thread stresses praxis as liberating action arising from true belief, through cultivating 
the competence (or 'orthopraxy') of people to collectively live well together.  This 
centers on the notion of inclusive communities using co-operative inquiry as a way of 
validating what is accepted to be true.  Moral decisions flow from a set of conditions 
that govern the linguistic interactions that take place between interlocutors affected by 
the decision.  Ruch's (2007) application to childcare work, Bilson's (2007) application 
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to teamwork and Hayes and Houston's (2007) application to case conferences illustrate 
the emerging day-to-day practical guidance to be derived from a commitment to 
proportionist communicative action.   
 
The classical virtue ethical eudaimonic idea of the good life naturally generates a search 
for a dialogical organic community - one in which virtues are consensually bounded and 
honoured and vices condemned, taking for granted the relational power dynamics of the 
moral sphere unifying the oikia, agora and polis.  However, our postmodern world lacks 
this sort of cohesiveness and unity.  The resurgence of communitarian ethics, which 
focuses on the primacy of communal goods and social capital, is rooted in a shared 
interlocutionary understanding of the good life, or at least not a bad life, within a 
particular community or society.  While building that community through a coalition of 
social workers, clients and carers has an immediate feel good appeal, it can be perhaps a 
little too beguiling.  Recalling my days as an approved mental health officer coercing 
people into hospital under the Mental Health Act, and as a child protection officer 
removing children under a Place of Safety order, I find it difficult not to end up seeing 
this approach as either an idealised democracy of the agreeable many or an overly cosy 
moral party for and of the few.   
 
The problematic is not those caring, consensual exchange relationships where the client 
and carer express a need which is shared with each other and with the social worker; it 
is the not shared, 'dissensual' ones which test out moral theory.  In Chapter 5, I 
described the Aristotelian idea of VE continence and the difference between enkratic, 
akratic and vicious behaviour, all of which fall short of virtue but arising from different 
states of mind.  Clients and their carers are no different.  Therefore these states of mind 
which may pertain to them inevitably inform the exchange relationship.   
 
Working with someone who at a particular point in time can overcome competing 
demands affecting her behaviour is different from working with one who is unable to do 
so, or one who is downright recalcitrant.  Different types of conflicted responses within 
one family network greatly complicate matters, compounded by multifarious ways of 
life within any one large society.  It seems to me that what is demanded in dissensual 
exchange relationships is a rigorous theoretical interpretation of what is meant by moral 
(or as it is often called ethical) relativism.  Moral relativism is a term covering several 
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positions that are poorly articulated in the social work literature and we are prone to 
conflate them.  I look at this in the next section.  
 
Ethical error theory and moral relativisms 
 
Relativist talk comes in all shapes and sizes with various claims as to what may count as 
moral veracity.  Different positions seek to manage fuzziness, colouring any sense of 
unacceptable moral remainder (which I outlined in Chapter 3).  'Ethical error' theorists 
maintain that a moral response is a property conveyed in an attitude towards a state of 
affairs brought to bear on the situation under inquiry (Darwall, 1998: 63-70).  The moral 
relativist positions covering this property and the attendant paradoxes can be found to 
varying degrees in, to borrow Nussbaum's phrase, confused and confusing social work 
practice. 
 
Descriptive relativism provides a de facto account of how and what different people (of 
time and place) hold to be morally true and according to which they conduct their 
behaviour.  This tells us how people behave, not how they should behave, although 
description and prescription can all too easily mingle.  Descriptive relativism posits that 
what is right or good, bad or evil in any particular setting, is simply that which is 
determined by a recognisable sovereign party, whether this be an individual or an 
affiliated group, a culture or a community.  On this account, tradition will have its own 
warrant so that there are no other upstanding prima facie duties or obligations.  So, for 
example, slavery will happen to be morally condoned, or condemned, or at least not 
prohibited.  
 
Forays into descriptive relativism do not logically entail a normative commitment to 
'polyphonic' moral truths.  It is still feasible to argue that some individuals and some 
cultures and communities will make mistakes in thinking about and determining moral 
values.  It would surely be hard for a social worker to conclude otherwise.  The power 
of Sendler's rescue story arises from the claim that there are some absolute evils 
producing an attitude of absolute abhorrence.  It is clearly possible for descriptive 
relativists to investigate a true state of affairs (how people are) but to hold that what is 
being observed is morally wrong.  One attempt to avoid any felt dissonance here 
between observer and observed is to propose a kind of moral system that may be short 
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of claims to full objectivity, settling for the lesser proposition that moral propositions 
can have a validity that is relative somehow to the context of judgment. 
 
Since they are made in different historicised situations, this can lead to a view that it is 
possible for two antinomous moral judgments to be both correct because there is no way 
of making a like-for-like comparison.  So whipping a woman in public is morally 
permissible for one sort of society, if only because its true positive meaning is not 
accessible to an outsider who attributes negative meaning.  This invites the prospect of 
different but evolved equally right modes of moral functioning as concurrent, and often 
competing, ways of life.  Such entrenchment can of course be manifest in communities 
within communities and sub-cultures within cultures, particularly where the source 
tradition is an exogenous one.   
 
In order to even begin to make any meaningful comparison of moral attitudes, there is 
often debate about whether two historically constituted ways of life, as perceived 
and expressed by different groups, share the same moral provenance.  However, even 
assuming such contiguity, two different moral judgments about the same agreed context 
could be equally valid because, from the viewpoint of one or the other judge, the 
judgment is sourced from different incommensurable preferences.  While one judge 
privileges a way of life she happens to favour, the other says that her judgment is based 
on another preferred tradition which will have none of it.  Such sorts of positioning 
invite animated debate - what Shaw (2001: 22) calls ‘emotional ejaculations’.  
 
If social work is a dialogue about sophistication of the moral impulse, the morally 
active practitioner needs to know just what is deemed relativistically germane at any 
given point of contestation.  Recalling the FMS caveat as to what is tolerable or not, she 
needs to know what sort of moral relativist she thinks she might be, and which is the 
correct one for a particular case.  She then has to work the pluralist differences and 
similarities accordingly in the quest for supersharp evaluations of what must be 
prevented and what restored.  Prevention here refers with clarity to a harm that if it were 
to be committed, or is in the process of being committed, would produce more or less 
irreversible consequences.  A child's death is a case in point, but so might be a 
clitorectomy.  An unavoidable part of the propensity for fuzziness is that a typical social 
worker simultaneously works for the state and for the client, so that she must render 
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what is owing to the state and to the client, not to mention to the client's carer or to the 
client's community, or even communities within communities.   
 
I suggest that the social worker's starting point cannot be any other than a supposition 
that there are indeed objective moral facts relating to extra-vulnerability.  What any 
moral relativist talk should remind us to do is to immediately seek to contextualise the 
moral facts of the case to either confirm or modify the supposition - the VE pause again.  
Our social work language should capture and elucidate this complex dialectic.  
Common sense tells us that in order to function as a society we need to agree 
pragmatically on some basic moral standards regarding care and the definition of an 
infraction inviting control.  Not everyone within that society needs to agree all the time 
on everything but yet, for the most part, peacefully co-exist.  Some aspects of moral 
fuzziness can be restated as a debate about VE perspectivism.  A qualified moral 
relativist needs only hold that a predominant moral perspective regulating ways of life 
be accepted, but only after listening to and learning from all sides. 
 
The virtue of perspective and proportionality 
 
Peterson and Seligman (2004: 181-196) suggest that the virtue of perspective is a form 
of wisdom, a capacity to provide counsel to others which entails ways of looking at the 
world that make sense to oneself and to other people.  I have already suggested that VE 
can and should make us humbly question our own inherited values; not only these, but 
also the concomitant judgments we make, and how as-given beliefs propagated by the 
self-serving powerful have been oppressive and discriminatory.  Taking away from, 
rather than giving to, the distressed other is ethical failure.  Causing additional distress 
instead of eradicating it at the point of intervening is double ethical failure.  Taking 
away and giving are irreducibly normative, conspicuously so in contested cases.  The 
transaction may be in Slote's terms (Chapter 4) admirably motivated or deplorable.  I 
have suggested that rather than sanctify and replicate the given, the moderating 
psychological structuralisation of righteous indignation and just generosity - 
phronesis/poiesis/sophrosune - demands a stable commitment embracing cautious, 
proportionist innovation. 
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Peterson and Seligman (2004: 95-196) describe cultivation of those positive traits of 
creativity, ingenuity, originality, open-mindedness, curiosity, novelty seeking, love of 
learning and critical thinking as indicators of the virtue of wisdom.  Creativity produces 
ideas that are recognisably original, surprising, ingenious and which are problem 
solving and adaptive. Open-mindedness is linked to broad-mindedness and lateral 
thinking when challenged by complex data.  That drives a person to continually learn 
about and from the world she has entered before she may seek to change it.  Perspective 
refers to an ability to take stock of life in broad terms in ways that make sense not just 
to the self but also to others around you.  It entails the agent listening first to others 
before she interjects.  Listening, here, is not just for the accumulation of information to 
confirm a pre-judgment but to see another’s point of view and hence build the picture.  
This signature strength of receptiveness invites a practice confidence amidst all the 
fuzziness in order to get beyond it.  Even Sendler did not just turn up one day and take 
babies.  She riskily entered into a dangerous dialogue with the besieged community and 
its families before working out a plan of action, its implications, and how to be 
successful. 
 
It will be recalled that the FMS caveats invite us to distinguish between changing levels 
and types of moral debt and how that debt is to be credited.  In the working of this 
complex moral economy, value words get deleted and updated, and new ones enter, 
shifting the register and the relationship of meanings.  Multiplying ways of life, some 
augmentative, some nefarious, impact on and transform the moral landscape.  In the 
search for some co-operative accord with our clients and carers and their ways of life, 
we must not easily be discouraged or despairing of our personal resources, nor be 
overconfident or overestimate ourselves in any situation.  Beckett (2007: 271) speaks of 
the need for realistic pragmatism out there.  I prefer the term clarity.  
 
At some practical point of no return, when any imminent harm is adjudged irreversible, 
we need to say unambiguously with defendable reason why the runaway extra-
vulnerable young person in her distress - and hence her immediate life world - is the 
primary target of our emotional intervention and field of inquiry.  We need to be clear 
about why we have a moral debt to her and then work out how we intend to discharge it.  
Our aim will be to eliminate or reduce her extra-vulnerability, accepting and living with 
any collateral damage - the moral remainder - that cannot be resolved.  In her moment 
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of certainty, the social worker is obliged to follow through her non-negotiable 
commitment to do the best she can.  In this sense - the ‘good-then-ought-to-tie-up’ 
debate - there cannot be a class of action the omission of which is not wrong.  In order 
to live properly with any remainder we need to be absolutely clear about the difference 
between means and ends.  In the next chapter I describe in more detail the features of 
the stability standard which, I hold, enable us to do so. 
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Chapter 10 
A VE framework of value 
 
Introduction 
 
The distinction between the means and ends of practice can be obscured by loose moral 
relativist discourse.  In this respect, a distinction needs to be drawn between 
constructions of clienthood and constructions of carer identity.  As interpretive 
researcher, the morally active practitioner considers the difference between consensual, 
non-consensual and dissensual interventions, whether it is the means (including the 
quality of the relationship), the end, or both which are being contested.  I develop the 
stability standard in critical/transcendent realistic VE minimal-maximal terms to target 
and aim at degrees of reliable social work moral certainty.  
 
The moral researcher  
 
Reflecting the Hursthouse qualified VE position described in Chapter 4, a client or carer 
becomes a characteristic sort of person in role, seen to behave characteristically so, and 
is treated as such.  In line with Hurka's VE baseline and recursion-clause analysis, our 
social work narrative includes a normative discourse about relational definitions of 
client extra-vulnerability and carer capacity, where the latter is deemed a good in itself.  
Echoing Slote, we can admire or hold despicable any person who is normally a carer 
depending on whether she excels in her role or culpably fails it.  As per Swanton, we 
aim and seek to hit the target accordingly in the determination of who is client and who 
is carer.  Modes of acknowledgment come into play in line with some typology of extra-
vulnerability in relation to failed caring modes. 
 
I hold that any social work VE fortification argument needs to separate out a reasoned 
commitment to establishing (i) an emotive supervaluative starting position; (ii) a 
confident, confirmed decision as to a moral statement of concern; (iii) the actual 
practice of engagement and how we go about dealing with that moral certainty once 
established; and (iv) the desired end which would resolve the concern.  In Sendler's 
case, starting position, process and end speak to each other since there was only one 
feasible moral course of action.  In contrast, much of our day-to-day confusions and our 
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prevarications can be attributed to a conflation of ends and means.  The former must 
always be embedded as a supersharp confident belief; the latter often spirals 
indeterminately.  In considering the runaway child whose safety and well-being are 
paramount, the VE practitioner has to move in a virtuous circle from (i) to (iv) 
managing the chaos in between.  
 
In the search for moral order social work seeks to posit an ‘alloyed bad’, such as child 
abuse, as the target of its practice, as if protection is a self-effulgent activity.  If the 
alloy metaphor is extended, the question might better be whether there is a number of 
base behaviours, each of which we would emote about and understand as abuse, to be 
amalgamated into the one overarching notion of evil, of which they are instances.  The 
cosy moral party syndrome alluded to in Chapter 9 encourages a symphonium of 
sometimes unruly voices.  This is an untenable social work position because it leaves in 
the air just what the particular components of child abuse might be and therefore just 
what might be an identifiable, intolerable risk.  Garcia et al. (2003) make the case for a 
transcultural integrative model of counseling.  Islam (2007: 704) raises the ‘paradox of 
cognitive relativism’ in which a ‘virtue approach to multiculturalism seems to be at 
odds with a multicultural approach to virtue’. 
 
In a sense, VE theory seems to demand that the morally active practitioner becomes 
some sort of (moral) action researcher.  Necessarily reflective, practitioners are 
interested in improvement (the elimination of some 'pure evil') rather than in 
understanding for its own sake, beginning with the reconnaissance phase of moral 
tagging through to neutralisation of the harm before it is too late.  Social work ends and 
means are obviously connected in terms of characteristic VE performance (being and 
doing, ethical and moral, aims and targets, recursion-clauses, habitual moral pausing).  
The interplay of phronesis and poiesis relies on this dynamic, forging a link between 
moral action, evolving notions of sociality, and evolving attitudes towards social 
structures in which extra-vulnerability is signified.  If the mobilisation of moral 
meaning is undertaken through a process of value contouring in the context of practice, 
any preconceived desirable moral end state can be transformed into another unpredicted 
but more desirable end state, since the process itself may recast the terms of reference - 
the 'double hermeneutic' as described by Giddens (1991).  This in turn can become part 
of a confluent account of revised moral sensibilities, inviting a comparison with 
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a 'catalytic' process of action research (Dunne et al., 2005: 88) and the elision of the 
researcher and the researched.  
 
This dynamic also serves to highlight the penetrating, confrontational nature of the 
social work gaze and how the client’s story is translated back into the idiom of 
contemporaneous social work value.  The morally active practitioner is committed to 
analysing how her knowledge base and trajectories of moral meaning, hence her 
language of intervention, are bounded by the socially constructed conditions which 
generate them.  Using her emotional intelligence, she is committed to finding out about 
herself and her impact.  However, she must also be the final arbitrator, reassembling and 
repossessing any ruptured knowledge for her particular purpose.  The essentially 
invasive nature of the social work mandate, the logic of its reconnaissance remit and 
control of the process sit uneasily alongside a commitment to client emancipation.  As 
social worker researcher, the morally active practitioner will always have to 
contemplate what Dunne et al. (2005: 89) call 'acts of ventriloquism' in the problematic 
representation and reconstruction of the safe other. 
 
Client and carer attributions  
 
Skillfully working and living the differences thrown up by relativist incursions 
deconstruct perspectivism and the nature of morally active research in discomforting 
ways.  Who is the client in the runaway scenario?  The young woman or her parents, or 
perhaps only the mother?  Maybe the family unit itself or even their community?  This 
depends on the shifting normative correlations of risk, vulnerability and crossover 
between client and carer status. 
 
We may retain from Aristotle the fundamental idea that the self is not prior to its 
socially constructed roles and responsibilities but is at least partially derivative of them.  
For Aristotle, the good for an individual has to be the good for one who inhabits well 
those roles defined by social structure.  That can be double-edged since some household 
role constructions, for example, mother or housewife, are more or less imposed, and 
performance failure can be attributed to the role holder's presumed deficiencies rather 
than to the weight of expectations, the press of a dehabiltating situation or the grind of 
circumstance.  Performance failures associated with ascribed roles can lend themselves 
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to a moral movement in social work’s pursuit of the abnormal, from being seen as the 
one who does the caring to being projected as a needy client.  As I have argued, the 
movement can also be justified through virtue and vice talk. 
 
In the very construction and contracting of client- and carer-hood something is always 
taken away from the other, beginning with a normative pre-definition of need, then 
throughout the moral transaction.  No matter how temporary or what the terms of 
endearment, these do not eliminate the violation of the other’s dignity in our urge to 
redress a morally tagged discomfort.  The other must always yield up something of her 
unique visage no matter what the euphemistic term might be to obfuscate that transfer 
and social work’s compulsory purchase.  Consensual exchanges hide this feature of the 
transaction; non-consensual ones where the client realistically or passively conforms, 
obscure it; dissensual ones foreground it.   
 
Non-invasive social work intervention through an agreed process towards an agreed 
socially ordained end is a myth caught between the Scylla of value-free positivism and 
the Charybdis of aporetic relativism.  It is the nature and extent of this vacillation that 
sustains social work moral fuzziness.  Some medical texts look at what it means to be, 
say, a courageous or self-caring patient (Lebacqz, 1985), even ‘dying well,’ in 
recognition that the patient is a lead actor in the health care encounter, not just the 
professional or the agency which employs her (Campbell, 2005).  The end in this case is 
quite literally the inevitable.  What is not inevitable is any jointly constructed process 
towards the end.  Similarly, then, for the moral action research odyssey we call social 
work and what it is for the client to feel not just ‘cared for well’ but ‘controlled well’. 
 
Borrowing a term from Byrne (2002: 148, cited in Dunne et al., 2005: 83), VE engages 
with 'in vivo codes' derived from the language of the researched.  Here we need to bear 
in mind my claim regarding the intractable nature of any codified value, which will also 
apply to the various code worlds of the social work subject.  Rooted in tradition and 
history, social workers are, in the manner of Bhaskar (1979), researchers who cannot 
abandon the transcendent realities of abuse and neglect, while at the same time 
knowingly work with the impossibility of a fixed single account of them.  As part of the 
human condition, abuse and neglect of others are intransitive moral facts.  
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Paradoxically, social work knowledge of this also needs to be logically transitive in 
order to retain under reflection a core stable (prototypical) concept of abuse and neglect.  
 
Kekes' (1993) ‘reserved’ version of pluralism denotes a position in which no value is 
held to be paramount but in which not all values are equally acceptable.  The basis of 
this distinction is between primary and secondary values or goods.  The former  (say the 
idea of care for the distressed other) are understood at a high level of generality where 
claims to relativistic standpoints are not plausible; the latter (care for this particular 
distressed other) are concerned with culturally specific goods.  Responsibility and 
responsiveness involve modifying other people’s vices and/or vicious circumstance for 
their own benefit, or for the protection and well-being of others under their roof.  
Consistent with Yearley's framework (Chapter 7), discussing, cultivating and building 
requisite virtues in others to assuage some particular person's plight seem to be fully in 
accord with social work’s historical heritage.  That means levering human flourishing, 
through the strategising of client self-help or through help imposed, or any critical 
realistic position in between.   
 
Comfortable moral fuzziness 
 
The Sorites paradox not only reminds us of the difference between supersharp 
evaluations and fuzzy moral indeterminateness but also, equally importantly, it invites 
us to be clear about the legitimate zone of fuzziness, where Bhaskarian uncertainty is 
not uncomfortable but instead to be comfortably expected.  To illustrate where this can 
take us, I will use Hugman's (2005: 19-21) example of research by Azmi (1997) who 
examines the meaning of health and welfare interventions from the perspective of a 
traditional Islamic community in Toronto.  Azmi concludes  (rightly or wrongly) that 
the difference of worldviews between traditional Islamic faith and the western 
secularism of professionals is such that they are implacably opposed.  Azmi mentions 
attitudes towards domestic violence, where he argues that the indigenous explanation is 
entirely at odds with the state professional’s condemnation.  As Azmi suggests, it seems 
that the only plausible choices for the professional are to either withdraw from the 
moral frontline or, making no pretence to conjoint ethical expertise, to engage in a 
reconstructed neo-colonial imperialism.  As in some ethnographic research inquiries, 
this would amount to no less than what Bar-On (1999) calls a  'missionary zeal to whip 
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the heathen along the path of righteousness’.  As I intimated earlier, righteousness, the 
do-gooding sort, is a contestable sentiment. 
 
Azmi is not defending domestic violence but posing a moral question as to who should 
intervene and how.  For the traditional Muslim, family honour requires that the local 
Imam, whose moral authority is grounded in the community, should mediate.  It seems 
to me that if we lack moral certainty about the difference between means and ends and 
what is rightly uncomfortable or not, we will forever wander between the two in the 
search for ethical veracity.  As often as not, we will end up mithering in an impasse but 
without the wherewithal to extricate ourselves even though we cannot afford to simply 
languish.  Blum's (2007: 225-250) idea of 'working racial virtues’ suggests one way out, 
inviting a different, new journey of moral understanding.  Having in mind the United 
States with its particular history of racism and the continuing legacy of racial 
inequalities, Blum argues that race-defined virtues matter in indispensible ways in the 
course of pursuing a professional ethical life.  
 
As with all virtue ethicists, Blum takes the idea of the virtue tradition to articulate the 
source of all value and disvalue.  His point of departure is a difference between wide 
ranging, standard issue virtues (including their counterfactual vices) such as justice, care 
and compassion, and the possibility of distinctive, in this case race-related, virtues such 
as recognising and positively valuing black group identity and a black person as a black 
person.  Blum invites us to consider the view that a comprehensive analysis of the 
pernicious, reprehensible racist beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of in-group individuals 
and their institutions will demonstrate the need for new forms of virtues.  He argues that 
working only from those classic single-word virtue and vice qualities such as justice or 
injustice misses some salient features of racism.  These are better confronted by 
introducing virtue neologisms, multi-phrased virtues such as connecting justice with 
being black, an example being his argument for a specific virtue of 'civic racial 
egalitarianism'.  
 
Blum's technical VE debate is whether or not race-related positive attitudes are 'too 
local' to count as distinctive virtues in their own right.  For Blum, racism is not simply 
explained as an instance of the inferiorising vices of malevolence and disregard towards 
the different other.  It is more than that and why we tend to think that race-based ill will 
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(as expressed in the idea of a hate crime) is a far worse form of ill will than many other 
types.  To hate a person for their colour is one of the nastiest of evils.  Blum goes on to 
say this suggests a call to the virtuous for an equally strong distinctive counter positive 
which is more than seeking the absence of the vice of ill will.  
 
In this vein, Blum explores the themes of 'colour blindness' and 'colour muteness’ where 
they express a well-intentioned desire to emphasise the common humanity of all people 
irrespective of colour or racial membership.  He notes how this expression in law and 
policy may in fact have some unintended race-differentiated adverse effects.  He also 
discusses the virtue of seeing the other as an individuated person, here as a black 
individual, not solely or predominantly as a member of a racial group.  Although in 
some contexts a black person is happy to be regarded as a proud representative of a 
racial group, this homogenising process can also be a burden, replicating the racism it 
was intended to redress.  One of Blum's points is that looking for commonalities in 
difference and differences in similarity and negotiating the gamut ranging from denial 
to over-identifcation demand considerable moral skill. 
 
Blum (2007: 242) explains that one's emotional and cognitive reactions to a particular 
member in question should not be only those triggered by the group itself.  This means 
not making unwarranted assumptions about the individual based on group membership.  
Virtuously recognising black people requires giving someone’s racial identity its due 
but not allowing racial identity to loom too large in one's responses, a point made by 
Webb (2009) in his critique of identity politics.  The lived sense of a racial other as 
equal is not the same as the lived sense of a racial other as individual.  As Walker and 
Ivanhoe (2007: 29) remark, Blum's analysis deepens and extends our understanding and 
appreciation of racism.  It also illustrates in a compelling way the particular strengths of 
virtue ethics as a researcher/practitioner tool.  Blum's proposal that there are time and 
place defined virtues and vices which cannot be best explained and actioned by 
reference to generic ideas of them also indicates the sheer complexity of a Slote-
Hursthouse-Swanton-Hurka VE framed practice.  Blum might be said to be a VE 
'neologian', one who has a tendency to adopt an increasingly rationalistic worldview in 
attending to transcendent spiritual emotion. 
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As VE technicians, we may or may not hold to Blum's idea of a new species of virtue 
emerging out of its genus in the evolutionary arena of practice.  It is a new direction 
requiring further exploration.  For now, however, his idea invites an analysis of 
supersharpness as an end state with fuzzy indeterminateness as permissible process, 
through an undogmatic mode of moral communitarian acknowledgment.  Certainty 
emerges from recursion of preconceived understanding and lived experience in the 
field, redefining both the situation and the understanding.  Practical knowledge is not 
merely informational fieldcraft to replicate the as-given but can be transformational of 
attitude (Fowers and Davidov, 2006, 2007).   
 
Blum's neological approach need not be confined to racial identity.  Similar arguments 
can be proffered for specific virtue formations relating to other group identities linked to 
class, gender, sexual orientation, disability and religious persuasion.  The Azmi 
perspective could be reconsidered in light of this approach.  Indicative of the scope for 
morally fuzzy emoting and reasoning, membership of one oppressed group does not 
provide immunity from the charge of oppressing another.  The belief that, say, certain 
racialised groups are bound to practise wife-beating, or forms of child abuse, in the 
name of collective identity, is a vicious hegemonic worldview.  Recognising that abuse 
of women or children may occur within one group context, as in any other, is not.  
 
Undogmatic communitarianism 
 
As Fives (2006: 211-212) points out in his critique of MacIntyre's tradition dependent 
communitarianism, there is no proper way, no standing ground, to engage in the 
practices of advancing, evaluating, accepting or rejecting reasoned argument apart from 
that way which is provided by some particular tradition or other in which we are already 
immersed.  However, as we have seen with sophrosune (Chapter 7), it does not follow 
that the values behind those practices need be the sole reason for commissioning a 
moral action, nor reason enough to not follow it through into the beginnings of another 
value position.  This surely describes morally charged social work, and a morally 
charged social worker could not want to do otherwise.  Wall (2003: 321) argues that 
although the ends of phronesis are always determined by tradition, the ends themselves 
are somewhat plastic: they transform, and can be transformed, over time.  
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Yearley's framework (Chapter 7) will hold that traditional ends, such as forms of child 
protection, are not just inert deposits from the past but arguments over rival traditions 
that have to be made and remade.  I maintain that a living reproductive tradition such as 
social work is a socially embodied argument about way of life goods constitutive of that 
tradition.  Repeated test case moral dilemmas (including the lessons from social work 
failures) will expose the incompleteness of accepted arguments as the world changes.  
Social/ethical way of life goods are necessarily tradition constituted but traditional 
goods themselves are constituted through a modifying process of historical discourse, 
especially through engaging with the under-histories of the dispossessed.   
 
It has been argued that the origins of virtue and vice lie in evolutionary beneficial 
explanations because other-regarding altruistic dispositions generate co-operative 
synergy and efficient division of labour for the purposes of group survival (Ridley, 
1996).  From a socio-biological perspective, Levy (2004: 83-86) suggests that the idea 
of morality began as survivalist self-deception, convincing each other and ourselves that 
we will act for the sake of others in moments of need.  Through a progressive process of 
‘exaptation’ the other-regarding virtues become valued for their own sake.  Notably, 
this includes moral responses not just to kinship in-groups but also to outsiders, 
redefining the boundaries of group membership and sense of belonging and community.  
 
I see the history of social work as exaptation in action.  It is a proud pioneering history 
of gradually including within its moral domain those marginalised groups hitherto 
denied full recognition by others and by social work itself.  This is sophisticated 
contouring of righteous indignation and just generosity in action.  I suggest that the 
dialectic can be articulated through Gadamer’s (1989) notion of truth and method as a 
never-ending ‘fusion of moral horizons’ and openness to the suffering of others.  Fives’ 
(2006) account of what he calls Gadamer's ‘undogmatic communitarianism’ expresses 
what I have described in Chapter 7 as the connection and difference between phronesis 
and poiesis within a relativist's landscape.  We aim to see with moral acuity the sheer 
bare face of the stranger in our midst who needs comforting, acknowledging both group 
identity and personal distinctiveness and then nuancing practice accordingly.  It was the 
wretched lived experience of black slaves and their personal stories of dehumanising 
brutality that  'little-by-little' led to the passionate clamour for abolition, first of the trade 
and then of chattel ownership, as two classes of evil.   
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The justificatory principle, a movement of reason from pro- to anti-slavery sentiment, 
came later.  Our present day anti-racist bona fides owe much to those early interlocutors 
of virtue who spoke out against the viciousness of their times.  VE talk constantly alerts 
us to the fact that at core social work must be about correcting unacceptable human 
tendencies, partly by creating the correct nomenclature to identify them.  Blum alerts us 
to the moral fact that racism is still with us.  We will always have our prejudices.  
However, the horizon of the present is continually in the process of being formed 
because we continually have to test our prejudices.  An important part of this testing 
occurs in encountering the past and in understanding the tradition from which we come. 
 
Fragmentation and conflict are part of today's society and those communities within it.  
Our vocation is discernment and insight but our understanding comes from iterative 
occurrences.  This requires the coming into play, and the playing out, of the content of 
tradition in those continuously widening possibilities of significance and resonance 
extended by different people living it.  As Gadamer (1989: 370, cited in Lawn, 2006: 
75) says:   
 
A person who wants to understand must question what lies behind what is 
said. [S]he must understand it as an answer to a question.  If we go back 
behind what is said then we inevitably ask questions beyond what is said.  
We understand the sense of the text only by acquiring the horizon of the 
question . . . . . 
 
Minimal and maximal value  
 
In Chapter 7 I described the idea of surplus exchange-value.  In our sophisticated role-
contouring, we should never stray from a root prototype virtue such as justice, whether 
this merits a 'new' double-barrelled virtue in Blum's sense or not.  One elementary 
mother’s knee account of justice is to give someone her due - an indebtedness to restore 
that which has been taken away or to distribute a good of entitlement not yet 
forthcoming.  As we search for the indeterminate borders demarcating the difference 
between comfortable and uncomfortable moral fuzziness, reaching for supersharp 
evaluations, we weigh up what is owed.  I suggest that this idea of proportionality and 
weight provides us with a stabilising VE anchor for measuring exchange-value and the 
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tracking of the moral impulse.  Consideration of options according to moral debt owed 
follows from our pattern of commitment to righteous indignation and our pattern of 
reasoning for just generosity. 
 
The underlying moral debt is generated as a mode of acknowledgment according to the 
degree of moral certainty and practice confidence regarding the occurrence of extra-
vulnerability and the likely permanence of any harm not undone.  The more unresolved 
the moral dilemma as to permanence, the greater the hesitation and the more cautious 
we should be in our bridled response.  The less fuzzy, the more certain we are of the 
unadorned other in distress, the clearer the nature of the moral wrong, the greater the 
size of the moral debt.  The minimal position generates an indebtedness of actually 
doing no harm ourselves, what must not be done.  The more maximal the position, the 
indebtedness will be revealed as the most that can and must be done, as in, say, 
Sendler's case.  Scope for imbalance even in quotidian routine practice is considerable.  
The moral fact of indebtedness to the distressed other is the same in all cases.  It is the 
weight, volume and effort of response which vary and must be justified.  
 
We can say that, as a satisficing VE fiducial threshold, giving the client her social work 
due means to adopt a chosen strategy of intervention the worst outcome of which is 
superior to the anticipated worst outcomes of all other alternatives.  The catechism of 
doing no harm is a venerable rule of thumb in social work as seen in, for the most part, 
forgotten theories of radical non-intervention.  Knowledge in action should serve to 
prevent further violence to the other by all others, including social workers.  This should 
at least arrest the wrong-making features of the situation, not compound them, ensuring 
no further human value is taken away.  
 
Actively considered non-intervention may be the situationially correct strategy of 
toleration but default behaviours of omission or bystanding can never be.  A teenager 
may run away to a social worker because her parents disapprove of her dress code.  We 
would normally tell her to go home.  On more certain moral ground, a cautionary step 
beyond the minimal requires a reversal of those wrong-making features, restoring or 
substituting lost human value.  If the runaway is being threatened with physical beatings 
or imprisonment in the home, we think twice.  In such moments, the moral 
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consequence, as something to be preferred to the moral consequences of all other 
alternative possibilities, is not always comprehended, let alone welcome. 
 
Maximally, in the supervaluative world of moral sharpness way above the VE fiducial 
line, an unqualified full ethical practice of value serves to reinstate the other’s lost, 
denied, stolen humanity in an expansive maximising strategy.  Non-violent knowledge 
means that nothing is taken away from the other that is not, in constructing the 
response, thereby added back and enhanced.  This entails not just reversing, even 
equalising, but transforming the wrong-making features of the situation by creating 
additional or surplus value which enables the client to flourish, not merely to survive or 
cope.  These replacement and gifting modes are akin to a deontologist's principle of 
what to do and not do, and the consequentialist's principle of utility, but the reasoning is 
of a different conceptual provenance. 
 
The purpose behind the VE moral pause towards the moral impulse is in order to 
interrogate a would-be strategy of intervention along a minimal-maximal continuum.  
This strategy directs us to move out of moral fuzziness to moral clarity, engaging with 
the supreme social work paradox of producing indissoluble sameness out of 
indissoluble otherness.  In Chapter 1, I quoted Louden (2001: 235) as saying that 
‘people expect ethical theory to tell them something about what they ought to do’, 
suggesting that VE was particularly weak in the area of casuistry.  A VE framed social 
work tells us that there can be no simple answer that can tell us exactly what to do.  
Social work truth is an open condition that lies in a stability standard on where, why and 
how to engage with human suffering, never the act or result itself.  Social work moral 
activity is the establishment, disruption and re-establishment of sameness and difference 
through the interpolation of extra-vulnerability and extra-ordinariness, neither radically 
undogmatic nor dogmatically radical.   
 
Confirmation of social work identity involves an escape from the very same tradition 
that once may have convinced, such as the acceptance of slavery and child labour, but is 
now seen to have deceived us.  Being social work undogmatic means never forgetting 
the danger of being deceived and a commitment to non-deception.  Experience is a kind 
of suffering to that effect as we change others and ourselves in the doing.  Social 
workers may speak of the immanence of truth which stands forth as an occurrence that 
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may initially subtract but then endures and is preservative.  Everything depends on the 
contextualisation of value which, in the idiom of Derrida, remains open and non-
saturable.  The target is always a supersharp evil, without qualification, to be 
eliminated.  It is those occurrences of practice, our ambiguous encounters with 
distressed others and the intrusion of the habitually deceptive that lead us to question 
and change our presuppositions.  Virtue is about what is difficult but if virtue is to be 
durable it can never settle.  
 
 Truth, hope and sincerity 
 
A social worker will characteristically hold a view about a way of life, as does a client 
or carer, and where a disrupted way of life is perceived by at least one of them to 
generate distress, the process of engaging with the amelioration will lead to a more or 
less consensual resolution.  We develop virtue only when the reasonable truth adhering 
to a situation is acquired but we acquire reasonable truth only in virtuous activity.  
Virtue has permanence only as communicative, transitive activity.  Through 
engagement with the moral chaos, righteous indignation and just generosity are built on 
social work passion for a will to ethical truth - of self and others.  As rational emotive 
moral beings we negotiate the complexities, drawing on our integrated virtues and our 
commitment and reflexivity to do so in the best way that we can.  The moral world is 
chaotic and the social worker's task is to restore some acceptable order to it.  'Moral 
luck' (Rescher, 1993; Statman, 2003; Silcox, 2006) runs out where matters are 
prevented from running in the tracks of ordinariness.  
 
Williams (2002) speaks of the intrinsic value of the concept of truth and the virtue of 
valuing truthfulness.  Social workers should be committed to recognising the disvalue 
of distress, even though we may never settle on the final truth.  The twin ideas of hope 
and truth, as Peterson and Seligman (2004: 570-582) point out, have a long history but 
always refer to states of mind and positive expectations about good matters that have a 
reasonable likelihood of coming to pass and bad matters which may be overcome.  A 
virtuous social worker is a hopeful, ingenious but also humble practitioner in her 
moments of certainty and uncertainty.  She aims to instill hope in clients, even in 
dissensual cases.  This requires the right sort of honest relationship as a moral 
enterprise.  Social work is a cognitive, emotional and motivational stance towards a 
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good future, acting in ways to make it more likely.  A shared feeling of confidence that 
it will ensue, even if only ever a small triumph overcoming day-to-day adversity, lies at 
the heart of moral practice.  
 
Sharp moral facts of concern to social workers require the search for sincere belief 
which holds stable under reflection.  This does not require consensus with clients, 
desirable though that may be.  The intrinsic value of this particular truth is grounded in 
the structure of the commitment of those who value it and the obligation to not remain 
silent but speak out.  A social worker's dialogue also ultimately involves standing up for 
the truth of her perspective.  Although it will never tell us what to do, a commitment to 
the truth as a fidelity procedure is always action-guiding and it is the truth of reasonable 
hope that we seek to gift to our clients and carers, consensual or not, in their fateful 
moments.  The stability of truthfulness follows from the instability of its opposite.  I 
will not deceive others, not even myself, since the truthfulness to which we are 
committed must be bearable.  Virtue narrative is both exaltation and exhortation. 
 
Truthful people care about the accuracy of what they say.  Williams (2002) explains 
accuracy as the virtue that encourages people to spend more effort than they might have 
done in trying to find the truth, not just accepting any belief-shaped thing that comes 
into their head.  So we are committed to finding out the moral truth of female 
circumcision: why, for example, it might be a corrupted anti-racist stance to ignore it, or 
where the motivation to intercede may itself be racialised.  Williams' is an action-
guiding ideal, not just a way in which we hope we will be disposed but a necessary 
corrective to our susceptibility to wishful thinking and any negligence in honouring the 
demands of the truth.  One primary expression of a commitment to accuracy is the care 
one takes against the obstacles to accuracy.  The only way to do that is to care about the 
difference between what you are motivated to believe - the naive moral impulse - and 
what you can defend to others and yourself - its sophisticated expression - as you search 
for the truth.   
 
In my final chapter, I summarise key themes leading to this position of conscience in 
order to illustrate how my proposed framework of value can revise practice.  As an 
example, I focus on social work training rules (my most recent area of professional 
expertise), concluding with some related thoughts on my own research journey.  
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Chapter 11 
The VE project  
 
Introduction 
 
I summarise the previous chapters leading to my idea of a redemptive VE specific 
framework of value.  The threads of my argument draw together themes of authentic 
social work self, loss and reclamation.  I highlight what I claim is original, what that 
helps illuminate, and how the framework can be mobilised into a project of practical 
action.  I propose that mobilisation commences with the promotion of unruly discourse 
sanctuaries that can attend to the moral impulse.  The educational institution is a key 
site for the promulgation of state social welfare, and social work training is the starting 
point for a professional career.  To illustrate the prospects for action, I point out some 
training requirements, the received wisdom of which is reconsidered in light of my 
framework.  By way of personalising a political strategy of resistance, I conclude by 
reflecting on the convergence of my own professional and research journeys.   
 
Recovery of identity, self and ethical space 
 
My starting point was that social work practice has lost what is moral about it and is 
therefore all too often failing its clients.  I linked the loss to our simplistic value 
discourse, which I claimed has failed to nurture our identity-conferring moral core and 
therefore failed to check our digressions.  Associating such shortcomings with an over-
reliance on act appraisal moral theory, I have explored an alternative agent appraisal 
discourse that stresses the primacy of good moral character over moral acts.   
 
I have undertaken this mostly uncharted exercise in recovery through a self-other 
dialogue, describing social work core identity as a distinctive friendship reaching out a 
helping hand to those in need.  I claimed that, anomalously, as subject-in-language, this 
identity has been gradually erased by modernistic maxims which have supplanted our 
historic supportive language.	   	   I have spoken of the derailed self, one whose sacred 
ethical space and distinctive domain of moral activity have been denuded through lack 
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of self-care; hence today's existential crisis of confidence as to who we are and what we 
should do.  
 
Seeking to overcome what I have called our conceptual amnesia, my search for lost 
identity has entailed looking back in a certain way to reclaim what is recoverable.  
While I have sought a theoretical perspective to reclaim the confident moral certainty of 
our pioneering tradition, a revitalised discourse need not replicate the psychodynamic 
sermonising that featured so heavily in the early days of social work.  Any recovery has 
to carry foreword all that has been progressive in social work.  At the same time, our 
disorderly world of postmodern moral uncertainties, which looks askance on any shared 
meaning of progress, also needs to be accommodated in my redemptive framework. 
 
My framework is derived from the philosophical academy’s paradigmatic wars, where 
agent appraisal virtue ethical theory battles with act appraisal deontic and 
consequentualist principled theories as to the primary source of value.  I argued that 
principled theory reduces virtue talk (my 'small ve') to the role of handmaiden in 
support of principle. This has made for a moral asymmetry of social work self and 
client; hence a much impoverished social work value discourse.  Using a notion of 'big 
VE' to indicate my theoretical stress on the primacy of moral character over principle, I 
have sought to recover those traces of characteristically 'being there' for one’s client. 
 
Restoring a relation between occupational function, authentic social work self and 
characteristic virtue traits, I have sought to contribute to the growing but still relatively 
small body of social work literature on the subject of applied virtue ethics, and in 
particular, to what I have called the radical politico-ethical thread.  I proceeded by 
making a critical distinction between being the sort of person one wants to be ethically, 
and then acting morally in order to be that person.  In making this distinction I have 
engaged with some of the key technical criticisms of virtue ethical theory that so far 
have been little explored for social work.  The most pertinent of these is whether the 
theory can generate credible action guidance statements while at the same time not just 
reinforcing the status quo.  My social work specific framework of value addresses this 
conundrum, yielding prospects for a distinctive ethical career built on an emancipatory 
account of virtuous social work practice.  
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Narrative self versus bureaucratic self   
 
Reprising our narrative in terms of virtuous sentiment, my starting point for recovery 
was to reinstate social work's waylaid moral impulse towards the distressed other as the 
legitimating source of practice.  This makes a social worker a morally active 
practitioner, one who learns to balance the naivety of the moral impulse with a 
sophisticated reasoned defence of it in a complexly antithetical world.  I have therefore 
described our lost social work tradition as an iterative emotive-rational dialogue.  I have 
argued how othering themes have shaped the explanatory and justificatory discourse as 
the view of mandated distress transforms over time.  
 
I have reinserted the once common enough proposition that social work interventions 
(the idea of which I have termed ethical labour) have traditionally focused on disrupted 
and disabling patterns of family domesticity where extra-vulnerable individuals are 
deemed in need of care and/or control.  I have described these disordered states as 
fractured ordinariness.  Borrowing from social biology the homologous idea of 
membranes always in need of repair, I argued that social workers seek out, detect, 
evaluate, classify and fix any normative rupture.  The social worker's moral gaze and 
what I have called her moral tagging of any rupture also remind us that constructions of 
household normalcy have always made for an uncomfortable set of power relations 
played out through contested hegemonic attributions of deserving clienthood.  In 
managing the gaze, the troubling sense of the sort of social worker we want to be, one 
who truly comforts, compels us to constantly review our discourse categories. 
 
I have maintained that, outwith their psychodynamic beginnings, our social work 
forebears also forged an expansive, genuinely caring ethical space within their 
discretionary domain.  In order to scope the rejuvenating nature of its empowering 
transactions, I described this aspirational activity as a social work moral economy.  I 
coined the term moral entrepreneur to describe such a social worker operating in 
between the rigid rules of engagement.  Stretching society's mandate, her street acumen 
once gave rise to plastic practices that could build compensatory social capital to offset 
discomfort and distress.  Social workers have traditionally gone about that business 
(which I have called moral petitioning) on the hegemonic edge, constantly exploring the 
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relationship between sensitivity to another's private ills and sensitivity to the unjust 
public causes of them. 
 
In answering the perplexing question as to what, therefore, has changed for the worse, I 
alighted on social work's hubristic pursuit of professional status and corresponding 
language.  In line with other critical commentators, I have noted with alarm a movement 
from a heightened sensitivity to another's suffering to the routinisation of that sensitivity 
associated with the imperceptible drift from nascent welfare reformer to bureau worker.  
The proletarianising tendency of rational-technical discourse distances the social worker 
from her clients and also from her own entrepreneurial ethical self.  This derailment has 
opened up a schism between the primordial sentiment of the moral impulse and its 
balanced sophisticated conciliation.   
 
I claimed that social work's standardised moral decision-making models - applied 
deontological and consequentualist paradigms underwriting rational-technical thought - 
serve to control both social worker and client.  Late modernity's aggressive market-
defined account of neediness has displaced the humanistic language of social 
solidarities which once defined our remit.  The straightjacket mentality of social worker 
as bureaucratic factotum in this colonisation is exemplified in what I have called the 
state's codification of social work value.  I have made the disturbing claim that the Code 
of Practice is not, as many assume, the apex of a grown-up profession but the binary 
opposite, a tyrannical, infantilising fixation on a de-moralising set of do and don’t 
instructions.  The de-centred moral impulse can barely find a purchase in practice at all.  
From social psychology, I have introduced the disturbing idea of the bystander effect, 
the failure to offer a helping hand when needed, to illustrate our paralysis.  
 
The supererogative reframed self 
 
I sought to unfetter social work's moral impulse by pitching anti-code VE theory against 
the establishment’s pro-code deontological and consequentualist theory.  I have drawn 
on the technical philosophical notion of self-effacement, expanding it allegorically to 
describe our schismatic codified separation from our clients.  My key argument is that 
authentic social worker identity lies in fully seeing and responding to the client in her 
immediate distress, rather than only seeing and responding to an injunction, policy or 
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procedure, which is where act appraisal theory leads us.  Focusing on the necessary VE 
moral pedagogy, I proposed the idea of the conscientious beginning social worker in 
search of non self-effacing moral refinement, whose characteristic virtue display is to be 
measured against some tradition defined standard outwith code.   
 
Introducing the notion of paradoxicality into the measure, I argued that a social worker 
needs to acquire the mentality to inhabit a peculiar laudatory moral world in which her 
vested moral interest lies.  Describing access to this world beyond mere duty in terms of 
supererogation,  I have claimed that hers is a promise to herself to eliminate distress 
caused by the continual moral omissions of others.  The realisation of social work self 
as ethical labourer is predicated on the idea of actively seeking opportunity to do good 
works arising out of people's inevitable misfortunes.  To miss the opportunity is to incur 
those avoidable tragedies which impugn the profession.  I linked this with the 
philosophical doctrine of double effect, the recognition that any complex moral 
intervention will as likely as not leave behind some moral remainder.  Learning to 
reduce as much as possible the moral residue, but also owning what is comfortable 
about it and foreseeing what is not, is the social worker's ethical journey. 
 
To minimise the double effect I introduced into social work the good enough language 
of moral satisficing.  I proposed that any successful social work intervention depends on 
a set of self-disciplining if and only if VE covering conditions.  Synthesised from 
contemporary mainstream virtue theory but a hitherto untried application to social work, 
I offered these V-rule action guidance descriptors as a non self-effacing counter to code 
do's and don'ts.  I argued that a social worker should act characteristically admirably, as 
one whose appropriate attitudes towards social work defined evils enable her to aim 
accurately enough to hit the appropriate target of her concern, depending on 
circumstance, capability and experience.  Based on these V-rules, I defended the idea of 
specific virtuous occupational activity and even specialisms within that activity.  No 
mere human can excel in all spheres of moral life but it is possible to do so in one 
through dedication and focus.  Marrying theoretical philosophy with historical narrative, 
my thesis regarding distinctive social work identity relies on this practical position. 
 
I also asserted that my V-rules lend themselves to the heuristic of an enigmatic paragon 
of social work, one whose laudable moral mastery is to be emulated.  Describing the 
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feasibility of such a character in technical virtue terms in a way that also retrieves our 
lost social work narrative has been a critical exercise.  It has conjured up one of those 
key paradigmatic skirmishes, the tu quoque challenge.  Here, the task for the virtue 
ethicist is to move from being motivated by the thought of emulation to exercising 
virtue without that thought, if, according to the moral analytic logic, she is to avoid her 
own version of self-effacement.  As a response to that impasse, I presented a fortifier 
derived from models of skills learning to consolidate social worker identity.  
 
I made a non self-effacing virtue out of fallibility in order to bolster the idea that 
paragonic moral agency is more than just formulaic thinking masquerading as moral 
intuition.  Adapting the classical axiom that the more one learns, the more one realises 
there is more to learn, there is always going to be an ideated better self in the making 
who we must strive to become.  This commitment to paragonic modelling is as much 
conceptual as literal.  It can be both, since we can and must always learn from our 
betters, as my account of the hero has suggested.  I have therefore posited the 
reasonably absurd idea that being a fully realised social work self can only ever mean a 
distinctive sort of perpetual reflexive becoming.   
 
I concluded that the moral expert is always learning to become someone better through 
a virtuous circle inscribed by her practice.  Reflexivity is a familiar enough theme in 
social work.  Picking up on that theme, I have claimed that the authentic social work 
self is discernible only through a perpetual reflexive process.  My key point is that a VE 
epistemology of moral gazing entails always pausing to reconsider what the moral agent 
has up to that point taken for granted.  If we really want to see the client in her 
unadorned uniqueness and not her hegemonic clothing then we are committed to always 
looking again beyond the first stereotypical glance.  This commitment is as much 
conceptual as temporal, although it is both since we constantly learn from reflection in 
and on practice.  
 
The other paradigmatic challenge to the idea of a moral paragon posits the unreliable 
fragile self, who therefore does not pause to hold true to her conscience just when 
situational steadfastness is most needed.  In response, I have offered the contentious 
view that authentic social work can only be a moral meritocracy of the relatively few 
and therefore should be open only to those with the right attributes to sustain 
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motivational self-sufficiency in adverse situations.  Based on what virtue theorists call 
moral continence, this burdensome journey can be conceptualised through skills-based 
leaning theory when external pressures are successfully negotiated by virtue of one's 
increasingly dependable moral holding.  With an emphasis on acquisition of tacit, fluent 
practice wisdom, I outlined the movement from earnest but clumsy beginner, relying on 
precarious mechanical instruction and then principled rules, to insouciant expert who 
characteristically finesses opportunity for poetical, innovative practice. 
 
The righteously indignant, justly generous self 
 
Translating such characteristic social work moral know-how into some knowing that 
propositions, I have hypothesised what a fully virtuous social worker might publically 
be willing to declare in terms of her own self-governance.  From the world of positive 
psychology, I introduced the concept of signature character traits to distinguish special 
dispositions from the desirable but humdrum.  Then, drawing on some recent practical 
accounts of virtue theory, I introduced the idea that we can conceive of occupational 
signature trait dispositions which have been contoured especially for social work from 
prototype other-regarding virtues.  This has made for an original contribution to social 
work discourse in the form of proposing two cardinal virtue modules for social work.  I 
have labeled these righteous indignation and just generosity.  
 
Imagining a lifelong ethical curriculum for caring professionals, all of whom share 
many desirable attributes, the conjoint modules of righteous indignation and just 
generosity would comprise the social worker's specialisms.  The emotion of righteous 
indignation is the social work moral impulse sanctified; just generosity expresses it in a 
reasoned out way.  The sophisticated justly generous management of the emotion entails 
the return of what is morally due to the distressed other through production of what I 
have termed surplus exchange-value and a gift relationship.  There must always be a 
personal loss to the client in the moral tagging process, a relinquishment of uniqueness, 
in order to be considered deserving.  Avoiding any further detriment, the fully virtuous 
social worker minimally gives back what is morally owed but also aims to expansively 
gift more than she takes in the encounter - virtuosity exemplified, moral remainder 
minimised.  
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I proposed that this exchange encounter is managed through a reflexive self-referential 
stability standard where correct patterns of commitments to righteous indignation and 
just generosity and patterns of reasoning in support of those commitments are 
conscientiously played out within the field of concern.  They make for the social 
worker's own affirmatory satisficing rules of the game according to my V-rule covering 
conditions.  I claimed that assimilation of the two action guidance modules under these 
stabilising conditions will exercise the social worker at the level of her essential best. 
 
My social work modules thesis is embryonic, inviting much interrogation conceptually 
and empirically, either by those who detect in it its possibilities or by those who reject 
its premises or dispute the logic of its conclusions.  In foregrounding the idea of 
modularity of moral excellence, the easily lost idea that is to be guarded, and therefore 
articulated well, is that a social worker would consider herself neither a nurse nor a 
teacher, nor they a social worker, and that there is something precious about each of 
their distinct businesses.  I have claimed that to ignore the difference amongst all the 
similarities is to invite much role confusion and some dire consequences for our clients. 
 
The reconnected puzzled self  
 
To support my idea of modularised domain authority, I re-traced the origins of social 
work to a 19th century communitarian discourse about client virtue, vice and vicious 
circumstance.  Drawing on a functional perspective, I have recast the social work 
tradition to be a meso-level focus on cohering societal virtues, which picks out and 
maintains a homeostatic balance between ways of life and prescriptive abstract 
injunctions.  While contemporary social work writers may speak increasingly of social 
work virtue, most if not all have shied way from speaking about client virtue and vice, 
as our forebears unashamedly once did.  I maintained that such analysis is even more 
apt in today's increasingly pluralistic society: it is key to hermeneutic action-guiding 
discourse about moral relativism, perspectivism and proportionality. 
 
Reformatted in such a way, I have proposed that the intrusion of postmodernism into 
the homeostatic balance requires the virtuous social worker to become a kind of moral 
action researcher - a transcendent critical realist - in the discharge of her mandate.  I 
introduced from the world of paradox a little-by-little, fuzziness argument as to the 
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supervaluative threshold for moral certainty.  I claimed that at some exigent point the 
righteously indignant but puzzled social worker must assume an absolutist supertruth 
view as to what is morally repugnant and not to be tolerated, knowing very well that 
today the moral relativist's critique will haunt her aspiration to justly generous practice.  
However, in the search for moral clarity we must always distinguish between the fuzzy 
means and the clear end of social work.  A commitment to an unconcealing of our own 
prejudices through the juxtaposition of means and end can yield an understanding of 
what gives rise to the prejudice and hence what may lie beyond it. 
 
Our own partiality need not cut us off but open us up to the matter at issue in such a 
way that what is taken for granted is capable of being revised.  In reprising the role of 
the past as a legitimate source of knowledge, skirting with the ideological 
conservativism charge, I have rehabilitated prejudice as a positive, not just a 
problematic, for virtuous social work.  Drawing on a Gadamerian perspective that sees 
prejudice as an anticipatory 'fore-structure' of better understanding, I have posited the 
mutual interrogation of righteous indignation and just generosity of each other by each 
other as an ongoing, hopeful fusion of moral horizons.   
 
The practical transgressive self   
 
Any theoretical professional thesis will always have to justify itself in terms of practical 
application.  However, although easily mislaid amongst all the technical talk, theory and 
practice are but one here.  Theory informs language of choice which in turn questions in 
its own way the performance of both the subject and those institutions in which she 
performs.  My research voice has shouted out that, as reflexive moral agents, social 
workers are beholden to inquire systematically into moral philosophy if they are to truly 
apply themselves to questioning their moral performance and that of their institutions. 
This is exactly what I have attempted to do.  Not to do so is itself an act of moral 
omission, a contradiction in terms of self-identity.  The collective mentality that we 
have come to inhabit can be examined in the hope that the less than virtuous activity in 
which we have come to engage by default can evolve into a reinvested set of practices.   
 
All along I have mooted the idea of vicious institutions.  In Bourdieusian manner, I 
have therefore been calling for a set of unruly social practices to emerge, aiming for the 
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virtuous circle of a revised habitus within a repurchased field of social work to 
challenge both workplace and ourselves.  My framework seeks not only to read more 
critically the demoralising establishment rules of the game but also to rewrite them in 
VE adapted language to once more generate distinctive symbolic and cultural social 
work capital.  Meanwhile, we cannot easily detach ourselves from those shibboleths that 
we would change, since improvisation without a guiding script is frightening.  I have 
proposed the first draft of an alternative script to assist those who are brave enough to 
wish to try.  It offers what I claim is a technically reliable account of moral action 
guidance which concerned social workers can comprehend and could begin to apply in 
their day-to-day business.  I believe that makes for practical working virtue that is fully 
in accord with social work’s all but lost tradition of incremental transformative practice.  
 
The actual working exercise is one of reclaiming an authentic ethical space undertaken 
little-by-little.  That depends on a prudential, temperate, albeit subversive feel for the 
game, which, I have argued, my version of the VE counter discourse can provide.  The 
nature of this challenge is illuminated by the story of mariners who need to replace each 
plank of their leaky boat while also at the same time continuing to sail in it and not sink.  
We may critically scrutinise each suspect plank but can only do this while standing on 
the other suspect planks of the boat.  At some indeterminate point of transition the old 
boat becomes more of a new one but only if, in the meantime, the ever-present risk of 
sinking has been averted.  Then, of course, as soon as the end of the boat is reached, the 
whole exercise must begin again.  This recurring mariner's tale indicates the nature of 
any practical day-to-day application of my theoretical framework.  I have come to call 
this the VE project.  The subtext here is just where might my thesis lead, hence the 
question 'What is next that would make for a little-by-little virtuous difference?'  I 
suggest that any answer lies in the establishment of virtue ethical inspired discourse 
sanctuaries to generate stratagems that may operate in between the establishment rules 
 
Discourse sanctuaries 
 
VE for social workers may be considered a project of return to a lost world.  However, 
this is not some ghostly absence: the fugitive social worker seeks some sense of 
revitalised permanence in a revised reality that can never and ought not to be the same 
as that which was lost.  The movement from fugue existence - the loss of one's identity 
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coupled with disappearance from one’s proper habitat - to revalidation makes for a 
politics of resistance.  Any practice of value will take place in what is left of social 
work’s unfettered spaces, seeking to reinsert the omitted through the openings that 
contradiction reveals.  Our language of value can be re-privileged into the present via 
speech and writing.  As code breakers, those of like mind can make dedicated 
professional time and space through the unruly written words of journals and 
publications and the disobedient spoken words of conferences, seminars and even team 
meetings to begin to refortify the moral impulse.  This has been my personal strategy, 
inviting peer scrutiny of my emerging ideas of VE and what is after all only a rough 
sketch.  
 
The last few years have seen a resurgence in affirmational collegiality and a coming 
together of hearts and minds to reconnect with our value base.  Articles as diverse as 
Ovrelid’s (2008) Buddhist account of moral character are starting to appear.  
Reminiscent of Foot's elective community as described in Chapter 4, there has emerged 
a manifesto (Jones et al., 2007) seeking to explore and reclaim lost identity through a 
new engaged practice.  Webb's (2010b) argument for an integrated social justice and 
recognition political strategy sees this not as a job for individual theorists but rather as a 
collective project for researchers, practitioners, clients and carers - 'a re-assembled 
Left’.  The learning network literature is germane here (Hodgson and Reynolds, 2005).  
The upsurge in value talk is no coincidence.  In the wake of a sequence of avoidable 
child abuse tragedies, social work and social work education in particular have been 
subject to intense scrutiny by the political establishment and over the next few years 
will be subject to some wide-ranging reforms.  A VE discourse learning network is not 
for idle chatter but little-by-little strategising.  I will lay down what I think are some key 
VE moral pedagogical stratagems within higher education since, as an inspector, social 
work training has been my most recent domain of professional expertise.  
 
Social work education 
 
The educational institution encapsulates all that I have said about the VE traveller and 
her ethical journey, beginning with the trite observation that unless she were a saint at 
the beginning, no one becomes a VE fluent moral expert within the course of a degree 
in social work.  The tensions between formal academic study and on the job vocational 
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training are set to increase with the advent of more employment-based direct entry 
routes.  The tensions are part of the historic fabric of social work training, which began 
with academia's 'scientification' of good works, all the better to 'aim and hit the target' of 
charity.  The present day function of higher education in both perpetuating and 
challenging the hegemony is a complex one, especially given the overweening influence 
of employers and the control of government in the production of social workers.  
 
A social work course is a socially constructed depository of authoritative text and hence 
a hub for its replication through controlled and measured dissemination.  As a 
distinctive speech community, a social work course propagates state welfare ideology 
but also provides a forum for interrogating both the subject matter and itself in the 
process.  The V-question becomes whether knowledge as power in this context weighs 
down the interlocutors and/or whether the press of conformity can push them to traverse 
the hegemony.  Social work training regulations take the form of descriptive text and a 
set of discourse permissions and non-permissions.  Study of the text can amount to little 
more than fine-grained interpretation, closing down discussion rather than liberating the 
production of expansive identity.  In many ways a social work course can become an 
elaborate code itself and all that is entailed by this. 
 
I have left unanswered all along just what a virtuous civic institution might look like 
other than intimating the simple answer that it is the sum of the good qualities of those 
people who inhabit it minus that which is taken away through internal and external 
threats to integrity.  Parrott (2006: 135-152) offers a standard type of analysis of ethics 
in social work organisations, exploring the scope afforded to the practitioner by the 
Code of Practice itself to challenge institutional behaviour such as discriminatory, 
unlawful procedures, inadequate services and unsafe practices.  Macaulay and Lawton 
(2006) for public administration, Nixon (2006) for higher education, Wilkinson (2007) 
for teacher education and C. Clark (2006, 2007) for social work offer some virtue 
insights into civic behaviours.  While not employing a VE framework as such, Tronto 
(2010) explores the idea of a caring institution.   
 
The virtuous social work tutor faces similar problems to the virtuous social worker.  
The idea of sophrosune is relevant here.  I no longer have the direct opportunity which 
once resided in me to influence the national education scene but I make the following 
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suggestions based on my framework analysis.  I will focus on some symbolic sites of 
virtuous intersections which cross the orthodoxy, lending themselves to the prospect of 
a parallel heterodox curriculum.  In my critical analytical study I began to itemise some 
implications for social work training and practice.  I now return to these. 
 
Recruitment and selection 
 
Educational institutions function as the gateway to the profession, making 
educationalists potential strategic VE operants.  Reid (2007) queries whether, as a social 
work qualified lecturer, he should resist the pressure to register with the GSCC since its 
requirements may be at odds with his competing obligations as a teacher.  Cowburn and 
Nelson (2008) and Nelson and Cowburn (2010) query whether they can ever risk taking 
on a highly suitable student in all other respects but for the fact that she has a criminal 
record.  In the same vein, McLaughlin (2010) argues how, lacking transparency and 
accountability, the regulator's heavy surveillance of students contradicts social work's 
avowed commitment to social justice.  Cowburn and Nelson are raising the fear factor 
and the issue of their integrity as educationalists as to the morally right thing to do.  A 
VE analysis in this situation would surely ask courageous questions about an applicant's 
circumstance, insight, remorse and the learning that has been gained in preparing to 
become a social worker, and not focus solely on the act of criminality itself.  Of course, 
risk-aversive employers may elect not to place such a student even if the educational 
institution is persuaded of her suitability.  
 
In signing up to a viable VE project in relation to formal education, one empirical 
research question relates to whether or not there is any evidence to indicate the presence 
of characteristically motivated social workers out of the 80,000 or so current registrants 
in England.  This raises a critical mass paradox.  Without sufficient numbers of 
righteously indignant people entering the profession and attracted to social work as a 
way of expressing that sentiment, any VE project for practice is likely to be stillborn; 
yet the project is needed all the more if social work becomes increasingly unattractive to 
the right sort of people and increasingly attractive to the wrong sort.  Any remedy must 
surely begin with a critical analysis of initial motivation on entry to training and how 
that ought to be managed. 
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Re-examining some motivational research (American, British and Australian) that I 
surveyed for my critical analytical study, and updating the literature in light of my 
theoretical account of righteous indignation, I find Sweeting's (2006) distinction 
between those who ‘seek’ out social work, those who ‘find’ it, and those who ‘settle’ 
for it, still remarkably apposite.  Typical comparative analyses of social work students 
and non-social work students show that the former are attracted by the opportunity to 
‘work with people’ and the ‘desire to help others’ (for example, Eber and Kunz, 1984; 
Black et al., 1993; Vincent, 1996).  More distinctively, significant life events, parental 
dysfunction and family trauma can also differentiate career choice (Russel et al., 1993; 
Rompf and Royse, 1994; Christie and Weeks, 1998; Parker and Merrylees, 2002).  The 
argument is that such exposure makes some people more sensitive to the needs of others 
to the point of seeking a professional caring career, whether this is because they 
received the right sort of help at the time or did not.  Contact with inspirational social 
workers when in the care system as a child client can motivate, perhaps to give 
something back (Sellers and Hunter, 2005).  
 
Consistent with the idea of righteous indignation, Humphrey's (2006) longitudinal study 
indicates that the main determinant for students positively choosing social work as a 
vocation are life-shaping first, second or even third hand accounts of abuse, disability, 
death, poverty, injustice or prejudice.  Humphrey notes that some students come with 
what I call a cognitive-emotional surplus capacity, enabling them to genuinely feel for 
others in similar situations.  In her opinion it is these who are best received by clients.  
Another type of research looks at personal accounts of career motivation based on 
reflective narratives.  Analysis of such stories leads Cree (2003: 157) to the conclusion 
that ‘there was something about the value base that allowed people to feel more at home 
with themselves’.  As Cree continues, ‘this comes close to the old fashioned idea of 
social work as a vocation or calling'. 
 
Research findings about somewhat mixed motivations to become a social worker, albeit 
altruistically framed, are emerging.  On the one hand, Furness (2007) continues to note 
common themes.  These include making a positive difference to others' lives, working 
with others and with like-minded people, reducing discrimination, helping people to 
reach their potential, improving the lifestyle of those in need, working with people to 
achieve growth and change, and the impact of positive and negative life experiences.  
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On the other hand, secondary explanations such as market factors, job security and 
perceived promotion prospects are being evidenced in some findings (Christie and 
Kruk, 1998).  Anecdotally, relatively low academic entry points and the material benefit 
of bursaries have also adversely impacted in the sense of attracting people driven only 
by those reasons.  
 
Some of the research focuses on the gendered nature of career choice and the relative 
attractions of the profession to women and men.  Sweeting (2006) looks at the 
difficulties of recruitment and retention of male social workers.  He suggests that 
socially constructed inhibitions on men about showing and cultivating care and 
compassion, combined with suspicions as to the motives of those who do, effectively 
perpetuate an uncomfortable balance between masculine and social work identity.  Men 
with families who regard themselves as traditional breadwinners will also find the 
prospect of student poverty unappealing.  
 
The relative dearth of men may give credibility to a core focus on those virtues of 
‘being for the other’, compassion and caring, and the nurturing that traditional gendered 
female roles imply.  Social work training itself usually entails sustained sacrifice of 
personal time and resources.  One might speculate that men aspirants would need to be 
exceptionally strong other-regarding evaluators to negotiate entry and survival.  
Ironically, the premium given to cold abstract formulaic principle might have perhaps 
appealed to more typical male mindsets, inviting re-engagement with Gilligan's (1982) 
controversy with Kohlsberg about emotional intelligence and gendered constructions of 
moral belief formation.  
 
Recent research by another Gilligan (2007) suggests that applicants these days tend to 
view social problems as individually rather than socially caused.  This is hardly 
surprising for a generation exposed to neo-liberal and neo-conservative ideologising, 
illustrating how deeply cuts the epistemological fallacy generated by a culture of late 
modernistic individualism.  However, Gilligan also reports that a number of applicants 
still enter social work for explicit social and political motivations concerned with social 
justice, stopping abuse and protecting others.  On my VE account of suitability and 
readiness, testing out the candidate’s already accumulated repository of righteous 
indignation and her potential for a sophisticated practice towards just generosity should 
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be critical criteria for selection.  Naïve best intentions too deeply engrained can end up 
as ‘disabling help’ (Beckett and Maynard, 2005: 116).  
 
Guggenbuhl-Craig's (1985) veritable account of the inquisitional power of the helping 
professions still offers up a startling reminder: themes of faux altruism mix up self-
healing and self-restitution motifs.  A student's 'readiness to practise' status before the 
first field contact with clients needs to be confirmed through VE evidenced confidence, 
as does her continuing professional suitability throughout the course.  As Lynn (1999) 
points out, social workers must be capable of comprehending the day-to-day practical 
connections between ideals of justice and the delivery of personal caring.   
 
Moriarty and Murray (2005) provide some demographic data as to who does and who 
does not apply for social work.  Open access policies and a wider inclusion agenda have 
allowed social work courses to reach out to the prior disadvantaged and to those with 
suppressed talents, so that we may speak of an admirably motivated institution.  One 
version of this sees social work training as an educational melting pot which will yield 
up a graduand as an 'alloyed good'.  Personal experience of types of discriminations will 
indeed be formative of the individual and the articulation of these in safe learning 
environments educational to all, but this does not mean admission tutors should not 
discerningly appraise a candidate's grasp of her own oppression.  
 
Increasingly these days, people with deeply held religious beliefs see in social work 
again a natural felicitous opportunity to engage with their particular versions of 
spirituality.  A renewed interest in religious and spiritual perspectives and a more 
confident social work pedagogy are beginning to explore this (Bowpitt, 1998; Henery, 
2003; Gilligan and Furness, 2006; Holloway, 2007; Zahl et al., 2007; Gray, 2008; 
Moss, 2008; Whiting, 2008a, 2008b, 2010; Humphrey, 2008; Galloway et al., 2008; 
Crabtree, 2008; Crabtree et al., 2008; Gilligan, 2010).  Religiously inspired students 
may reconnect with our evangelical roots, reaching out to their own spiritual under-
served communities.  However, they may also ignite some dormant tensions regarding 
the clash of liberal and fundamental attitudes, for example, the intrusion once again of 
overt homophobia and patriarchy. 
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My pluralist account of VE motivational theory will recognise the fact that some 
individuals will always make better salespersons than social workers, just as some 
people will also make better nurses or teachers.  One important question is whether in 
order to do it ‘well’, recruitment and selection should be a trained specialist's task and 
not just an annual inconvenience spread around the more or less willingly co-opted.  On 
my VE account, recruitment and selection into the profession must be a well-informed  
(even supersharp) moral decision about who might eventually make a morally active 
practitioner, not an exercise in filling places or meeting course quotas.  The recruitment 
season is usually driven by a default process, eliminating the clearly unworthy but also 
having in mind intake figures.  My account foregrounds a suitability debate about 
acceptable versus unacceptable difference, VE readiness to undertake training, and it 
invites re-examination of the melting pot strategy.  
 
As Ryan et al. (1995) and Clark (1995) pointed out many years ago, the actual 
professional socialisation and formation of social work identity have been thinly 
scrutinised and this lack continues today.  The longitudinal study by Ryan et al. at least 
provides some empirical support for the Dreyfus model of learning (Chapter 5).  Most 
of this type of research has concentrated on homogeneous groups at a particular time 
and place rather than documenting change over a prolonged period.  Manktelow and 
Lewis's (2005) study of the personality attributes of applicants for social work training 
show how selected candidates scored higher on measurements of personal non-
judgmental openness compared to others.  Gibbons et al. (2007) explore how 
psychometric testing of the personal qualities of students prior to their first field 
placement suggests that those who were moderately empathetic, moderately libertarian 
and not narcissistic performed better than those who were extremely judgmental in their 
moral orientation.  Post-qualification, McAuliffe's (2005) study of social workers details 
the short and long-term personal impacts on them (emotionally, behaviourally and 
physiologically) of dealing with ethical dilemmas. 
 
The curriculum  
 
In today's climate, the evidence-based practice movement and vernacular positivism, 
which the profession is encouraged to embrace, pursue research derived interventions 
which sometimes owe as much to state moral posturing as to cost-effectiveness.  This 
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raises the question of what it is that institutions are teaching, not to mention researching.  
The idea of social work training as little more than rote learning of today’s policy, 
backed up by the Code of Practice and sanctified by clients' and carers' cautionary tales 
from the field, is a parody to make the point.  The fugitive's curriculum must foreground 
learning to critically accommodate, rather than to just accept, the world of work and its 
bureau regulation.  At the very least, this will depend on how, and the extent to which, 
educational establishments teach values, and formatively and summatively assess them.  
On my VE account, this is not best done through crude national occupational standards, 
subject benchmarks, tick boxes and the cataloguing of performance indicators.  
 
In Chapter 1, I described the press of orthodox moral theory and the way critical 
decision-making is usually taught.  What is learnt is one matter; how then practised is 
another matter.  As to congruency with a VE position, McAuliffe’s (1999) 'clutching at 
codes' is an insightful account.  In their compilation of different teaching methods and 
ways for students to reflect generally on values, Banks and Nohr (2003) consider the 
virtue ethical character dimension alongside the other standard approaches to moral 
theory.  In contrast to the textbook case typically served up to students, Banks and 
Williams (2005) explore practitioners' own accounts of real dilemmas including the 
qualitative effect of character.  Osmo and Landau (2006) seek to extrapolate the actual 
role of different moral theories from social workers' decision-making accounts.  Gray 
and Gibbons (2007) suggest that there are often no right answers, only choices.  
McAuliffe and Chenoweth (2008), Harrington and Dolgoff (2008) and McAuliffe 
(2010) provide an overview of the literature on models of moral decision-making.  Gray 
(2009) shows how the models depend on moral sources and the view of the world being 
propagated. 
 
Drawing a distinction between basic biological needs and ones based on psychological 
or social needs, Borrmann's (2010: 59) critical realistic model of moral decision-making 
lends itself to the 'golden rule . . . . that there are dilemmas that cannot be solved so 
much as managed'.  A small number of academic pedagogues, for example, Morelock 
(1997), Bowles et al. (2006), Clifford and Burke (2009) and Pullen-Sansfacon (2009) 
are now incorporating virtue ethics in their direct teaching of moral theory to students, 
some expressly using a pedagogy associated with Socratic dialogue.  Banks and 
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Gallagher (2009) outline a diverse range of virtue ethical teaching strategies for both 
professional education and practice.  
 
A number of other educationalists, for example, Heron (2005) and her account of anti-
racist reflexivity, and Burman (2005) for emotional literacy, offer up various critical 
accounts of professional formation which can be adapted for VE purposes.  However, 
learning how to help clients and carers develop their own life-resilient and life-
enhancing virtues has barely infiltrated training.  Van den Bersselaar (2004) suggests 
how structured virtue narratives by clients about their lives can be adopted by students 
in appreciative inquiry.  Clark (2006) reminds us that social workers have always been 
concerned about client moral character, not just our own.  As Clark (2006: 82) says, in 
situations of high personal significance for the client, the social worker is not only a 
conduit of practical assistance but also a personality who, by lived example and 
expressed values, conveys and models approved ways of living, 'even if she does not 
deliberately set out to do so'.  My VE suggests that we ought to and therefore we also 
ought to learn all the better how to.  
 
The main purpose of classroom teaching is to prepare the student for work-based 
experience and assessment of live performance.  This raises the issue of vicious service 
delivery institutions and exposure to them.  VE highlights the pivotal role of work-
based practice educators or practice teachers as mentors and assessors, posing questions 
as to who they should be, what they should do and how they should do it.  My 
discussion of standard learning theory, tacit knowledge formation and the situationist 
challenge (Chapters 5 and 6) is relevant here.  It draws attention to the insufficiency, 
limited range and variable quality of work placements and learning opportunities.  
Forcing a student to copy the poor practices of an agency, being assessed by an equally 
poor work-based supervisor, and perhaps being surrounded by a demoralised team, are 
bad enough; knowingly putting students into such situations is a worse offence. 
 
The chronic resource debates and the pragmatism arguments are familiar enough to 
anyone involved in social work education and training.  A VE framework invites a 
supersharp moral perspective regarding the functions of a moral educator within the 
world of work, and what a minimal VE duty of care towards the student might mean.  
Hurka's account of higher-level V-clauses (Chapter 4) suggests that practice teaching 
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excellence (the nuanced knowledge and skills of role modelling, teaching, enabling, 
mentoring and assessing) will make high demands on any individual in terms of ability 
and commitment.  A practicum with more or less willing but unskilled, unsupported 
practice educators offering inappropriate learning opportunities is surely a vice wrapped 
up as expediency.  The view that a virtuous student will survive, if not thrive, is a little 
too sanguine. 
 
Just how even a specialist teacher-practitioner might nurture the moral 
novitiate/sophomore through to moral licentiate status, as opposed to merely meeting 
occupational standards and following agency procedures through to registration, is a 
moot point.  This is a VE discussion barely begun - a discussion that is presently fixated 
on the practice educator as efficient technocrat.  The (voluntary) Code of Practice for 
Practice Teachers (NOPT, 2004) lists 63 expectations of must do's including such 
banalities as the need to record supervision with students and agree the record (3.6).  It 
contains a routine anti-oppressive opening statement, including the obligation to 
'encourage students to recognise and work towards minimising the effects of structural 
inequality and injustice'.  There is nothing wrong with any of this: it is just that such 
guidance ends where VE practice education should begin.   
 
Issues about placement range, level and type sharpen the moral question about at which 
point a social worker in training should specialise in, and be assessed against, one or 
other client group.  Having an Eriksson-like overview of life from birth to death and an 
awareness of the extra vulnerabilities of putative clients at transitional stages are key to 
morally active practice (Chapter 7).  At the same time, the Slote-Hursthouse-Swanton-
Hurka VE analysis (Chapter 4) suggests that very few of us can ever become a moral 
expert along both the horizontal and vertical dimensions of practice.  The issues of the 
generically qualified social worker and the transition point to specialist require re-
examination in light of my VE framework.  
 
Most of us have a natural specialist disposition towards, and more of a rapport with, one 
client group or the other, making us recursively keener in Hurka's sense to learn more 
about their travails and the causes of them.  Specific client need and recognition of 
human uniqueness require a capacity to fine tune the aim and home in on a precise 
target.  The idea that a qualifying student can commence a first post in childcare without 
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appropriate prior placement experience and associated specialist knowledge is to invite 
yet another high profile tragedy.  Retention strategies involving creation of a sustainable 
career pathway which enables and encourages novices to become advanced 
practitioners are essential (Healy et al. 2009).  Any VE moral supersharpness we 
acquire comes from a dedicated immersion in the particularities of practice.  The 
proposed post-qualification, pre-licence year of protected but assessed practice in one's 
chosen specialism is fully in accord with VE sentiment and reasoning, assuming it will 
be a virtuous employing institution offering the internship.  
 
Interprofessional education 
 
A VE referenced generic/specialist debate invites interrogation of the current 
curriculum requirement for interprofessional learning.  It is routinely argued that shared 
learning automatically makes for something akin to what might be called a vicarious 
fusion of professional horizons.  However, if social work is at core a specific sort of 
ethical endeavour, with its own distinctive aim and target, there is no simple equation 
which makes the mere fact of interaction with other professional care students and their 
own as yet unformed and uninformed identities mutually beneficial.  
 
VE learning is about overcoming moral confusion as to who we once were, who we are 
now, and who we should become, while we travel towards an identity-conferring 
stability standard.  On my VE account, we share other-regarding virtues with other 
professions but their role-specific configuration means that finding the differences 
among the similarities and the similarities among the differences is no easy exercise in 
pedagogy.  It can end up as a counterproductive othering process.  Properly managed 
mixed student action learning sets are a VE compatible way forward in constructing 
shared common ethical space, so long as domain differences and hence unique identity 
are respected.  
 
The actual impact of interprofessional education on knowledge formation and 
attitudinal change is debatable.  While a natural concomitant of the joint health and care 
approach to virtue as exemplified by the Banks and Gallagher (2009) publication, there 
has been little systematic analysis of the impact of interprofessional and 
interdisciplinary working on 'moral order' in social work.  Sharland and Taylor's (2008) 
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systematic research of the literature invites questions about what is actually meant by 
interprofessional learning and its efficacy. 
 
The changing roles of social workers, their physical relocation and the fragmentation of 
service delivery modes have urged a reconsideration of mandated boundaries, forcing 
the profession to recast its distinctive ethical territory.  Spafford et al. (2007) highlight 
how oral transmission, transformation and encodement of client information in 
multidisciplinary settings impact on notions of acceptable uncertainty and risk, and on 
supervision, mentoring and attitudinal shifts.  The directives on interprofessional 
working are as likely to obfuscate role boundaries and responsibilities as to helpfully 
delineate them.  Interprofessional working can make for an abyss in which no individual 
takes personal responsibility, the joint process itself offering up the illusion of moral 
activity.   
 
Each publically dissected tragedy of social work failure batters our self-confidence 
further.  We no longer confidently tread where others fear, and our failures haunt us.  I 
introduced the phenomenon of the bystander effect in Chapter 3: all too often, official 
inquiries routinely find multidisciplinary working with its lack of meaningful 
interprofessional co-operation to be the fault.  Mindful of my cosy moral party illusion, 
just how the virtuous doctor, schoolteacher, police officer, nurse and social worker are 
to communicate and work together successfully requires much deeper consideration.  
Maybe the other professions should first of all lay claim to their own distinctive set of 
specialist virtue modules, as I have attempted to do for social work. 
 
The user and carer movement   
 
Nowadays, as a practical manifestation of the fusion of horizons (Chapter 10), current 
or former clients and carers are, through regulation, routinely involved in recruitment 
and selection of students, teaching, assessment, design, delivery and quality assurance 
of courses.  They form a welcome, if unsettling, additional community within social 
work courses.  The reconstruction of social realities by clients and carers themselves - 
alternative voices that retell stories in terms of lived experience and resistance to 
hegemonic discourse, values and power - impacts powerfully not only on social work 
students but also on course teaching staff and their own identities as educationalists.  
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The gradual shift from notions of passive clienthood and dependency to active 
participation and empowerment are redefining professional relationships and these are 
entering the classroom.  
 
I noted in my critical analytical study that the response to this needs to be more than 
what Parton and O’Byrne (2000) describe as curiosity and respectful puzzlement.  The 
response demands an occupational role re-examination, whether this be as student, 
practitioner or educationalist (Braye and Preston-Shoot, 1995; Sousa and Eusebio, 
2007; Glasby and Beresford, 2007).  An alternative partnership concept has now entered 
the fray, redefining the terms and conditions for equal and meaningful engagement, and 
exposing the ambiguity of words like 'consultant'.  People who receive or are subject to 
services query who authors and who delivers the institutional text, and who 
deconstructs it.  They query the field positions which may be taken in relation to them 
directly and indirectly though the text. 
 
Having been responsible for setting up, training, developing and supporting a national 
group of clients and carers to approve and inspect social work courses, I speak from 
experience.  Many are not willing to enter formal arenas with social workers and 
educationalists, let alone regulators, where the engagement replicates, writ small, 
practices of domination writ large.  We therefore tussle over the contract and the ethical 
space that conjoins us, uncertain whether to share power or to wholly relinquish it.  We 
wrestle with the radical shift of client as passive welfare recipient to active 
commissioner, co-producer, scriptwriter and designer of services (Ferguson, 2007).  The 
'user movement' calls into question dog-eared precepts about being a professional social 
worker and hence also what it is to be a virtuous student and a virtuous lecturer. 
 
We assume that clients and carers have an intuitive feel for what makes a good social 
worker, or more exactly a bad one, and that this particular tacit moral knowledge can be 
transmitted into the classroom.  A capacity to zone in on innate empathy, honesty, 
reliability, trustworthiness and integrity  - those relational properties or their lack - is 
often cited, but does invite further questions as to how an educational institution 
facilitates expression of client and carer knowledge.  Moreover, while naive realistic 
positions assume so, the experience of being or having been cared for or controlled are 
not sufficient conditions for an enterprising and productive partnership.  Certainly, 
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clients and carers may demonstrate courage, fortitude and perseverance in the pursuit of 
social justice; righteously indignant survivors of mental health and residential care 
institutions often advocate for others.  In these cases, the voice of experience is a moral 
voice albeit a far from homogeneous one.  The partnership forum is often a fraught one 
(Yeung and Box, 2008).  While clients and carers can role model virtue, they can also 
be racist, sexist and homophobic, build hierarchies of disabilities, and promulgate 
classed and gendered constructions of reality, just like any one else. 
 
The user movement embraces a wide range of political stances.  In their own dispute 
about the construction of normalcy, ordinariness and vulnerability, some - coalitions of 
'unruly' clients and carers - reject a consumerist/managerialist model of participation, 
intended to simply make delivery more efficiently targeted and which accepts the neo-
liberal and neo-conservative agenda on its own terms.  They argue for a citizenship/ 
humanistic model to effect what it is to flourish holistically, one which seeks to redefine 
need and share ethical space in terms of social solidarities (Beresford and Croft, 2003).  
In doing so, they begin also to redefine professional boundaries and responsibilities in 
ways that question whether a crude consumerist model can really accommodate 
definition of need (Cowden and Singh, 2007). 
 
The alternative VE anti-market moral language I employ - rescue, gift and exchange 
relationship - will not sit comfortably with many.  Healy’s (2002) in-depth interviews of 
social work managers highlight the tensions between social justice principles, which 
once brought people into the profession, and the emerging contexts of social welfare 
management.  The thrust of my thesis is to look askance on a curriculum that is set 
down by the political establishment and which would have students simply genuflect to 
the hegemony.  All this gets played out in any discussion with clients and carers.  
Questions arise about whose voice of experience, what sort of moral expertise is being 
foregrounded, who can claim to speak for whom, and why and how connections 
between personal experience and the bigger picture are made.  
 
Clients and carers who have experienced the sharp, statutory control end of social work 
(exempting perhaps the field of mental health) are the least likely to come forward.  
Dominelli (2002) speaks of an exclusionary othering dyadic process that persists in 
social work.  That can be as true between clients and carers.  Formal partnerships can 
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easily become another them-us version of that moral party of the few.  No doubt, those 
who are hard to reach would take the dialogue regarding moral certainty in hitherto 
unexplored directions.  Engaging in virtue and vice talk with clients and carers requires 
more than co-option of the amicable by the wary.  Even discourse location and territory 
need to be deconstructed.  Warren (2007) offers some practical strategies.  A brave 
course team might step out to set up a partnership forum in a children's home, a nursing 
home or day centre.  I suggest that the old virtues of the settlement movement, reaching 
out to and working alongside the dispossessed in their own localities, are due for re-
examination.  
 
My professional research journey 
 
It is appropriate to conclude any professional thesis with some final personal thoughts.  
My motivation for researching into virtue ethics is made clear in the Introduction.  I 
have endeavoured to conceptualise and propose a framework of value which bridges 
moral philosophy, social work history, social science, theory and practice in order to 
make sense of our crisis of identity and confidence.  In retrospect, having struggled to 
manage the range of material I wished to include, even within the extended words 
granted, I could have concentrated on just one aspect, say the vice of bystanding.  This 
would have made for an easier journey but, until I incorporated the idea of bystanding 
into my thinking and researched the social psychology, that opportunity did not exist.  It 
is but one theoretical theme that awaits to be explored empirically in relation to social 
work failure. 
 
I discarded adapting an idea of an Hegelian master-slave dialectic, freedom and self-
determination, based on my last academic study of philosophy (Webster, 1976), as 
being overly esoteric and one step too far for my present ambition.  That also awaits.  I 
dallied with classic game theory to describe how social work moral judgments might be 
made in situations of uncertainty and also considered distribution of goods theories 
associated with Rawls (2001: 170-188) and Nozick (2001: 189-207).  I have enjoyed 
several other eureka moments, mostly false.  I did not have much of a preconceived idea 
of what to focus on within the VE paradigm at the commencement of my inquiry other 
than a feeling that my original critical analytical survey of the theory was very much a 
beginning effort and at the time the social work literature was inadequate.  I realised 
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that only a deeper and broader theoretical inquiry could begin to find better conceptual 
answers to those problems of practice which motivated me to inquire in the first place.   
 
My VE framework emerged from a cacophony of ideas which I went about filtering and 
seeking to corroborate by further theoretical exploration and appeal to any empirical 
data.  Undertaking a truly systematic review of virtue ethics is nigh on impossible, if 
only because, as I indicated in my Introduction, the subject matter is vast (over two 
millennia of western philosophy to start with).  The paradigmatic wars also require a 
study of relevant psychology and sociology and everything moral pedagogical in 
between.  This brings me on to another conundrum.   
 
Getting the balance right between a dissertation on moral philosophy and one on social 
work has not been straightforward.  I am prone to writing dense text.  As I have 
developed my ideas, I have at least tried to road test some aspects of them with a social 
work audience of practitioners, students, clients and carers (Webster, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
including an open forum debate (Wright and Webster, 2008).  I am grateful for 
feedback regarding content, presentation and accessibility.  Using my VE model on 
myself, I have endeavoured to manage the difference between passion for my interest 
and being angry about my world. 
 
Knowing when to stop reading and discussing has also been difficult.  A number of 
tangential publications have emerged, especially in the last two years while I have been 
delayed in concluding my own work, making me pause and reflect on my own pattern 
of commitments and reasoning and then wanting to modify my own analysis.  
Ferguson's (2008, 2010) 'mobile practices' themes and the Banks and Gallagher (2009) 
publication on virtues appeared during my own formative drafts, covering some of the 
material I was preparing.  Webb (2010b) has just published another cogent social work 
argument for social justice based on moral categories of redistribution and recognition.  
I feel part of a discourse community with my own modest contribution.  Even if 
somebody else proposes something similar, it will be said in a different way and for not 
quite the same reasons. 
 
I have brought to this submission my own professional life experience.  That includes 
the case of the runaway young person who, through the good offices of the local 
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community leader, I persuaded all concerned to put into the care of a sympathetic uncle 
and aunt.  In my very last case as a practitioner, having placed seven children into care 
for their own safety, I was put under police protection because the father threatened to 
shoot me.  My ideas of righteous indignation and just generosity, including the fear 
factor, can be traced to such experiences. 
 
My critique of social work code and regulation stems from my direct hands-on 
management of the GSCC's national quality assurance of social work courses and my 
disillusionment with a regime that I have come to believe is part of the problem.  I now 
share that I had to give reassurance to a worried employer that my thesis ideas could not 
be used as a defence in misconduct hearings.  But for the fortunate misfortune of an 
accident leading to early retirement, I would finally have had to consider my role and 
function within the organisation, which was becoming increasingly untenable. I now 
speak as a fugitive myself, a social worker rather than a regulator. What I have learnt 
from becoming a researcher has been instrumental in that emerging position.  For this 
thesis, I began by trying to recall all that I had forgotten as a postgraduate student of 
moral and political philosophy thirty-five years ago.  The Sussex course has given me 
the words to explore and understand my philosophical discontent with my profession.  
Finding the appropriate field position has been difficult: a theoretical literature-based 
approach has made the research task easier to broker.  
 
As a profession immersed in the realities of clients and carers, social work brings to the 
fore the postmodernist crisis in representation.  I could have chosen to examine and 
project VE through the more explicit lens of one or two critical theorists from the 
outset.  I eventually removed several connecting passages relating to Foucault, Levinas 
and Derrida, traces of whom alongside Deleuze, Badiou and Bourdieu are found 
throughout my text.  While Bauman, Bhaskar and Gadamer are more obviously present, 
my cryptic allusions invite accusations regarding my own eclecticism - as might my 
amalgam of VE theorists.  My defence would be that while avoidance of theoretical 
over-simplification is necessary, a practice of value is far too complex to be explained 
(away) by adherence to one theorist.   
 
Smilansky (2007: 1) quotes Bertrand Russell who claimed that the point of philosophy 
is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end up with 
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something so paradoxical that no one will believe it. In that vein, I began this 
dissertation by criticising our simplistic and piecemeal approach to value discourse, 
making an association with social work failure.  Sending thousands of children of the 
working class poor to Australia to rescue them from the cycle of deprivation was for 
many decades of the 20th century the conventional best practice wisdom.  Only now is 
that episode being reassessed as part of the aftermath of regret.  Today's practices will 
be subject to the same retrospective scrutiny and some, at least, will be found wanting.  
Today's certainty may be tomorrow’s error and today's error may be tomorrow's 
certainty.  This is the only claim to moral knowledge that can be uttered with enduring 
confidence.  
 
No theoretical framework will prevent social work failure.  What is dispiriting is the 
failure to learn - the deadening past repeating itself in the present.  However, if we care 
about who we think we are, a VE framework does at least provide the wherewithal to 
criticise those realities, acknowledge the ever-present prospect of failure and learn little-
by-little.  Swanton (Chapter 8) alerts us to the danger of the separation of role-contoured 
virtue from its prototypical source.  The imperceptible continental drift of our language 
has made for a backwash of disvalue.  The Foucauldian idea of an 'ethics of self', a 
‘rapport a soi’, the kind of relationship one ought to have with oneself, requires a 
language of discourse that is once again truthful to that tradition.  Restoration of lost 
identity is a project only for those to whom it matters.  Any such project must be 
nomadic, mobile and emergent, not static, sedentary, striated, and submissive or 
asphyxiated (Webb, 2008).  Much depends on the mobilisation of words we would use 
to describe how we want to live within our sacred ethical space.  I have proposed a non 
self-effacing standard of righteous indignation, just generosity and value-exchange by 
which we can begin again to measure our worth and hence identity in our own terms.  It 
makes for a peculiar kind of humanistic faith.  Social work is a matter of conscience.  
Paraphrasing Louden (2001: 235), if the essential social worker's question is 'what sort 
of person ought I and can I be?’ rather than ‘what ought I and can I do?’ then 
sophisticated practice will always immerse itself in, and derive its meaning from, the 
paradox of social work itself. 
 
The morally active practitioner is a casuist in the original sense of the term, one who is 
skilled in resolving matters of conscience, deciding how far in a given case an action 
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can be justified, discovering and classifying the exceptions according to the norms laid 
down by society.  As in the modern disparaging sense of casuist, a VE morally active 
practitioner will also invite accusations of sophistry, inevitably so, given that the social 
worker's moral impulse is derived from her inner traits, motives, and dispositions and 
those are 'of the greatest moral importance' (Louden, 1998: 491).  The lost language of 
virtue and vice is a deeply rich, honourable way of speaking about human suffering and 
its alleviation and therefore resonates with social work’s deep, rich and honourable 
tradition.  To know ourselves again we must choose to speak of the virtuous social 
worker and of the viciousness of the world which is the source of all social work value. 
Little-by-little, out of our reclaimed laudatory language might eventually emerge some 
no small victory. 
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Appendix 
 
Classification of Character Strengths 
 
(From Peterson & Seligman, 2004: 29-30, with permission to reproduce from OUP) 
 
 
1. Wisdom and knowledge - cognitive strengths that entail the acquisition and use of 
knowledge. 
 
• Creativity [originality, ingenuity]: Thinking of novel and productive ways to 
conceptualise and do things; includes artistic achievement but is not limited to it 
 
• Curiosity [interest, novelty-seeking, openness to experience]: Taking an interest in 
ongoing experience for its own sake; finding subjects and topics fascinating; 
exploring and discovering 
 
• Open-mindedness [judgment, critical thinking]: Thinking things through and 
examining them from all sides; not jumping to conclusions; being able to change 
one's mind in light of evidence; weighing all evidence fairly 
 
• Love of learning: Mastering new skills, topics, and bodies of knowledge, whether on 
one's own or formally; obviously related to the strength of curiosity but goes beyond 
it to describe the tendency to add systematically to what one knows 
 
• Perspective [wisdom]: Being able to provide wise counsel to others; having ways of 
looking at the world that make sense to oneself and to other people 
 
 
2. Courage - emotional strengths that involve the exercise of will to accomplish goals in 
the face of opposition, external or internal 
 
• Bravery [valour]: Not shrinking from threat, challenge, difficulty or pain; speaking 
up for what is right even if there is opposition; acting on convictions even if 
unpopular; includes physical bravery but is not limited to it 
 
• Persistence [perseverance, industriousness]: Finishing what one starts; persisting in a 
course of action in spite of obstacles; "getting it out the door'; taking pleasure in 
completing tasks 
 
• Integrity [authenticity, honesty]: Speaking the truth but more broadly presenting 
oneself in a genuine way and acting in a sincere way; being without pretence; taking 
responsibility for one's feelings and actions 
 
• Vitality [zest, enthusiasm, vigour, energy]: Approaching life with excitement and 
energy; not doing things halfway or half-heartedly; living life as an adventure; 
feeling alive and activated 
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3. Humanity - interpersonal strengths that involve tending and befriending others 
 
• Love: Valuing close relations with others, in particular those in which sharing and 
caring are reciprocated; being close to people 
 
• Kindness [generosity, nurturance, care, compassion, altruistic love, "niceness"]:  
Doing favours and good deeds for others; helping them; taking care of them 
 
• Social intelligence [emotional intelligence, personal intelligence]: Being aware of the 
motives and feelings of other people and oneself; knowing what to do to fir into 
different social situations; knowing what makes other people tick 
 
 
4. Justice - civic strengths that underlie healthy community life 
 
• Citizenship [social responsibility, loyalty, teamwork]: Working well as a member of 
a group or team; being loyal to the group; doing one's share 
 
• Fairness: Treating all people the same according to notions of fairness and justice; 
not letting personal feelings bias decisions about others; giving everyone a fair 
chance 
 
• Leadership: Encouraging a group of which one is a member to get things done and at 
the same time maintain good relations within the group; organising group activities 
and seeing that they happen 
 
 
5. Temperance - strengths that protect against excess 
 
• Forgiveness and mercy: Forgiving those who have done wrong; accepting the 
shortcomings of others; giving people a second chance; not being vengeful 
 
• Humility / Modesty: Letting one's accomplishments speak for themselves; not 
seeking the spotlight; not regarding oneself as more special than one is 
 
• Prudence: Being careful about one's choices; not taking undue risks; not saying or 
doing things that might later be regretted 
 
• Self-regulation [self control]: Regulating what one feels and does; being disciplined; 
controlling one's appetite and emotions 
 
 
6. Transcendence - strengths that forge connections to the larger universe and provide 
meaning 
 
• Appreciation of beauty and excellence [awe, wonder, elevation]: Noticing and 
appreciating beauty, excellence, and/or skilled performance in various domains of 
life, from nature to art to mathematics to science to everyday experience 
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• Gratitude: Being aware of and thankful for the good things that happen; taking time 
to express thanks 
 
• Hope [optimism, future-mindedness, future orientation]: Expecting the best in the 
future and working to achieve it; believing that a good future is something that can 
be brought about 
 
• Humour [playfulness]: Liking to laugh and tease; bringing smiles to other people; 
seeing the light side; making (not necessarily telling) jokes 
 
• Spirituality [religiousness, faith, purpose]: Having coherent beliefs about the higher 
purpose and meaning of the universe; knowing where one fits within the larger 
scheme; having beliefs about the meaning of life that shape conduct and provide 
comfort 
 
 
